On May 20, 2005, at 11:42 AM, Dan Minette wrote:
From: "Warren Ockrassa" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
On May 16, 2005, at 7:34 PM, JDG wrote:
At 07:03 PM 5/16/2005 -0700, Warren wrote:
The problem there is that your reasoning does not reduce. There is a
distinct difference between, say, a blastocyst and an infant. The
question is not even when the zygote becomes "human". The question
is
what "human" actually means.
If the answer is "homo sapiens" its actually a rather easy question.
It's the easiest answers of which we should often be most suspicious.
In one sense, yes, but in another sense, no. If the answer is
straightforward within our scientific understanding of the world, then
the
simple answer is usually considered the best.
Naturally. And if all we're seeking is a genetic definition, then the
simple answer is more than sufficient. However I believe I've made it
more than clear that the genetic answer is far from sufficient in this
case, and I don't find it satisfactory.
Expressed another way, what exactly does the simple genetic answer
*mean*?
I'd argue that human societies have, for a number of convenient
reasons,
denied the humaness of the "other."
Sooth.
For a number of reasons, and even when
the genetic differences are extremely small (as with the Irish vs. the
English), it was "common sense" that the "other" was so different as to
render than inherently less than one's own group.
As Nick has pointed out obliquely, this labeling of "other"s is a
commonplace in *all* religious traditions as well.
As I suggested in my note to Dan, extending the epithet "human" to
every member of the species is an ideal and nothing more; in reality
we
barely allow that label to be placed on fellow countrymen with whom we
do not agree, let alone other cultures.
I would argue that this is denying the humanness of others. Homo
sapients
are human is a tatology, human is simply a common word for homo
sapient. It
is considered a critical first step in promoting atrocities....denying
that
those who are about to be killed, tortured, enslaved, etc. are humans
like
those who are doing the killing, the torturing, etc., and therefore the
actions are acceptable I'd argue that this is the easy answer...that
what
one wishes to do for selfish reasons really doesn't violate any
ethics. It
is easy to promote war by dehumanizing the enemy. It's much harder to
justify wars that involve the killing of innocent people, just like
your
kids.
Your conclusion, interestingly, is almost exactly the opposite of mine,
even though we start from the same premise. My conclusion is that,
since it's abundantly clear that no one is innately of greater or
lesser worth than anyone else, the very worst thing we can do is
proceed as though our definitions of what "human" means make any
absolute sense, that we can ascribe the trait of humanness to some and
not to others -- that in fact arbitrary assignment of value is what we
do *all the time*, and therefore we *must* remain conscious -- as much
as possible -- of how any action we might take can adversely affect
others.
If you look at some of the arguements given for blacks being sub-human,
Native Americans being sub-human, the Irish being sub-human, you get a
number of counterfactuals that are believed and are used to "prove" the
point.
Yes, which is why, of course, any such arguments should be viewed with
suspicion. This is no different from whatever line of unreasoning is
followed internally to transform a person from simply a person to The
Enemy, He Who Is Not As I Am And Therefore Must Be Killed. The line of
unreasoning can be a declaration from a holy writ, a holy personage or
even a lowly president.
Is a one-week-old zygote human? Genetically, sure, maybe even
potentially. Actually? I don't think the question is so easily
answered. Same for someone who's completely brain dead and on life
support. Now, how about a third trimester fetus? Or someone in a PVS
who appears to evince consciousness in rare and random ways? Those
questions should be even more difficult to answer.
Why aren't they human?
Umm, Dan? Have you *read* my other discussions? Do you understand that
I reject the idea of a "real" definition of what "human" is, because
there are so many shades of meaning to the term that cannot be
addressed easily, particularly with a facile application of a genetic
category?
The question, in the context of what I've stated on this topic, is
meaningless.
I think that your "soft" definition of human,
instead of one based on a reasonable scientific classification, is
really
the answer to another question. "Which beings deserve to be treated as
I
want to be treated because they are my peers?"
