btw if I got that right, it means you dont even have to fix the asn.1 level ambiguity (though its a good idea to remove openSSL asn.1 parsing code) to have conditional payments using not yet broadcast txid outputs as inputs to work with high assurance. (And even in the event that a new crypto level malleability is discovered in ECDSA it remains secure.)
Adam Adam Back wrote: >So I was thinking a more generic / robust way to fix this would be to change >the txid from H(sig,inputs,outputs,script) to H(pubkey,inputs,outputs,script) >or something like that in effect so that the malleability of the signature >mechanism doesnt affect the security of conditional payments. Adam ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ October Webinars: Code for Performance Free Intel webinars can help you accelerate application performance. Explore tips for MPI, OpenMP, advanced profiling, and more. Get the most from the latest Intel processors and coprocessors. See abstracts and register > http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=60134071&iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk _______________________________________________ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
