On Sat, Oct 16, 2010 at 1:34 PM, Dan Minette <danmine...@att.net> wrote:

> I'm not sure why you think the main argument against letting banks fail is
> false.  It is that the financial system as a whole could have collapsed if
> there was no intervention.

Maybe he thinks it is false because it IS false. A lot of financial
company fat cats screamed for help to their cronies in Washington, and
of course, their old chums came to their rescue. What's a trillion in
taxpayer dollars between friends?

By the way, he said "corporations". Why do you immediately assume he
was referring to banks? I know it is hard to keep track of all the
handouts the politicians gave to their cronies during their bailout
spree, but off the top of my head:

Fannie Mae
Freddie Mac
AIG
Bear Stearns
Citigroup
BoA
GM
Chrysler

Are you seriously going to argue that the failure to bailout all of
those would have led to disaster?

The politicians and their advisors have no clue about what would have
happened without the bailouts. He is an example of the predictive
ability of Obama's financial advisor:

"The paper concludes that the probability of default by the GSEs is
extremely small. Given this, the expected monetary costs of exposure to
GSE insolvency are relatively small -- even given very large levels of
outstanding GSE debt and even assuming that the government would bear
the cost of all GSE debt in the case of insolvency. For example, if the
probability of the stress test conditions occurring is less than one in
500,000, and if the GSEs hold sufficient capital to withstand the stress
test, the implication is that the expected cost to the government of
providing an explicit government guarantee on $1 trillion in GSE debt is
less than $2 million."
--Peter R. Orszag, et al.  "Implications of the New Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac Risk-based Capital Standard," in Fannie Mae Papers, Volume
1, Issue 2, March 2002.

Dan Minette wrote:
>  As it stands, the estimate of the bailout costs are now
> down to $50 billion, as the government sells some of the assents it got in
> the bailout at bargain prices at a higher price.

Still drinking the Kool-aid, I see. I know there is little hope of you
seeing the truth, but I will give it a shot anyway.

The Fed has purchased over $1.5 Trillion in MBSs from Fannie and
Freddie, a large fraction of which are delinquent mortgages and
valued on the books significantly higher than the amount at which the
properties can be liquidated. And there are more big foreclosure waves
coming in late 2010 and in 2011. The FASB has helpfully suspended
rule 157, mark-to-market valuation, until at least 2013, allowing
"substantial discretion" in asset valuation. In other words, the asset
values currently on the books are pure fiction. You can get a decent
idea of the market value of many mortgages by checking the FDIC auctions
of mortgages it obtained from bank takeovers. Most of them are selling
well below 50 cents on the dollar.  What happens after 2012 when the
Treasury backing of the bad GSE loans goes away?

If a corporation engaged in this sort of fraud, the board and officers
would have been put in jail. But when the politicians do it, the gullible
think they are heroes saving the public!

Dan Minette wrote:
> I'm honestly curious what you think would have happened if the government
> did nothing and just let the chips fall where they may.

As I have explained to you before, there is a difference between
allowing the bad companies to fail, and doing nothing. Congress should
have passed emergency legislation streamlining the process for the bad
shareholder and bondholder debt to be stripped away, allowing the
solvent operating portion of the companies to be sold off, thus
allowing the useful portions of the companies to continue operating,
while properly penalizing the shareholders and bondholders who
imprudently allocated their capital.

I'll conclude with an excerpt from Ben Bernanke's Humphrey-Hawkins
testimony before Congress in July. He was questioned by New Jersey
Congressman Scott Garrett  of the House Financial Services Committee.

SCOTT GARRETT: You bought over a trillion dollars of GSE debt, and to
that point, under normal circumstances, on the Fed's balance sheet
what you have on there are Treasuries, or if you had anything else on
there, I assume you would have a repurchase agreement for those
securities on your balance sheet. Now of course around two-thirds of
that are in GSE debt.

BEN BERNANKE: Correct.

GARRETT: So right now, those are guaranteed - whether they're
sovereign debt or not, we don't know - but they're guaranteed by the
U.S. government. But they're only guaranteed to when? 2012, right?
After that, Congress may in its wisdom make another decision, and at
that point in time, you may be holding on your balance sheet - two
thirds of your balance sheet - something that is not guaranteed by the
Federal government. First of all, you don't have a ... do you have a
repurchase agreement on those with anyone? No.

BERNANKE: I don't know what you mean by a repurchase agreement. We own
those securities.

GARRETT: You own those securities. Right. So there is no repurchase
agreement outside to buy them back. You own them.

BERNANKE: Right.

GARRETT: So after 2012, if they're no longer guaranteed, is it fair to
say that you may at that point in time actually engage in fiscal
policy, because you basically are creating money at that time? And I
know that you'd agree that it would be an unconstitutional role for
the Fed to engage in fiscal policy - so where will you be at 2012 if
they had to take a haircut on those because they're no longer
guaranteed?

BERNANKE: Well, first from the government's perspective, I, uh, such
an act would, uh, there would, the Federal Reserve would lose money
which the Treasury would gain. There would be no overall change to the
position of the U.S. government. Secondly, the Federal Reserve act
explicitly gives..

GARRETT: How would we be gaining? How is the Treasury gaining?

BERNANKE: Well, if there's a bad mortgage and the Treasury.. it
requires $10 to make it good, if the Treasury refuses to do that then
the Fed loses $10, so one way or another the government's going to
lose $10. But I would just say two things, one is that I think, uh...

GARRETT: But if you didn't purchase them in the first place, it would
just be a total - then what would have occurred? There would not have
been the creation of that $10. Now that you've purchased them, and in
essence if we don't back them up, then you will have created that
additional $10.

BERNANKE: Well, I hope that doesn't happen, because I think it's very
important for financial stability and confidence that we, that we
guarantee...

GARRETT: Let's play out that hypothetical that it does happen.

BERNANKE: Well, then the Fed would lose money there. But let me just
point out that the Federal Reserve Act, that we did not invoke any
emergency or unusual powers to buy those agencies. It is explicitly in
the Federal Reserve Act that we can buy Treasuries or agency
securities and so we did not do anything unusual there.

GARRETT: In what status were they when you bought them? Were they in
conservatorship at that point?

BERNANKE: Um, yes.

GARRETT: Is it normal practice for the Fed to buy agency securities
when they're in conservatorship? Was that ever done before?

BERNANKE: It's never been in conservatorship before.

GARRETT: Well, there you go. So the normal practice is not what was
followed here. It just seems to me that we may have gone down a
different road than we've ever gone down in U.S. history, where the
Federal Reserve has engaged in buying a security, it's not Treasury,
it's not guaranteed by the full faith and credit of the United States
for its lifetime, nor is there any repurchase agreement from any other
entity that you purchased - that you have a trade with an agreement
with - and that the Fed in essence could have created money if the
government does not guarantee them. At least, that could be the
situation we could find ourselves in 2012.

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