That is not a declaration of my perspective, nor do I believe I implied
it to be so; the question is more along the lines of "What exactly do
we mean by human, what impact can that definition have on society and
on individuals, and how can we apply the awareness of these plastic
issues to a particular set of circumstances?"
That is a non-emperical
question, unlike the question of humanness. It is strongly related to
another non-emerical question "which beings have self-awareness, as I
do."
Not exactly. You've really oversimplified the question, or perhaps not
fully caught what I'm suggesting, which has led you to several
misunderstandings, I think. The related question is *really* "What is
self-awareness, and how can we attribute it to ourselves, let alone
deny it in others?"
Neither of these questions can be answered scientifically. No model of
obsevables requires the inclusion of the existance of a
non-observable. I
do not and cannot see your self awareness. Logical positivism tried
to use
language to get around this, but Wittgenstein did a very good job of
showing that reference to language is not an out. We do not see each
others "beetles in boxes."
Precisely, which is why this facile definition of "human" -- actually
*any* facile definition of "human" -- is unsatisfactory to me. The
question is not just about cladism; it is about meaning.
Look at it this way. We can define, with great precision, precisely
what an orange is. We can talk about chemical makeup, we can talk about
wavelengths of reflected light and the descent of the orange tree in
plant evolution; we can even discuss the history of oranges and how
Anita Bryant related to them at one time.
None of these things, however, can describe the experience of peeling,
smelling and *eating* an orange. The "meaning" of orange is in some
ways addressed, but the *experience* or "deeper" meaning of orange is
something else entirely.
So when I talk about what "human" means, I am not talking about the
stuff that can be measured. Which is why I keep coming back to
rejection of rigid definitions. They simply aren't adequate to sum the
*experience*.
Until we can find or agree on a true, working definition of "human",
then, it seems very clear to me that there are some grey areas to
which
no law should be applied, because there will always be some cases in
which those laws are inappropriate or insufficient to address
circumstances.
The problem with this is that the "grey areas" are applied
arbitrarily...not based on anything systematic. A 2 month preme is
human,
a 2 week overdue fetus is not human when she has partially emerged,
but is
fully human only when it fully emerges (I don't think he has to
actually
breath, but I'm not positive).
Who is applying those delineations? You seem to be of the opinion that
late-term abortions are performed callously, easily and without any
sort of regard for the life of the fetus, yet the numbers simply do not
back up your beliefs. One in 25,000 is *not* a glut of late-term
abortions, and seems to put to the test your apparent beliefs that such
procedures are both commonplace and conducted with a casualness on par
with donning a condom or applying a contraceptive hormone patch.
So, in conclusion, I think we should accept human as the common name
for
homo sapient. This allows us to focus on what the real questions are:
do
all humans have rights?
No, it refocuses the discussion, allowing you to start implying that
those who do not accept *your* definition are denying "rights" to
various individuals. That is, those of us who don't accept the shallow
genetic definition of "human" are somehow guilty of *something* -- it
might be callousness, or arrogance, or blindness, or fuzzy thinking, or
whatever is convenient for you to denigrate -- but whatever it is,
we're neither as clear-headed nor as ethically strong as those who
extend "human" as a definition to anything within a given gene space.
Sorry, Dan, but the discussion can't proceed, as I indicated before,
until we're able to agree on what "human" means in the first place.
And
When is it acceptable for individuals and/or society to limit these
rights
or take actions that would infringe on these rights? (e.g. even though
humans have the right of liberty, we can put murderers in jail.)
Turning the formulation around on the one proposing it, a rephrase
might be, "When is hypocrisy acceptable?" If one suggests that *all*
members of a gene space can be glibly defined as "human", obviously
abrogation of what we call "human rights" is hypocrisy.
--
Warren Ockrassa, Publisher/Editor, nightwares Books
http://books.nightwares.com/
Current work in progress "The Seven-Year Mirror"
http://www.nightwares.com/books/ockrassa/Flat_Out.pdf
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