http://www.pbs.org/now/transcript/transcript_hersh.html

Transcript: Jane Wallace Interviews Seymour Hersh

JANE WALLACE: Thank you for joining us. 

SY HERSH: Glad to be here. 

JANE WALLACE: It might be safely said that the one country for whom the
war on terror has been a bombless bonanza is Pakistan. In a matter of two
weeks they went from being an international pariah, to being our new best
friend. 

The aid started flowing. It is flowing in the billions. Are they worthy
of our friendship and our aid, the Pakistanis? 

SY HERSH: In a perfect world, sure, it would be great if Musharraf, the
head of the country can hold it together and they can become secular. And
we can avoid having an Islamic republic with a lot of nuclear weapons.
But it's dicey. 

JANE WALLACE: What kind of dicey? 

SY HERSH: I think it's a losing game. I think it's a losing game and I
think there's a lot of evidence that Musharraf is certainly much more
interested in his own survival than ours. I can't give you chapter and
verse of things. He came to American when and when there was tremendous
concern about the fate of Danny Pearl, the WALL STREET JOURNAL reporter. 

And he was here about a week or so before it became known that Pearl was
dead. And the whole time, we later learned, that he was here, when he was
saying, you know telling us that he was doing everything he can. He was
sure he was alive. He knew that Pearl was dead. We now know that. We knew
he was deceiving us. 

JANE WALLACE: How do we know that? 

SY HERSH: Because-- 

JANE WALLACE: Time of death on Pearl? 

SY HERSH: More than that. There's-- we were able to unravel a lot of
information, WALL STREET JOURNAL reporters and others about when he died.
And there was, if you remember, there's been a trial. And everything that
showed up in the trial indicated that-- witnesses told about telling the
government things-- weeks before we thought they had. 

JANE WALLACE: There is a man facing death, facing hanging, Saeed Sheikh,
in the murder of Daniel Pearl. Saeed Sheikh is reported, in various
quarters, to have been an ISI Pakistani intelligence agent. 

SY HERSH: Asset. Yeah. 

JANE WALLACE: Do you believe that? 

SY HERSH: This certainly is a case when he gave up, he turned himself in
basically eventually to ISI and-- who-- not-- not right away, but pretty
immediately. He turned a-- he was made available to the ISI and they
debriefed him first. 

JANE WALLACE: Why would he turn himself in to Pakistani intelligence as
opposed to the police? 

SY HERSH: There's no question he has some connection. There's no question
he had some deep standing-- long standing connection to Pakistani
intelligence. 

JANE WALLACE: Now let me draw the picture ... If in fact he has a deep
long standing connection to Pakistani intelligence, we are supporting a
government that has some responsibility in the murder of an American
reporter?

SY HERSH: What can you do? 

JANE WALLACE: Let's talk about Konduz. During the war with Afghanistan-- 

SY HERSH: Great story. 

JANE WALLACE: -- you reported that during a key battle our side in that
battle had the enemy surrounded. There were a reported perhaps 8,000
enemy forces in there. 

SY HERSH: Maybe even more. But certainly minimum that many. 

JANE WALLACE: It's your story, take it. 

SY HERSH: Okay, the cream of the crop of Al Qaeda caught in a town called
Konduz which is near ... it's one little village and it's a couple
hundred kilometers, 150 miles from the border of Pakistan. And I learned
this story frankly-- through very, very clandestine operatives we have in
the Delta Force and other very... 

We were operating very heavily with a small number of men, three, 400
really in the first days of the war. And suddenly one night when they had
everybody cornered in Konduz-- the special forces people were told there
was a corridor that they could not fly in. There was a corridor sealed
off to-- the United States military sealed off a corridor. And it was
nobody could shoot anybody in this little lane that went from Konduz into
Pakistan. And that's how I learned about it. I learned about it from a
military guy who wanted to fly helicopters and kill people and couldn't
do it that day. 

JANE WALLACE: So, we had the enemy surrounded, the special forces guys
are helping surround this enemy. 

SY HERSH: They're whacking everybody they can whack that looks like a bad
guy. 

JANE WALLACE: And suddenly they're told to back off-- 

SY HERSH: From a certain area-- 

JANE WALLACE: -- and let planes fly out to Pakistan. 

