On Tuesday, February 28, 2012 11:48:39 AM Pieter Wuille wrote: > A simple way to fix this, is adding an extra protocol rule[1]: > > Do not allow blocks to contain a transaction whose hash is equal to > that of a former transaction which has not yet been completely spent. > > I've written about it in BIP30[2]. There is a patch for the reference > client, which has been tested and verified to make the attack > impossible.
Has it been verified to make even rocconor's complicated transaction-based version impossible? > The purpose of this mail is asking for support for adding this rule to > the protocol rules. If there is consensus this rule is the solution, I > hope pools and miners can agree to update their nodes without lengthy > coinbase-flagging procedure that would only delay a solution. So, who > is in favor? Can we do this in two steps? First, prefer blocks which don't break the rule; once 55%+ are confirmed to have upgraded, then it is safe to treat it as a hard rule. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Keep Your Developer Skills Current with LearnDevNow! The most comprehensive online learning library for Microsoft developers is just $99.99! Visual Studio, SharePoint, SQL - plus HTML5, CSS3, MVC3, Metro Style Apps, more. Free future releases when you subscribe now! http://p.sf.net/sfu/learndevnow-d2d _______________________________________________ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
