> I feel sorry for the victims, but wasn�t here an alarm, calling
> for evacuation from the city _3 days_ before Katrina hit?
Going to the National Hurricane Center Archives, we see that that,
3 days before it hit, it was a minimal hurricane (75 mph winds)
... The probability of being within ~125 km of New Orleans when
it hit land was estimated at only 8%.
As far as I can see, this is correct but misleading.
Emergency preparedness is helped by prior warning, but must work even
when there is no warning.
According to the St. Petersburg, FL, USA, Times
http://www.sptimes.com/2005/08/30/State/For_forecasting_chief.shtml
At 11 p.m. Friday, more than two days before Katrina reached land,
the hurricane specialists [at the US National Hurricane Center]
said the hurricane would make landfall in the bayous of Louisiana,
east of New Orleans. ... They were off by 18 miles.
No one, much less themselves, believed such a prediction. However,
the news story continues
On Saturday night, Mayfield was so worried about Hurricane Katrina
that he called the governors of Louisiana and Mississippi and the
mayor of New Orleans. On Sunday, he even talked about the force of
Katrina during a video conference call to President Bush at his
ranch in Crawford, Texas.
Put another way, in advance, serious warning was available of a
disaster equivalent to a nuclear, chemical, or radiological attack
against the city.
The warning about Hurricane Katrina was taken sufficiently seriously
that on Sunday, 28 August 2005, the flow on inward-heading lanes on an
interstate highway was reversed so that cars could could evacuate New
Orleans more readily. In addition, the United States navy prepared at
least one nearby ship for help, although it was forbidden to and did
not act until US President Bush gave it permission a day or two later.
Since emergency preparedness is helped by prior warning, but must work
even when there is no warning, supplies and exercises must come ahead
of time.
In the Kennedy and to a lesser extent in the Eisenhower
administrations, civil defense people made plans for city evacuation.
I remember them. Civil defense people stowed supplies both for
evacuees and for locals.
Moreover, they also made plans for an event for which warning was
short or effectively non-existant: radar seeing missles coming over
the pole or seamen seeing the wave or flash from a hydrogen bomb
explosion coming from a device laid down on the seabed near a major
port, such as New Orleans.
(Such seabed weapons were later banned by treaty. In the 1960s, the
US government figured that the Soviet government felt them to be more
reliable and accurate than warheads carried by rockets, but with much
worse command and control characteristics. Besides submarines, they
could be laid by Soviet `fishing trawlers' in international waters,
like the one I saw `close by' Cape Cod. It was a clear day; an
experienced man told me that the ship was probably about 12 miles (20
km) out in international waters.)
In addition to the local school, civil defense stored Geiger counters
and other supplies in the basement of the town hall. I tested the
Geiger counters every few years from the early 1960s through the early
1980s. (They and their batteries, stored separately but in the same
boxes, continued to work. The other supplies, in unopened containers,
looked fine, too. I was impressed.)
Obviously, a Soviet nuclear attack did not occur: so the US never made
use of the defense actions associated with one. But people in the US
could be and are harmed by more than the former Soviet Union.
People are hurt by hurricanes. This is important for the `common
defense' (to use a phrase that is important in American history).
There is a distinction between the concepts of `typical' and `normal'
that is based on time scale:
`Typically', New Orleans is not hit or nearly hit by hurricanes.
`Normally', New Orleans is hit or nearly hit once in a while.
This distinction is important. It has been known for years that New
Orleans is hit or nearly hit by a hurricane once in a while, even
though hurricanes are not typical.
Thus many of the same actions from civil defense a long time ago still
apply.
Supplies that may not be used in their lifetimes produce an issue.
But that issue has been a part of government for centuries. In the
Middle Ages, for example, the governments of European city-states
stored supplies. Many of the powers-that-were handled the corruption
associated with their purchase and storage.
With or without warning, exercises tell us more, like the one called
`Hurrican Pam' that was held for New Orleans.
Besides the need to evacuate people unable to drive or lacking cars,
besides people who stay, besides looting and shooting, besides pumps
under water, and the like, such an exercise tells us that city
flooding causes the equivalent of biological, chemical, and
radiological attacks. Sewage plants are flooded, under-the-sink and
other chemicals enter into the water. Radioactive materials from
industries and hospitals are washed outside their buildings.
Thus, in addition to the geo-strategic concerns for a region that
handles bulk US imports and exports, such as US soybean and corn,
New Orleans and surrounding areas must be decontaminated.
Each of these problems results in human suffering and death.
--
Robert J. Chassell
[EMAIL PROTECTED] GnuPG Key ID: 004B4AC8
http://www.rattlesnake.com http://www.teak.cc
_______________________________________________
http://www.mccmedia.com/mailman/listinfo/brin-l
