Hey Andrew, Given that the metrics are not a superset of what you're trying to deprecate, could you please add CountDeprecation <https://source.chromium.org/chromium/chromium/src/+/main:third_party/blink/renderer/core/frame/deprecation.cc;drc=f6f22e82bcd0d50f390b23ee9688c58de5ae0bdc;bpv=1;bpt=1;l=702?q=deprecation&ss=chromium> metrics of the case you are intending to deprecate? That would ensure .e.g deprecation reports are sent to folks that happen to have such cookies. Even though you haven't really asked, from my perspective, it's also fine to add a console deprecation message at this point, in parallel to the metrics.
Cheers :) Yoav On Wednesday, September 1, 2021 at 5:05:44 PM UTC+2 Andrew Williams wrote: > Here is the percentage for the metric mentioned in my last email: over a 7 > day period, 0.00004% of cookies seen in the stable version of Chrome had > truncated names and/or values. > > Ultimately our plan is to ship this feature behind a kill switch that we > could flip if major issues are reported. With that in mind, and given the > low number of truncated cookie names/values observed via our existing > metrics, would it make sense to implement and collect the new metrics in > parallel with rolling out the changes described in this I2P&S? Or do you > think taking the more cautious approach and implementing/collecting the new > metrics before landing this change is a better way forward (despite taking > more time)? > > -Andrew > > On Fri, Aug 27, 2021 at 1:45 PM Andrew Williams <awil...@chromium.org> > wrote: > >> Thanks for the feedback/questions Yoav and Daniel. >> >> We have some metrics >> <https://source.chromium.org/chromium/chromium/src/+/700dc7fe1578ab5e0e50a6304f2a1960005b8f8b:tools/metrics/histograms/metadata/cookie/histograms.xml;l=56;bpv=1;bpt=0> >> >> on Chrome's existing behavior to truncate cookie lines containing \x00, >> \x0d, and \x0a (specifically, in cases where the truncation affects the >> cookie name or the cookie value). The percentage of cookies with truncated >> names or values is quite low, although I'm still waiting on approval to >> release the exact percentage. We don't have any metrics for cases where >> truncation affected cookie attribute parsing (for example, the malicious >> case this intent aims to address) or where truncation was harmless (for >> example, a newline as the last character in the cookie line), though. >> Especially for the latter case, it does seem plausible that certain sites >> could be constructing cookie lines in such a way that control characters >> slip in unnoticed. We will add new metrics to cover these cases so that we >> can better predict the level of breakage that these changes may have. >> >> -Andrew >> >> On Thu, Aug 26, 2021 at 2:22 PM Daniel Bratell <bratel...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >>> Even if browsers are currently slightly incompatible, it seems this >>> change will short term make them more incompatible. As Yoav said, it would >>> be good to have an idea about how common this is, i.e. how often will >>> cookies that are today truncated instead be rejected? >>> >>> /Daniel >>> >>> On 2021-08-25 16:18, Yoav Weiss wrote: >>> >>> Hey Andrew! Thanks for working on this, this seems like a significant >>> compatibility gap (with security implications) that would be great to >>> close. >>> >>> On Tuesday, August 24, 2021 at 3:45:50 PM UTC+2 Andrew Williams wrote: >>> >>>> Contact emails awil...@chromium.org, miketa...@chromium.org Explainer >>>> >>>> https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/issues/1531 >>>> >>>> https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1589 >>>> >>>> Specification >>>> >>>> >>>> https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/blob/main/draft-ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis.md >>>> >>>> Summary >>>> >>>> Updates how control characters in cookie data are handled. >>>> Specifically, the tab character is now permitted, but all other control >>>> characters cause the entire cookie to be rejected (previously the \x00, >>>> \x0D, and \x0A characters in a cookie line caused it to be truncated >>>> instead of rejected entirely, which could have enabled malicious behavior >>>> in certain circumstances). This behavior is also in line with the latest >>>> drafts of RFC6265bis. >>>> Blink component >>>> >>>> Internals>Network>Cookies >>>> <https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/list?q=component:Internals%3ENetwork%3ECookies> >>>> >>>> Motivation >>>> >>>> In the case where attacker controlled data is used to set a new cookie, >>>> having certain control characters truncate the cookie line could result in >>>> security-related cookie attributes being ignored. This behavior may also >>>> lead to cookie data corruption when control characters are introduced, >>>> which may cause unpredictable behavior on the application side (more so >>>> than cookies not being set, which is a case that applications should >>>> already handle). Having control characters result in the whole cookie >>>> being >>>> rejected helps mitigate these concerns and aligns Chrome with RFC6265bis. >>>> For the tab character, although it falls in the control character range >>>> (\x00 - \x1F, \x7F), it’s a printable character and allowed by other >>>> browsers. Treating it the same way that the space character is treated >>>> makes sense intuitively, eliminates a potential fingerprinting vector, and >>>> aligns Chrome with RFC6265bis. >>>> >>> >>> In the past, moving to a stricter models that forbade certain characters >>> resulted in at least some breakage of non-malicious content. I doubt this >>> one would be significantly different. >>> Do you have a sense of the resulting breakage? If not, I think it'd make >>> sense to add metrics to our cookie parsing algorithm and see what that >>> breakage would look like. >>> >>> >>>> Initial