On Fri, Jun 14, 2024 at 10:36 AM Emily Stark <est...@chromium.org> wrote:
> (Apologies for the slow response, we had some OOOs) > > On Mon, Jun 3, 2024 at 7:55 PM Mike Taylor <miketa...@chromium.org> wrote: > >> Hi Emily, >> >> A few questions inline: >> On 6/1/24 5:05 AM, Emily Stark wrote: >> >> Contact emails est...@google.com, jdebla...@google.com, >> dadr...@google.com, l...@chromium.org, tito...@chromium.org, >> cl...@chromium.org, mk...@chromium.org, v...@chromium.org >> >> Explainer >> https://github.com/WICG/private-network-access/blob/master/explainer.md >> >> Specification https://wicg.github.io/private-network-access >> >> Design docs >> >> https://docs.google.com/document/d/1x1a1fQLOrcWogK3tpFBgQZQ5ZjcONTvD0IqqXkgrg5I/edit#heading=h.7nki9mck5t64 >> >> Summary >> >> Requires that private network requests for subresources from public >> websites may only be initiated from a secure context. Examples include >> internet to intranet requests and internet to loopback requests. This is a >> first step towards fully implementing Private Network Access: >> https://wicg.github.io/private-network-access/ >> >> >> Blink component Blink>SecurityFeature>CORS>PrivateNetworkAccess >> <https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/list?q=component:Blink%3ESecurityFeature%3ECORS%3EPrivateNetworkAccess> >> >> TAG review https://github.com/w3ctag/design-reviews/issues/572 >> >> TAG review status Issues addressed >> >> Chromium Trial Name PrivateNetworkAccessNonSecureContextsAllowed >> >> Link to origin trial feedback summary >> https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1z5ZdCslNCnSVR7TNlUTHjSvunMFmT_9G9NOx8-O78-I/edit?usp=sharing&resourcekey=0-DITlG8tDuFDWHiBUHnlSoQ >> >> Origin Trial documentation link >> https://developer.chrome.com/blog/private-network-access-update/ >> >> WebFeature UseCounter name >> kPrivateNetworkAccessNonSecureContextsAllowedDeprecationTrial >> >> Risks >> >> >> Interoperability and Compatibility >> >> No interoperability risks. Compatibility risk is small but >> non-negligible. UseCounters show ~0.1% of page visit making use of this >> feature. Direct outreach to the largest users per UKM data revealed no >> objections to this launch. Rolling this deprecation out to beta per the >> previous I2S resulted in more feedback about the compatibility risk and the >> need for a time extension. See the following doc for an extensive >> discussion: >> https://docs.google.com/document/d/1bpis0QwaA9ZrRFmpPW6LiaPmdwT0UhhUMNsEnU0zfLk/edit >> >> Can you speak to the number of sites in the largest users group? Is it >> dozens of sites? Hundreds? Presumably they're all enrolled in the DT? >> > I've requested access to the OT data so I can't say for sure yet, but in > the meantime, my impression is that we're roughly talking about hundreds of > sites. The breakage of ending the deprecation trial would be quite small in > terms of affected page loads, but there are legitimate use cases > <https://github.com/WICG/private-network-access/issues/23#:~:text=in%20order%20for%20a%20device%20to%20get%20a%20coveted%20MFi%20(%E2%80%9CWorks%20with%20HomeKit%E2%80%9D)%20certification%20from%20Apple%2C%20it%20must%20not%20require%20direct%20internet%20access%20for%20the%20initial%20setup> > for nonsecure subresource requests to the private network that we're trying > to accomodate because they don't have an alternative/workaround. > Update: it looks like there are ~1000 sites registered in the DT. > *Gecko*: Closed Without a Position ( >> https://github.com/mozilla/standards-positions/issues/143) Tentatively >> positive, but no formal position yet. >> >> *WebKit*: Positive ( >> https://lists.webkit.org/pipermail/webkit-dev/2021-May/031837.html) >> >> *Web developers*: Mixed signals ( >> https://docs.google.com/document/d/1bpis0QwaA9ZrRFmpPW6LiaPmdwT0UhhUMNsEnU0zfLk/edit) >> In our recent survey, most of websites are able to migrate if our new >> permission prompt can be landed as a way for them to relax mixed content >> checks. >> https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1z5ZdCslNCnSVR7TNlUTHjSvunMFmT_9G9NOx8-O78-I/edit?resourcekey=0-DITlG8tDuFDWHiBUHnlSoQ#gid=309953809 >> ------------ >> Some websites, broadly falling in the category of controller webapps for >> IoT devices, find this change incompatible with their use cases. While many >> use cases can be solved with specific workarounds, some still require >> further engagement. >> >> *Other signals*: >> >> Activation >> >> Developers of non-secure sites that rely upon local servers will need to >> upgrade to HTTPS. This might cause some complications, as mixed-content >> checks will begin to apply. Chrome carves out HTTP access to loopback (as >> perhttps://w3c.github.io/webappsec-secure-contexts/#localhost), which is >> a release valve for folks who don't want to go through the effort of >> securely-distributing certs for local servers. The initial launch in M92 >> was delayed due to compatibility risks surfaced during the rollout to beta. >> See this doc for a lot more details: >> https://docs.google.com/document/d/1bpis0QwaA9ZrRFmpPW6LiaPmdwT0UhhUMNsEnU0zfLk/edit >> >> >> Security >> >> This change should be security-positive. >> >> >> WebView application risks >> >> Does this intent deprecate or change behavior of existing APIs, such that >> it has potentially high risk for Android WebView-based applications? >> >> >> Goals for experimentation >> >> Reason this experiment is being extended >> >> The blocker to shipping this feature is that some websites can't create >> HTTPS connections to subresources on the private network due