Contact emails
mk...@chromium.org

Explainer
https://github.com/WICG/signature-based-sri


Specification
https://wicg.github.io/signature-based-sri


Summary

This feature provides web developers with a mechanism to verify the provenance 
of resources they depend upon, creating a technical foundation for trust in a 
site's dependencies. In short: servers can sign responses with a Ed25519 key 
pair, and web developers can require the user agent to verify the signature 
using a specific public key. This offers a helpful addition to URL-based checks 
offered by Content Security Policy on the one hand, and Subresource Integrity's 
content-based checks on the other.



Blink component
Blink>SecurityFeature>Subresource Integrity


Search tags
sri, signature, ed25519, integrity, provenance


TAG review
https://github.com/w3ctag/design-reviews/issues/1041


TAG review status
Pending


Origin Trial documentation link
https://github.com/WICG/signature-based-sri


Risks




Interoperability and Compatibility

None


Gecko: No signal (https://github.com/mozilla/standards-positions/issues/1139)

WebKit: No signal (https://github.com/WebKit/standards-positions/issues/434)

Web developers: No signals Shopify (@yoavweiss) has expressed positive initial 
impressions, as have folks at Cloudflare and Google.

Other signals:


Ergonomics

The hash functions we currently support for SRI generally are not conducive to 
streaming responses. This is arguably fine for scripts and stylesheets (as 
those are executed atomically, requiring the entire body), but it cannot work 
for other resource types (images, video, etc). It's likely we'll want to extend 
the set of hash functions in the future (though we'd do that for SRI, CSP, and 
this mechanism in one fell swoop).



Activation

Chromium's implementation of WebCrypto doesn't yet support Ed25519 
signing/verification, which means tooling to help developers generate 
signatures requires flipping the experimental web platform features flag. Not 
the end of the world.



Security

The feature aims to plug a security hole in the platform's status quo ante: it 
is impossible to deploy content-based integrity checks for dynamic resources, 
and URL-based checks are too broad to provide meaningful security protections. 
We continue to require CORS-based opt-in for integrity checks on responses to 
ensure that we're not leaking data unintentionally between origins.



WebView application risks

Does this intent deprecate or change behavior of existing APIs, such that it 
has potentially high risk for Android WebView-based applications?

None




Goals for experimentation




Ongoing technical constraints

None.



Debuggability

`Signature` and `Signature-Input` header parsing and validation is well-covered 
with DevTools issues. The same cannot (yet!) be said for `Unencoded-Digest` 
parsing and enforcement. Working on it!



Will this feature be supported on all six Blink platforms (Windows, Mac, Linux, 
ChromeOS, Android, and Android WebView)?
Yes


Is this feature fully tested by web-platform-tests?
Yes
https://wpt.fyi/results/subresource-integrity/unencoded-digest?label=experimental&label=master&aligned
 
https://wpt.fyi/results/subresource-integrity/signatures?label=experimental&label=master&aligned



Flag name on about://flags
signature-based-sri


Finch feature name
SignatureBasedIntegrity


Requires code in //chrome?
False


Tracking bug
https://issues.chromium.org/issues/375224898


Estimated milestones


Origin trial desktop first 135

Origin trial desktop last 141

Origin trial Android first 135

Origin trial Android last 141

Origin trial WebView first 135

Origin trial WebView last 141




Link to entry on the Chrome Platform Status
https://chromestatus.com/feature/5032324620877824?gate=5259773271080960


Links to previous Intent discussions
Intent to Prototype: 
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/6753088f.2b0a0220.1432c2.020a.GAE%40google.com



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