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On the cygwin list, it was pointed out that printf("%**s",1,"a","b")
proceeds to try to print "b" with a field width of whatever the integer
value of the pointer to "a" contained (or, in other words, each additional
* consumes another vararg position off the stack). This quickly becomes a
denial of service or even an exploitable security hole. Solaris 10 has
the same behavior.
On the same input, glibc prints "%1*s" and returns 4, rather than failing
with EINVAL. POSIX says results are unspecified if the format string is
not valid.
Is detection of invalid format strings something that we want the gnulib
replacement *printf routines to handle, and if so, what semantics should
we provide in rejecting the bad string?
- --
Don't work too hard, make some time for fun as well!
Eric Blake e...@byu.net
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