On Sat, Aug 23, 2014 at 10:32:15AM -0400, Peter Todd wrote: > On Sat, Aug 23, 2014 at 01:17:01AM -0500, Troy Benjegerdes wrote: > > This is why I clone git to mercurial, which is generally designed around the > > assumption that history is immutable. You can't rewrite blockchain history, > > and we should not be re-writing (rebasing) commit history either. > > Git commits serve two purposes: recording public history and > communication. While for the purpose of recording history immutable > commits make sense, for the purpose of communicating to other developers > what changes should be added to that history you *do* want the mutable > commits that git's rebase functionality supports. Much like how > university math classes essentially never teach calculus in the order it > was developed, it is rare indeed for the way you happened to develop > some functionality to be the best sequence of changes for other > developers to understand why and what is being changed. > > Anyway, just because mercurial is designed around the assumption that > commit history is immutable doesn't mean it actually is; an attacker can > fake a series of mercurial commits just as easily as they can git > commits. The only thing that protects against history rewriting is > signed commits and timestamps.
What I would really like is a frontend and/or integration to Git/Mercurial that uses Bitcoin transactions *as* the signature, which has the nice side effect of providing timestamps backed by the full faith and credit of a billion dollar blockchain. So what is the best way for me to stick both a git *and* a mercurial identity hash into a bitcoin transaction? (which leads to point 2 below) > > > The problem with github is it's too tempting to look at the *web page*, > > which > > is NOT pgp-signed, and hit the 'approve' button when you might have someone > > in the middle approving an unsigned changeset because you're in a hurry to > > get the latest new critical OpenSSL 0day security patch build released. > > > > We need multiple redundant 'master' repositories run by different people in > > different jurisdictions that get updated on different schedules, and have > > all > > of these people pay attention to operational security, and not just > > outsource > > it all to github because it's convenient. > > The easiest and most useful way to achieve that would be to have a > formal program of code review, perhaps on a per-release basis, that > reviewed the diffs between the previous release and the new one. Master > repos in this scenario are simply copies of the "master master" repo > that someone has manually verified and signed-off on, with of course a > PGP signature. > > If you feel like volunteering to maintain one of these repos, you may > find my Litecoin v0.8.3.7 audit report to be a useful template: > > https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=265582.0 I'm not interested in volunteer, I'm interested in getting paid, and the best way I believe I can accomplish that is use *my* bitcoin address in a signature-transaction of the code I've reviewed. What is the advantage of PGP? Far more people have ECDSA public-private keys than PGP keys. -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Troy Benjegerdes 'da hozer' ho...@hozed.org 7 elements earth::water::air::fire::mind::spirit::soul grid.coop Never pick a fight with someone who buys ink by the barrel, nor try buy a hacker who makes money by the megahash ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Slashdot TV. Video for Nerds. Stuff that matters. http://tv.slashdot.org/ _______________________________________________ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