public proposal TAG review >>>> >>>> N/A >>>> <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/blink-api-owners-discuss/c/uBxq9uCpKx0/m/A5LI0NbyAAAJ>: >>>> >>>> this change is already specified in RFC 6265bis and is a relatively minor >>>> change to what's already implemented in Chrome (to improve spec >>>> compliance). >>>> >>> >>> I agree that this change is in lower layers than those the TAG usually >>> deals with. >>> >>> >>>> TAG review status Not applicable >>>> Risks >>>> >>>> N/A >>>> Interoperability and Compatibility >>>> >>>> WebKit / Safari: >>>> >>>> - All control characters except the tab character cause the cookie to >>>> be rejected if present in the name and cause the rest of the cookie line >>>> to >>>> be truncated if present in the value >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Gecko / Firefox: >>>> >>>> - 0x00 in the cookie value causes the rest of the value to be >>>> truncated (but subsequent attributes are preserved) >>>> >>>> - 0x00 in the cookie name causes the rest of the name and the value to >>>> be truncated (but subsequent attributes are preserved) >>>> >>>> - 0x0d and 0x0a cause the entire cookie line to be truncated >>>> (attributes ignored) >>>> >>>> - 0x01 through 0x09 (the tab character), 0x0b through 0x0c, and 0x0e >>>> through 0x1f cause the cookie to be rejected if they are present in the >>>> name, but are allowed in the cookie value >>>> >>>> - 0x7f is allowed in the cookie name and cookie value >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> The following issues exist reporting these differences: >>>> >>>> - >>>> >>>> Firefox - https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1702031#c1 >>>> - >>>> >>>> WebKit - https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=229088 >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Allowing tab characters in cookie names aligns Chrome with Safari but >>>> not Firefox, and allowing tabs in the cookie value aligns Chrome with both. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Regarding control characters (not including tab), what will change in >>>> Chrome is the handling of 0x00, 0x0d, and 0x0a characters. Today, Chrome >>>> truncates cookie lines when these characters are encountered, and this >>>> intent proposes having these characters result in cookie rejection >>>> instead. Rejecting cookie names containing these characters aligns Chrome >>>> with Safari but not Firefox, but rejecting cookie values containing these >>>> characters is inconsistent with existing Safari or Firefox behavior. >>>> However, these changes unify Chrome’s control character handling behavior, >>>> better align Chrome with RFC6265bis, and also help prevent a class of >>>> cookie attribute removal attacks (when malicious input is used to build a >>>> cookie line under certain conditions). >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Gecko: N/A - these changes seem too small to justify this effort WebKit: >>>> N/A - these changes seem too small to justify this effort >>>> >>> >>> I somewhat agree that asking for a position here would be an overkill, >>> but would love to get a signal from both Mozilla and Safari on their >>> intents to align with the RFC. (the former seems more likely than the >>> latter, as this seems like a CFNetwork issue) >>> At the same time, the issues seem sufficient for that purpose, assuming >>> folks there respond. >>> >>> Web developers: N/A - these changes are relatively small and are in >>>> alignment with the RFC, other browsers, and/or existing behavior >>>> >>> >>> Yeah, developers are unlikely to be happy about this from a breakage >>> perspective, even if it'd reduce compat issues. The main thing we can do >>> about that is ensure breakage is minimal before shipping. >>> >>> >>>> Debuggability >>>> >>>> DevTools debugging support will be implemented along with this change. >>>> Rejected response cookies are already shown in DevTools in the Network >>>> panel, with a status explaining why they were rejected. Another status >>>> will >>>> be added to annotate cookies rejected due to control characters. >>>> >>>> Is this feature fully tested by web-platform-tests >>>> <https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/master/docs/testing/web_platform_tests.md> >>>> ? >>>> >>>> In Progress - >>>> https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/3084521 >>>> Flag name >>>> >>>> UpdatedCookieControlCharacterChecks >>>> Requires code in //chrome? >>>> >>>> False >>>> Tracking bug >>>> >>>> https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=1233602 >>>> >>>> Estimated milestones >>>> >>>> M96 >>>> Link to entry on the Chrome Platform Status >>>> >>>> https://www.chromestatus.com/feature/5709264560586752 >>>> >>>> Requesting approval to ship? >>>> >>>> Yes >>>> >>>> This intent message was generated by Chrome Platform Status >>>> <https://www.chromestatus.com/>. >>>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "blink-dev" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to blink-dev+unsubscr...@chromium.org. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/e2de8b96-8878-47fe-99e2-5497b96c9adcn%40chromium.org >>> >>> <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/e2de8b96-8878-47fe-99e2-5497b96c9adcn%40chromium.org?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>> . >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "blink-dev" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to blink-dev+unsubscr...@chromium.org. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/44805dc7-edd8-218d-dcbe-9c589509b633%40gmail.com >>> >>> <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/44805dc7-edd8-218d-dcbe-9c589509b633%40gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>> . >>> >> -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "blink-dev" group. 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