SY HERSH: There was about a three or four nights in which I can tell you
maybe six, eight, 10, maybe 12 more-- or more heavily weighted--
Pakistani military planes flew out with an estimated-- no less than 2,500
maybe 3,000, maybe mmore. I've heard as many as four or 5,000. They were
not only-- Al Qaeda but they were also-- you see the Pakistani ISI was--
the military advised us to the Taliban and Al Qaeda. There were dozens of
senior Pakistani military officers including two generals who flew out. 

And I also learned after I wrote this story that maybe even some of Bin
Laden's immediate family were flown out on the those evacuations. We
allowed them to evacuate. We had an evacuation. 

JANE WALLACE: How high up was that evacuation authorized? 

SY HERSH: I am here to tell you it was authorized � Donald Rumsfeld who �
we'll talk about what he said later � it had to be authorized at the
White House. But certainly at the Secretary of Defense level. 

JANE WALLACE: The Department of Defense said to us that they were not
involved and that they don't have any knowledge of that operation. 

SY HERSH: That's what Rumsfeld said when they asked him but it. And he
said, "Gee, really?" He said, "News to me." Which is not a denial, it's
sort of interesting. You know, 

JANE WALLACE: What did we do that? Why we would put our special forces
guys on the ground, surround the enemy, and then-- fly him out? 

SY HERSH: With al Qaeda. 

JANE WALLACE: With al Qaeda. Why would we do that, assuming your story is
true? 

SY HERSH: We did it because the ISI asked us to do so. 

JANE WALLACE: Pakistani intelligence. 

SY HERSH: Absolutely. 

JANE WALLACE: Yeah. 

SY HERSH: Yeah. That's why. You asked why. Because we believe Musharraf
was under pressure to protect the military men of � the intelligence
people from the military, ISI, that were in the field. The Pakistanis
were training the Taliban, and were training al Qaeda. 

When the war began, even though this is-- again, you know, this is
complicated. Musharraf asked, as a favor, to protect his position. If we
suddenly seized, in in the field, a few dozen military soldiers,
including generals, and put them in jail, and punished them, he would be
under tremendous pressure from the fundamentalists at home. 

So, to protect him, we perceive that it's important to protect him, he
asked us-- this is why when I tell you it comes at the level of Don
Rumsfeld, it has to. I mean, it does. He asked-- he said, "You've got to
protect me. You've got to get my people out." 

The initial plan was to take out the Pakistani military. What happened is
that they took out al Qaeda with them. And we had no way of stopping it.
We lost control. Once there planes began to go, the Pakistanis began--
thousands of al Qaeda got out. And so-- we weren't able to stop it and
screen it. The intent wasn't to let al Qaeda out. It was to protect the
Pakistani military. 

SY HERSH: What else can you do? We need the idea of some sort of country
as a bulwark to what's going-- look, Afghanistan is smoking today. You
know if you want another reality, the reality that nobody wants to hear
about is that probably from Khandhar to Jalalabad and all of the southern
part of Afghanistan is cowboy and Indian territory. 

It's ISI. It's Taliban. It's Pashtun. Some al Qaeda. You know you don't
find our troops-- a little bit in-- on the coast near-- you know in the
north-- the northern territories. We're-- it's-- we have un-- we're--
we're really at square one even in Afghanistan. 

JANE WALLACE: Okay, I'm gonna slow you down because you know your
material very well. The northwestern part of Pakistan-- 

SY HERSH: Right. 

JANE WALLACE: --that borders on Afghanistan now is where the-- the al
Qaeda forces are said to be regrouped? 

SY HERSH: Along with Kashmir. They probably are there too. 

JANE WALLACE: Yes. This is where some of our American troops-- we have
about 8,000 left in Afghanistan, are facing some of the heaviest fighting
they've seen in a year. 

SY HERSH: The forces that are seeing heavy fighting are a few special
forces that are there and some elite units from the 82nd Airborne. Most
of our troops are just guarding bases. But we have some elite units in
contact. Yes. 

JANE WALLACE: What you're saying is that then part of the forces our guys
are facing are forces that are being supported by or intermixed with
Pakistan intelligence which is a government we support. And al Qaeda,
which is supported by a government we support. In other words we're doing
battle with ourselves to some degree? 

SY HERSH: I'll make it better. We have reason to think, from
intelligence-- I haven't written this that-- that the Saudi's are
financing some of this all the way. 

