On Fri, Nov 28, 2014 at 12:45 AM, Mistr Bigs <mister...@gmail.com> wrote: > That's what I was trying to say... The researchers are deanonymizing > transactions from non-Tor connected hosts. So why are we talking about Tor > limitations in response to this? Shouldn't we be discussing how to address > the issues in Bitcoin proper?
Because if the user does not use tor or an analogous infrastructure (e.g. something else reimplementing tor's functionality) the user can be deanonymized in many different ways. At the end of the day, if I'm listening widely to the network, and your host is regularly the first to hand me your transactions then I can draw reasonably reliable conclusions... and this is true even if there is a complete absence of identifiable characteristics otherwise. And, on the flip side if the host is persistently behind tor, even with some watermarkable behaviour, their privacy is protected. So making sure that hosts can continually use tor (or similar systems) should be the higher priority. (And, of course, not reimplementing tor leverages the millions of dollars of investment and dozens of subject matter experts working on that system). ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Download BIRT iHub F-Type - The Free Enterprise-Grade BIRT Server from Actuate! Instantly Supercharge Your Business Reports and Dashboards with Interactivity, Sharing, Native Excel Exports, App Integration & more Get technology previously reserved for billion-dollar corporations, FREE http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=157005751&iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk _______________________________________________ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