to various >> constraints (e.g., unable to obtain a publicly trusted HTTPS certificate). >> A permission prompt is in development ( >> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/blink-dev/c/sL15TKGmXqM/m/rD0SF8sQBwAJ) >> to allow such subresources to be loaded over HTTP (whereas they would >> usually be blocked by mixed content rules). However, the permission prompt >> currently only works for fetch() and does not work in iframes, thus we need >> to investigate whether we need to support use cases not supported by the >> current implementation. The overall Private Network Access project is also >> currently being transitioned between teams, so the extension request >> includes some time for handoff/rampup. >> >> I'm slightly confused on the timing - >> https://chromestatus.com/feature/5954091755241472 states that we shipped >> the permission prompt in 124 - is that not the case? >> >> What are the non-fetch cases that might need to be supported? XHR? >> Sub-resource loads? Both? Something else? Is it feasible to design a DT >> that addresses the non-fetch() use cases? >> > The permission prompt for fetch() requests did indeed ship in M124, but > there are feature requests to support subresouce loads from HTML tags > (<img>, <iframe>, etc.) as well as to support permission delegation to > iframes. These outstanding feature requests are described in this > (Google-internal) doc: > https://docs.google.com/document/d/1r4MnGtCmXvt-sDdp3RiaYLkdTcLKPjmmL4ky4TCOMS0/edit?tab=t.0#heading=h.1fxgtnya8b50 > > So we're requesting an extension to this DT (which allows enrolled > nonsecure origins to make private network requests) to give us time to > implement those feature requests. That will allow the origins enrolled in > this DT to migrate to secure origins and use the permission prompt (and > related feature requests) to make private network requests to nonsecure > origins. > > I don't think I understand your last question ("Is it feasible to design a > DT...?"), could you clarify? > >> Also, could you clarify what milestones you're requesting a renewal for? >> The table below is hard for me to parse (e.g., extension 5 ending in 132; >> extension 6 ending in 126). >> > I've been staring at Chrome Status for a while and am honestly pretty > confused as to how that table came to be. We're requesting a renewal in > M127, to last until M132. > >> >> Ongoing technical constraints >> >> None. >> >> >> Debuggability >> >> When a request is made that violates this restriction and the feature is >> not enabled, three things happen: 1. A warning message is logged to the >> DevTools console. 2. A deprecation report is filed against the initiator >> website's Reporting API, if so configured. 3. An issue is surfaced in the >> DevTools Issues panel. Likewise, when the feature is enabled and a request >> is blocked, the same happens except that the message logged to the DevTools >> console is an error and its text is slightly different. The devtools >> network panel shows information about the source and remote address spaces >> at play. >> >> >> Will this feature be supported on all six Blink platforms (Windows, Mac, >> Linux, ChromeOS, Android, and Android WebView)? Yes >> >> Is this feature fully tested by web-platform-tests >> <https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/main/docs/testing/web_platform_tests.md> >> ? Yes >> >> >> https://wpt.fyi/results/fetch/private-network-access?label=master&label=experimental&aligned >> >> >> Flag name on chrome://flags BlockInsecurePrivateNetworkRequests >> >> Finch feature name None >> >> Non-finch justification None >> >> Requires code in //chrome? False >> >> Tracking bug https://crbug.com/986744 >> >> Launch bug https://crbug.com/1129801 >> >> Estimated milestones >> Shipping on desktop 127 >> Origin trial desktop first 94 >> Origin trial desktop last 126 >> Origin trial extension 1 end milestone 126 >> Origin trial extension 5 end milestone 132 >> Origin trial extension 6 end milestone 126 >> DevTrial on desktop 86 >> OriginTrial Android last 126 >> OriginTrial Android first 94 >> DevTrial on Android 86 >> >> Link to entry on the Chrome Platform Status >> https://chromestatus.com/feature/5436853517811712?gate=5187028487766016 >> >> Links to previous Intent discussions Ready for Trial: >> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/blink-dev/c/EeGg7TxW6U4/m/7ZvqAqHLAwAJ >> Intent to Experiment: >> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/blink-dev/c/vlDZXlPb00k/m/1421ACiuAAAJ >> Intent to Extend Experiment 1: >> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/blink-dev/c/JPD001kqeck >> Intent to Extend Experiment 6: >> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/blink-dev/c/JPD001kqeck >> Intent to Ship: >> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/blink-dev/c/JPD001kqeck >> Intent to Ship: >> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/blink-dev/c/JPD001kqeck >> >> >> This intent message was generated by Chrome Platform Status >> <https://chromestatus.com/>. >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "blink-dev" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to blink-dev+unsubscr...@chromium.org. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAPP_2Sbhrsrmmk5ZTwkxkuwT6_iEs4QPNGNYTL9u_7ODmEb3Vw%40mail.gmail.com >> <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAPP_2Sbhrsrmmk5ZTwkxkuwT6_iEs4QPNGNYTL9u_7ODmEb3Vw%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >> . >> >> -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "blink-dev" group. 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