JANE WALLACE: Financing what? 

SY HERSH: Saudi's put a lot of money into Pakistan to religious aspects.
I'm not saying the Saudi's necessarily-- the Saudi government knows that
the money they're putting in is ending up supplying the forces that are
in contact with our forces in the northern territories. But the fact is
the Saudi's are still a supplier of a great deal of funds to Pakistan.
We've got a country that's teetering on the edge, we don't want Pakistan
to go Islamic. We don't want the weapons to get out of control. 

JANE WALLACE: How exactly did the Pakistanis acquire nukes? 

SY HERSH: They stole the technology from Europe-- to-- basically-- they
used enriched uranium, Enriched uranium makes as perfectly a good a bomb
as plutonium without a big nuclear reactor that anybody can see and-- and
get intelligence on. They began turning out warheads. We now know I-- as
they say, we estimate up to 40-- and that's just a rough guess. 

JANE WALLACE: Forty warheads means what in terms of destructive power? 

SY HERSH: Well, it depends the average warhead probably-- takes out New
York. A good chunk of New York. 

JANE WALLACE: So forty warheads is a lot-- 

SY HERSH: Yeah. 

JANE WALLACE: --for a country the size of Pakistan? 

SY HERSH: I would say one isn't a lot if you can fire it. Yes, if you
know how to do it and-- and-- it's a lot. They-- 

JANE WALLACE: So formidable, especially in a third-world country where
we're not entirely sure-- 

SY HERSH: It could-- 

JANE WALLACE: --who's in charge of the switch? 

SY HERSH: Well, we'd like to think that the military and Musharraf is in
charge of the switch. That makes us very happy to think that. That's the
whole issue. The issue is making sure and reinforce Musharraf being in
charge of the switch, which-- 

JANE WALLACE: But the-- 

SY HERSH: It's-- 

JANE WALLACE: --on the-- 

SY HERSH: --it's a-- 

JANE WALLACE: -- issue-- 

SY HERSH: --it's a crap game. It's a roll of the dice. That's what it is.


JANE WALLACE: You reported recently that not only do the Pakistanis have
the nukes, the international community knew that. That's why they were
ostracized for many years, because they wouldn't stop developing their
own nuclear program. So they were blackballed by the rest of the world.
Forget it, we're not trading with them anymore. 

They were in that position when 9/11 struck. Not only do they have these
nuclear weapons, but then they go one further to put it in our face and
start helping North Korea develop the same cheaper, more efficient
warheads. What is that about? These are our new best friends? 

SY HERSH: Well, this started before they became our new best friends.
This isn't-- this started in '97. What I did is I wrote about an
intelligence report that the White House had for, what, eight months
before it became known. 

I love the story that this administration does live in a sort of a web of
it's own sort of stories. They-- the story they put out was last fall one
of our guys goes to North Korea, the Pyongyang and-- and confronts the
North Koreans. And they admit they have it. And we're stunned. They've
admitted they have it. Something we've known they've had for a year. 

What they did is in '97-- they buy missiles from North Korea. The North
Korean government is insane. Half the people starve and meanwhile they
have a tremendously efficient missile system. They-- they-- if-- if the
leader of that country decided that he wanted to-- to get rid of the
missiles and start spending money on-- on-- on food, they could all live.
There's enough there. But it's-- it's a madness society. 

And so the North-- the North Koreans are supplying missiles for-- for
Pakistan for years. And in '97, Pakistan had some serious economic
problems. And I can tell you right now i-- if nu-- if Pakistan's economy
is-- is in the toilet, North Korea's deep in the sewer. 

So here they are. North Korea's-- one of their great exports is missiles
for cash and then they sell some missiles to the Paks. And the Paks come
to the North Koreans in '97 and they say, "Hey guys, we can't pay. We got
no money. We're broke too. But we've got something in kind. I'm giving
you the most--" this is actually an interpretation the community--
intelligence community, same people in the American intelligence
community. 

And by the way, there's a lot of good people in our system. And awful
lot. And they must be very frustrated with it, because I think things at
the top-- it's a very strange world at the top of this government. It's a
cocoon. And no bad information invited. I'm talking about in a-- in the--
in the leadership. 

JANE WALLACE: What do you mean cocoon, no bad information invited? 

