Department of odd facts: - The ICANN rules for new TLDs forbid all top level domain names that start with a digit - The IDNA rules for bidirectional scripts forbid domain names that start with a digit (Unicode bidi afficandoes will know why) - The only real reason why leading digits aren't outlawed in domain names at the second level is 3com.
It seems safe to say that no legitimate fully qualified hostname will ever have a last component consisting only of digits. That means the only time we could get a legitimate hostname is for something that has to be resolved via a search path. On Thu, Aug 19, 2021 at 2:33 PM Yoav Weiss <[email protected]> wrote: > > > On Thu, Aug 19, 2021 at 2:28 PM Matt Menke <[email protected]> wrote: > >> I created the title using Chrome Status's deprecation template, so any >> confusion should be blamed on that. >> > > +Jason Robbins <[email protected]> - on the title issues. > > >> >> I used the "Draft Intent to Deprecate and Remove email" button, and >> assume I'd need to do a "Draft Intent to Ship email" before shipping to >> stable, after a 50% trial on prerelease channels. >> > > There's no need for 2 emails for removals. We can discuss the full > deprecation, experimentation/trials and removal on stable here. > > >> >> On Thu, Aug 19, 2021 at 3:15 AM Yoav Weiss <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> >>> On Wed, Aug 18, 2021 at 11:36 PM Matt Menke <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wed, Aug 18, 2021 at 5:23 PM Yoav Weiss <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Wed, Aug 18, 2021 at 11:18 PM Matt Menke <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On Wed, Aug 18, 2021 at 4:53 PM Yoav Weiss <[email protected]> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Wed, Aug 18, 2021 at 8:47 PM 'Matt Menke' via blink-dev < >>>>>>> [email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Contact [email protected] >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> ExplainerNone >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Specificationhttps://url.spec.whatwg.org/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Summary >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Most hostnames that aren't valid IPv4 addresses, but end in numbers >>>>>>>> are treated as valid, and looked up via DNS (e.g., >>>>>>>> http://foo.127.1/). Per the Public Suffix List spec, the eTLD+1 of >>>>>>>> the hostname in that URL should be "127.1". If that is ever fed back >>>>>>>> into a >>>>>>>> URLs, "http://127.1/ <http://127.0.0.1/>" is mapped to " >>>>>>>> http://127.0.0.1/"; by the URL spec, which seems potentially >>>>>>>> dangerous. "127.0.0.0.1" could also potentially be used to confuse >>>>>>>> users. >>>>>>>> We want to reject URLs with these hostnames. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Blink componentInternals>Network>DNS >>>>>>>> <https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/list?q=component:Internals%3ENetwork%3EDNS> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Motivation >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Most hostnames that aren't valid IPv4 addresses, but end in numbers >>>>>>>> are treated as valid hostnames, and looked up via DNS. Example >>>>>>>> hostnames: >>>>>>>> 127.0.0.0.1, foo.0.1, 10.0.0.09, 08.1.2.3. These can be problematic >>>>>>>> for the >>>>>>>> following reason: * "http://foo.127.1/"; has an eTLD+1 of "127.1", >>>>>>>> per the public suffix list spec. If that's ever used as the hostname >>>>>>>> in a >>>>>>>> new URL, however, as in "http://127.1 <http://127.0.0.1/>", it >>>>>>>> will then get mapped to "http://127.0.0.1/";, per the URL spec, >>>>>>>> which is a different host, which is not safe. * "http://127.0.0.0.1"; >>>>>>>> and "http://1.2.3.09";, both of which are looked up via DNS rather >>>>>>>> than failing or being treated as IPv4 hostnames, also seem potentially >>>>>>>> confusing. While no exploit is currently known here, we want to remove >>>>>>>> support for these as a preventative security measure. The URL spec has >>>>>>>> been >>>>>>>> updated so that any URL with a hostname ending in a number that's not >>>>>>>> an >>>>>>>> IPv4 address (including, e.g., http://foo.1./, but not >>>>>>>> http://foo.1../) is considered invalid. Since this is part of the >>>>>>>> URL spec, not the DNS spec, we want to reject these URLs are the GURL >>>>>>>> layer, for URLs with appropriate protocols (http, https, ws, wss, >>>>>>>> file). >>>>>>>> For consistency, we should also fail DNS lookup attempts of these >>>>>>>> sorts of >>>>>>>> hostnames. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Initial public proposalhttps://github.com/whatwg/url/pull/619 >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> TAG reviewNot required for an Intent to Deprecate, I believe. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> TAG review statusNot applicable >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Risks >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Interoperability and Compatibility >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Any URL with an affected hostname will fail to load, and will need >>>>>>>> to be migrated to another hostname. URLs of this form do appear to be >>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>> use, though it's not clear under what circumstances. No entry in the >>>>>>>> public >>>>>>>> suffix list is affected. Affected URLs make up no more than 0.0003% of >>>>>>>> hostnames looked up via the host resolver on any platform, and are >>>>>>>> basically not used in any file URLs, according to our metrics. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Do we have reason to believe these hostnames are not legitimate ones? >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Unfortunately, we have no insight into them - they could be mistyped >>>>>> URLs sent to typo squatting ISPs that OSX lets through but the Windows >>>>>> host >>>>>> resolver blocks, and various flavors of Linux treat differently. Or they >>>>>> could be mapped via a hosts file, or they could be hostnames that only >>>>>> resolve on public networks. Could be some network tool that uses them >>>>>> when >>>>>> installed locally, but is only available on certain platforms. No reason >>>>>> to think one possibility is more likely than the others. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Do we have UKM for them that would enable us to test a random sample? >>>>> I'm concerned about blocking those hostnames if they are legitimate, >>>>> as that's something that a web developer can't do anything about. >>>>> So even if the number of hosts is small, I'd like to get more >>>>> certainty that they are *not* legitimate hosts before blocking them. >>>>> >>>> >>>> We have UKM on their number (0.0003% of DNS lookups on OSX, less >>>> elsewhere - we can't meaningfully instrument percent of created GURLs), but >>>> we don't have their hostnames, what they resolve to, or know anything else >>>> about them, unfortunately. >>>> >>>> Navigation to a subset of these as frame URLs were broken at one point >>>> - I'm pretty sure the breakage even made it to stable: >>>> https://crbug.com/1173238. There were no reports of problems. Only >>>> non-IPv4 URLs where the last two components were broken, though, and it >>>> didn't affect subresources. On OSX and Android, over 99% of successfully >>>> resolved problematic hostnames fit into that bucket, though on Linux, only >>>> about 2% do. >>>> >>>> That doesn't give us any hard conclusions, except they're either not >>>> deliberate navigations on OSX/Android, or they're not navigations. >>>> >>> >>> :| >>> >>> One more question: Is this an intent to Prototype or an intent to >>> deprecate? The title is a bit unclear.. >>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On OSX and Android, about 90% of host resolver lookups for these >>>>>>>> hostnames succeed, 60% do on Linux, and 2% on Windows and ChromeOS. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Do you know where those failures are coming from? >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Could be typos, could be the Windows and ChromeOS host resolvers >>>>>> don't let them through. Since we've had no filed bugs about them, I >>>>>> suspect the failures are not deliberate navigations or intended network >>>>>> requests. I'm much more interested in where the successes are coming >>>>>> from, >>>>>> myself. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> To allow for emergency disabling in case of wider than expected >>>>>>>> breakage, I intend to add a feature for it, and do a 50% field trial on >>>>>>>> pre-release channels, though plan to just enable the feature, rather >>>>>>>> than >>>>>>>> do a gradual rollout to stable, given the low usage. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Gecko: Positive ( >>>>>>>> https://github.com/whatwg/url/pull/619#issuecomment-890826499 >>>>>>>> <https://www.chromestatus.com/admin/features/launch/5679790780579840/1?intent=1> >>>>>>>> ) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Can you file an official position request? >>>>>>> https://bit.ly/blink-signals >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Done for Mozilla: >>>>>> https://github.com/mozilla/standards-positions/issues/568 >>>>>> >>>>>> Should I also do this for WebKit as well? They have in process CLs, >>>>>> so not sure if it's still needed. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Agree that in-flight patches for WebKit are a sufficient positive >>>>> signal. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> WebKit: In development ( >>>>>>>> https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=228826) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Web developers: No signals >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Activation >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> This breaks anything using one of these domains, and requires >>>>>>>> migrating to other hostnames. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Security >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> None >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Debuggability >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> These will act like any other invalid URL. Behavior is context >>>>>>>> dependent. Since this is logic deep within GURL, and GURLs are created >>>>>>>> in a >>>>>>>> great many places, console warnings specifically for this seem not >>>>>>>> practical. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Is this feature fully tested by web-platform-tests >>>>>>>> <https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/master/docs/testing/web_platform_tests.md> >>>>>>>> ?No. Javascript URL construction is tested, but URLs are used in >>>>>>>> a great many other places, which don't have test coverage, since DNS >>>>>>>> lookups for these domains must succeed in the first place for the >>>>>>>> tests to >>>>>>>> be meaningful. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Flag name >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Requires code in //chrome?False >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Tracking bughttps://crbug.com/1237032 >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Estimated milestones >>>>>>>> DevTrial on desktop 95 >>>>>>>> DevTrial on Webview 95 >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Link to entry on the Chrome Platform Status >>>>>>>> https://www.chromestatus.com/feature/5679790780579840 >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> This intent message was generated by Chrome Platform Status >>>>>>>> <https://www.chromestatus.com/>. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>>>> Groups "blink-dev" group. >>>>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>>>>> send an email to [email protected]. >>>>>>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>>>>>> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAEK7mvq%2Bfnau%3DE%2BONhe0kr9HOpN84eCpoub84%3DswKzPkrGzi5A%40mail.gmail.com >>>>>>>> <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAEK7mvq%2Bfnau%3DE%2BONhe0kr9HOpN84eCpoub84%3DswKzPkrGzi5A%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>>>>>>> . >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "blink-dev" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAL5BFfWB4wVuGshgPaLVXp%3DYsWUiXgJhUABD3ZFJ9xbhg1J3ww%40mail.gmail.com > <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAL5BFfWB4wVuGshgPaLVXp%3DYsWUiXgJhUABD3ZFJ9xbhg1J3ww%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "blink-dev" group. 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