From: Haolin Xue <[email protected]> When chown or chgrp is invoked with -RH --preserve-root (and without --from or -h), two distinct bugs allowed '/' to be silently re-owned:
1. TOCTOU race (the originally reported variant): restricted_chown short-circuited and returned RC_do_ordinary_chown when required_uid and required_gid were both -1 (i.e., no --from). The caller then used chownat() by name with flags=0, which follows symlinks. An attacker who can write in a directory being traversed can replace a directory entry with a symlink to '/' between the FTS_D stat and the FTS_DP chown, causing '/' itself to be re-owned silently. 2. Pre-existing symlink (no race needed): with -RH (no -h), a symlink to '/' already present in the traversed tree is dereferenced via fstatat (flags=0, following the symlink) to obtain file_stats, which then holds '/' own dev/ino. The second root guard in change_file_owner only fired when FTSENT_IS_DIRECTORY(ent) was true, but a symlink entry has fts_info=FTS_SL and is not a directory for FTS, so the guard was skipped. restricted_chown then opened the symlink (openat without O_NOFOLLOW follows it), fstat on the fd returned '/' own stat, psame_inode compared '/' to '/' and passed, and fchown re-owned '/'. Fix #1: remove the short-circuit in restricted_chown so that all chown operations go through the openat + fstat + psame_inode + fchown path. If a directory entry was replaced by a symlink during the race window, the inode obtained by fstat on the opened fd will differ from the original stat cached by FTS, psame_inode returns false, and the operation is aborted with RC_inode_changed. Fix #2: remove the FTSENT_IS_DIRECTORY(ent) condition from the second root guard in change_file_owner so that the guard also fires for symlink entries whose dereferenced stat (file_stats) matches '/'. Remove the now-unused FTSENT_IS_DIRECTORY macro definition. Note: the protection in restricted_chown relies on fstat + psame_inode, NOT on O_NOFOLLOW (which is not used in chown-core.c). openat follows symlinks; the TOCTOU defense is the inode comparison between the FTS-cached stat and the fstat of the opened fd. * src/chown-core.c (restricted_chown): Remove early return when required_uid and required_gid are both -1. (change_file_owner): Remove FTSENT_IS_DIRECTORY condition from the root-dev-ino guard so it also protects against dereferenced symlinks-to-/. (FTSENT_IS_DIRECTORY): Remove now-unused macro. * tests/chown/preserve-root.sh: Add regression test for -RH without -h. Reported by SecBuddyF (with Hy4-preview) of Tencent KeenSecurityLab via Anthropic's OSS Scanner. See https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi/bugreport.cgi?bug=82115 --- src/chown-core.c | 15 ++++----------- tests/chown/preserve-root.sh | 23 +++++++++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/chown-core.c b/src/chown-core.c index 4698e27eb..b1875ad3a 100644 --- a/src/chown-core.c +++ b/src/chown-core.c @@ -30,12 +30,6 @@ #include "root-dev-ino.h" #include "xfts.h" -#define FTSENT_IS_DIRECTORY(E) \ - ((E)->fts_info == FTS_D \ - || (E)->fts_info == FTS_DC \ - || (E)->fts_info == FTS_DP \ - || (E)->fts_info == FTS_DNR) - enum RCH_status { /* we called fchown and close, and both succeeded */ @@ -230,9 +224,6 @@ restricted_chown (int cwd_fd, char const *file, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, uid_t required_uid, gid_t required_gid) { - if (required_uid == (uid_t) -1 && required_gid == (gid_t) -1) - return RC_do_ordinary_chown; - int open_flags = O_NONBLOCK | O_NOCTTY; if (! S_ISREG (orig_st->st_mode)) { @@ -406,9 +397,11 @@ change_file_owner (FTS *fts, FTSENT *ent, || required_gid == file_stats->st_gid)); } - /* This happens when chown -LR --preserve-root encounters a symlink-to-/. */ + /* This happens when chown -LR --preserve-root encounters a symlink-to-/, + or when chown -RH --preserve-root encounters a symlink-to-/ in the + traversed tree (the symlink entry is not a directory for FTS, but + file_stats has been dereferenced to point to /). */ if (ok - && FTSENT_IS_DIRECTORY (ent) && ROOT_DEV_INO_CHECK (chopt->root_dev_ino, file_stats)) { ROOT_DEV_INO_WARN (file_full_name); diff --git a/tests/chown/preserve-root.sh b/tests/chown/preserve-root.sh index fea84adc1..a14310aae 100755 --- a/tests/chown/preserve-root.sh +++ b/tests/chown/preserve-root.sh @@ -51,8 +51,14 @@ echo '==== test -RLh' >> out || framework_failure_ chown -RLh --preserve-root "+$(id -u)" d >> out 2>&1 && fail=1 test -n "$id_g" && chgrp -RLh --preserve-root "+$id_g" d >> out 2>&1 && fail=1 -( - cat <<\EOF && +# These must also fail: -RH without -h dereferences a symlink-to-/ found +# in the traversed tree; --preserve-root must catch it (bug#82115). +echo '==== test -RH (without -h)' >> out || framework_failure_ +chown -RH --preserve-root "+$(id -u)" d >> out 2>&1 && fail=1 +test -n "$id_g" && chgrp -RH --preserve-root "+$id_g" d >> out 2>&1 && fail=1 + +{ + cat <<\EOF chown: it is dangerous to operate recursively on '/' chown: use --no-preserve-root to override this failsafe chgrp: it is dangerous to operate recursively on '/' @@ -64,11 +70,20 @@ chmod: use --no-preserve-root to override this failsafe chown: it is dangerous to operate recursively on 'd/slink-to-root' (same as '/') chown: use --no-preserve-root to override this failsafe EOF - { test -z "$id_g" || cat <<\EOF; } + test -z "$id_g" || cat <<\EOF +chgrp: it is dangerous to operate recursively on 'd/slink-to-root' (same as '/') +chgrp: use --no-preserve-root to override this failsafe +EOF + cat <<\EOF +==== test -RH (without -h) +chown: it is dangerous to operate recursively on 'd/slink-to-root' (same as '/') +chown: use --no-preserve-root to override this failsafe +EOF + test -z "$id_g" || cat <<\EOF chgrp: it is dangerous to operate recursively on 'd/slink-to-root' (same as '/') chgrp: use --no-preserve-root to override this failsafe EOF -) > exp || framework_failure_ +} > exp || framework_failure_ compare exp out || fail=1 -- 2.43.0