SY HERSH: Oh, I just don't think it was hard-- I don't think they could
sell this story of the-- the-- I don't think the intelligence community
was-- was able to get the President and the Vice President and other
people to focus on North Korea-- for a year before it became known. It
was just-- they didn't wanna focus on it. They had other issues. 

But the Paks then start giving the fruits of their 10, 15 years, 20 years
of nuclear labor to the North Koreans. And you have to understand, to
start with a centrifuge and some designs and get to the point where you
can actually make bomb-grade material is a 12, 15 year process. The
Paks-- 

JANE WALLACE: It's very sophisticated? 

SY HERSH: Oh. The Paks cut it way down to a couple years, three, four,
maybe five years. 

JANE WALLACE: So you could really spin 'em out? 

SY HERSH: You can kick it out. You can put it in high gear. They gave 'em
prototypes of the centrifuges that they made. They gave 'em prototypes of
the warheads. They gave 'em test data. 

There's something called cold testing. You can actually test natural
uranium in a warhead and it gives you a lot of information about the real
stuff-- enriched stuff would work. 

JANE WALLACE: So both third-world powers become more dangerous? 

SY HERSH: To put it mildly. 

JANE WALLACE: Colin Powell did not deny your story. He did go out of his
way to say, the Secretary of State, that Musharraf has assured the State
Department that this is not happening now. 

SY HERSH: Right. 

JANE WALLACE: That's all-- well, what do you make of that? 

SY HERSH: It's the-- it's the-- it's the-- the three-card Monty we have
going, which is that, "What are you going to do with this guy? Are you
going to say--" it's clear that some of the help that Musharraf gave the
North Koreans took place after 9/11. That is a continuum. 

Musharraf's answer to us was a-- you know, "Oh my god. There's gambling
on the premises?" You know shades of Casablanca. And, "I'll stop it right
now." And we say, "Great." What else are we gonna do? 

Are we gonna take a run at this guy and make it-- make him more
vulnerable to his critics that are there already? The fundamentalists--
the Islamic-- the mujahadin? So we-- 

JANE WALLACE: Or are we gonna pretend it didn't happen or-- or at least
it's stopped? 

SY HERSH: We-- the rationalization for pretending it didn't happen or
that it's stopped-- and it probably has stopped. The rationalization--
first of all, why shouldn't it stop? They've got what they need already? 

The rationalization is that we can't jeopardize Musharraf. We've gotta
keep him going. Prop him up as much as possible. 

JANE WALLACE: This is getting to be a very costly prop up. 

SY HERSH: Absolutely. But you know, let me give you another-- theory. Why
do you think Pakistan has only helped North Korea with nuclear weapons?
Why haven't they helped other countries? 

JANE WALLACE: I don't know why. 

SY HERSH: Well, the answer is, they probably have. They're interested in
spreading it to the Third World. How much control does Musharraf have? 

JANE WALLACE: Do you have any evidence? 

SY HERSH: No, no. I'm just telling you-- heuristically, I'm just telling
you-- I'm telling what I-- my instinct tells me that in a perfect world,
if our editor of the world's newspaper, I would-- I would want to look at
our-- is Pakistan-- I'd look at Pakistan and Iran, look at Pakistan and--
and Indonesia. Look at Pakistan even and Lebanon. There's a lot of ties
that I'm interested in. Are they gonna be spreading nuclear technology
into the Muslim world above and beyond their own country? 

JANE WALLACE: If we were really going after the people who sponsored al
Qaeda, wouldn't we be bombing Pakistan? 

SY HERSH: Well, it'd be attacking Pakistan is not like attacking
Afghanistan, or Iraq. They have an air force. They have nuclear weapons,
of course. They have a-- very strong powerful Army. We're not gonna
attack Pakistan. That would be-- that would be an impossible chore. If
you said to me, "Are we better off in Pakistan or in Iraq in terms of
beating terrorism?" I would say to you-- if you'd asked me that question,
I would say, "No question. Let's forget about Iraq and let's focus on
Pakistan and start doing-- the money we're gonna spend if we go to war
there, even in moving troops, if we tried to use some of that money in--
in positive ways in Pakistan, we might be able to accomplish more than we
are right now." 

JANE WALLACE: The picture you are painting here is that we're dealing
with the devil. 

SY HERSH: It's not a perfect world. 
 

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