This week's issue of The Economist is particularly outstanding.   Among the
more notable articles is an accounting of a fascinating study which
concluded that human evolution has led to longer female lifespans in recent
history.    

Another article is the following fascinating review of Hans Blix's new book
from The Economist..... this article speaks for itself and includes lots of
juicy tidbits.   

JDG


 http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=2498679

Iraq and weapons of mass destruction 

A disarming tale

Mar 11th 2004 
>From The Economist print edition


Without Saddam Hussein's co-operation, it was impossible to be sure that
Iraq had dismantled its weapons programme. That was the problem


Disarming Iraq: The Search for Weapons of Mass Destruction
By Hans Blix
Pantheon; 285 pages; $24.
Bloomsbury; �16.99



DAYS before America, Britain and the other coalition partners launched
their attack on Iraq last year, Hans Blix, the United Nations' chief
weapons inspector, met Amr Moussa, the head of the Arab League. Mr Moussa
was planning to visit Baghdad in a last-ditch effort to avoid a war. In the
end, he never went. But Mr Blix had suggested a two-fold message for the
man he dubbed �the emperor of Mesopotamia�: that the only chance to avoid
an onslaught was for Saddam Hussein to make the long-refused �strategic
decision� to tell all about his weapons or weapons programmes; and that, if
it came to a fight, Iraq must refrain from any use of chemical or
biological weapons. Otherwise, people who now opposed armed action would
say the action had been proved justified.

In his new book, Mr Blix makes clear that he was one of those who opposed
the use of force. He regrets that inspectors were not given more time to
try disarming Iraq peacefully. In the light of the subsequent failure to
find stocks of chemical or biological weapons, he is critical of George
Bush and Tony Blair for over-selling the immediacy of the threat. And he
thinks they were anyway wrong to start such a war without explicit UN backing.

Yet, as his chat with Mr Moussa showed, and despite finding no more than a
few empty chemical shells himself, Mr Blix at the time also had a �gut
feeling� that Iraq still had weapons hidden away and was up to no good.
And, for all the frantic attempts by Iraqi officials to fend off force, Mr
Blix is clear that they never provided the �immediate, active and
unconditional� co-operation that the Security Council had demanded,
unanimously, the previous November in resolution 1441.

That resolution had given Iraq a �final opportunity� to disarm or show what
it had done with its weapons. All documents relating to nuclear, chemical,
biological and missile programmes and research, whether military or
civilian, were to be given up. Iraq failed to do any of this. Its
12,000-page declaration a month later did not answer any of Mr Blix's
outstanding questions. Yet most council members still opposed using force.
So what had been the point of 1441? And what could more inspections have
hoped to achieve?

As Mr Blix acknowledges, inspectors would not have been in Iraq at all
without the build-up of American and British troops on its borders. Yet Mr
Bush had made quite plain to the UN General Assembly in September that his
goal was not simply to get inspectors back (after four years' absence), but
to ensure Iraq's proper disarmament, with the UN or, if necessary, without
it. Thus to America, after 12 years of Iraqi defiance, 1441 was indeed the
final ultimatum. Yet the French, concluding that America was now bent on
war no matter what, dug in their heels.

>From his dealings with American officials, Mr Blix saw it differently. Had
Saddam Hussein responded, he argues, the military build-up would have been
slowed, or stopped. Yet, like France, Germany and Russia, he wanted more
time for the inspectors. Force might be contemplated at some point, but not
now. Why couldn't these differences be bridged? 

Mr Blix accepts that the military force built up to pressure Iraq into
admitting the inspectors, once at full strength, could not be held
indefinitely through the summer heat. He skates more lightly over why the
rift in the Security Council became so bitter. The main reason was that the
big players had all been through this before. During earlier inspections in
the mid-1990s, trust had broken down badly in the council when first Russia
and China, then France, tiring of mounting Iraqi intransigence, argued for
a switch to less intrusive monitoring and an easing of sanctions so that
trade could resume. The inspection regime collapsed. Now the same countries
were espousing inspections they had once deemed no longer necessary, in a
way that, to American eyes at least, again hindered proper enforcement of
Iraq's obligation to disarm.

Yet Mr Blix is clear about the main reason why military preparations
eventually outpaced fraught diplomacy�Iraq's own obduracy. It did
eventually make the process of inspection easier, and allowed the
destruction of some illegal missiles, but this was far too little, and too
late.

Have inspections since been vindicated? Mr Blix points out that the UN had
succeeded in disarming Iraq, only without knowing it. But that is the
difficulty. Without ready Iraqi co-operation, of the sort Libya has shown
in giving up its illicit weapons and missiles, how would anyone have known
it. Iraq gave every indication of hiding something. 

And indeed it was. The American-led inspectors who have been combing Iraq
since the war have found materials, documents and evidence of research
programmes that should have been handed over to the UN. They have also
uncovered efforts, unknown to Mr Blix and his team, to acquire illegal
far-flying missiles with help from North Korea and companies in Russia. Why
would Saddam Hussein pay millions for missiles if he had no powerful
warheads to put on them? Like so much about Saddam's Iraq, this is a
mystery. But Mr Blix's hunch before the war, that he was up to no good,
wasn't far wrong.

Disarming Iraq: The Search for Weapons of Mass Destruction. 
By Hans Blix. 
Pantheon; 285 pages; $24. 
Bloomsbury; �16.99 

_______________________________________________________
John D. Giorgis         -                 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
               "The liberty we prize is not America's gift to the world, 
               it is God's gift to humanity." - George W. Bush 1/29/03
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