Follow-up Comment #7, bug #64229 (group groff): [comment #6 comment #6:] > I instrumented `macro_diversion::output()` in "div.cpp" and learned that the Linux OOM killer slays the DoS attack proposed in comment #0 at only about 4 million lines of output on my machine. > > While my box isn't supremely specced, that's still 3 orders or magnitude less than INT_MAX, which is the effective maximum "page" length of a diversion.
I misspoke here. I was using `nroff`, and all the terminal devices have a
vertical resolution greater than 1, so the _vertical position_ at OOM death
was 4 million.
This doesn't change the analysis much because the overflow condition (and
computed distance to the next trap) is _also_ divided by the vertical
resolution.
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