> That said, a sufficiently incentivized actor (like Daniel Lipshitz or Muun
> wallet developers) could work on a fork and run several nodes with such
> functionality.
Daniel Lipshitz has been working on BSV apparently [0] so I guess anything is
possible with him. But as others have said turning a mempool policy issue
(users have always been free to choose whatever policy they like with zero
chain split risk) into a consensus issue and a contentious soft fork issue at
that would not be advised. I highly doubt any of the long term Muun
contributors would want to support a contentious soft fork and fight a
consensus rule war on this.
[0]:
https://coingeek.com/gap600-ceo-daniel-lipshitz-talks-bsv-powered-stablecoins-on-coingeek-backstage-video/
--
Michael Folkson
Email: michaelfolkson at [protonmail.com](http://protonmail.com/)
Keybase: michaelfolkson
PGP: 43ED C999 9F85 1D40 EAF4 9835 92D6 0159 214C FEE3
------- Original Message -------
On Monday, December 5th, 2022 at 16:12, Rijndael via bitcoin-dev
<bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> Good morning,
>
> That sounds like a very dangerous mode of operation. You can already hand a
> transaction to a miner privately. I hand a transaction to a miner with some
> reasonable fee, and then I go and broadcast a different transaction with a
> minimal fee that spends the same inputs. The whole network (including the
> miner I handed the tx to) could all be running with a strict first-seen
> mempool policy, but we can still have a situation where the miner creates a
> block with a different transaction from what you see in your mempool. If
> anytime this happens, the nodes running your proposed rule drop the block,
> then anyone can fork those nodes off the network whenever they want.
>
> Even outside of adversarial settings, Bitcoin doesn't (and doesn't attempt
> to) promise consistency across mempools. Making a consensus rule that
> enforces mempool consistency is a recipe for (unintended?) chainsplits.
>
> - rijndael
>
> On 12/5/22 7:20 AM, El_Hoy via bitcoin-dev wrote:
>
>> The only option I see against the attack Peter Todd is doing to opt-in RBF
>> and 0Conf bitcoin usage is working on a bitcoin core implementation that
>> stops propagation of full-rbf replaced blocks. Running multiple of such
>> nodes on the network will add a risk to miners that enable full-rbf that
>> would work as an incentive against that.
>>
>> Obviously that would require adding an option on bitcoin core (that is not
>> technically but politically difficult to implement as Petter Todd already
>> have commit access to the main repository).
>>
>> That said, a sufficiently incentivized actor (like Daniel Lipshitz or Muun
>> wallet developers) could work on a fork and run several nodes with such
>> functionality. As far as I understand the percolation model, with 10 to 20
>> nodes running such a rule would create a significant risk for full-rbf
>> miners.
>>
>> Regards.
>>
>> --- Eloy
>>
>> On Tue, Nov 15, 2022 at 11:43 AM Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev
>> <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, Nov 15, 2022 at 03:36:08PM +1000, Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev
>>> wrote:
>>>> On Tue, Nov 08, 2022 at 01:16:13PM -0500, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev wrote:
>>>> > FYI I've gotten a few hundred dollars worth of donations to this effort,
>>>> > and
>>>> > have raised the reward to about 0.02 BTC, or $400 USD at current prices.
>>>>
>>>> Seems like this has been mostly claimed (0.014btc / $235, 9238sat/vb):
>>>
>>> I'm turning it back on when (if) the mempool settles down. I've got more
>>> than
>>> enough donations to give another run at it (the majority was donated
>>> privately
>>> FWIW). There's a risk of the mempool filling up again of course; hard to
>>> avoid
>>> that.
>>>
>>> Right now of course it's really easy to double spend with the obvious
>>> low-fee/high-fee method as the min relay fee keeps shifting.
>>>
>>>> https://mempool.space/tx/397dcbe4e95ec40616e3dfc4ff8ffa158d2e72020b7d11fc2be29d934d69138c
>>>>
>>>> The block it was claimed in seems to have been about an hour after the
>>>> default mempool filled up:
>>>>
>>>> https://twitter.com/murchandamus/status/1592274621977477120
>>>>
>>>> That block actually seems to have included two
>>>> alice.btc.calendar.opentimestamps.org txs, the other paying $7.88
>>>> (309sat/vb):
>>>>
>>>> https://mempool.space/tx/ba9670109a6551458d5e1e23600c7bf2dc094894abdf59fe7aa020ccfead07cf
>>>
>>> The second is because I turned down the full-rbf reward to more normal fee
>>> levels. There's also another full-rbf double-spend from the Bob calendar,
>>> along
>>> the same lines:
>>> 7e76b351009326a574f3120164dbbe6d85e07e04a7bbdc40f0277fcb008d2cd2
>>>
>>> I double-spent the txin of the high fee tx that got mined. But I mistakenly
>>> had
>>> RBF enabled in that double-spend, so while it propagated initially, I
>>> believe
>>> it was replaced when something (someone?) rebroadcast the high-fee 397dcb
>>> tx.
>>>
>>>> Timeline (utc) to me looks like:
>>>>
>>>> - 13:12 - block 763148 is mined: last one that had a min fee < 1.5sat/vb
>>>> - 13:33 - f503868c64d454c472859b793f3ee7cdc8f519c64f8b1748d8040cd8ce6dc6e1
>>>> is announced and propogates widely (1.2sat/vb)
>>>> - 18:42 - 746daab9bcc331be313818658b4a502bb4f3370a691fd90015fabcd7759e0944
>>>> is announced and propogates widely (1.2sat/vb)
>>>> - 21:52 - ba967010 tx is announced and propogates widely, since
>>>> conflicting tx 746daab9 has been removed from default
>>>> mempools
>>>> - 21:53 - murch tweets about default mempool filling up
>>>> - 22:03 - 397dcbe4 tx is announced and propogates widely, since
>>>> conflicting tx f503868 has already been removed from default
>>>> mempools
>>>
>>> Is that 22:03 time for 397 from your node's logs? It was originally
>>> announced
>>> hours earlier. From one of my full-rbf nodes:
>>>
>>> 2022-11-14T14:08:37Z [mempool] replacing tx
>>> 764867062b67fea61810c3858d587da83a28290545e882935a32285028084317 with
>>> 397dcbe4e95ec40616e3dfc4ff8ffa158d2e72020b7d11fc2be29d934d69138c for
>>> 0.00468 additional fees, -1 delta bytes
>>>
>>>> - 22:35 - block 763189 is mined
>>>> - 22:39 - block 763190 is mined
>>>> - 23:11 - block 763191 is mined
>>>> - 23:17 - block 763192 is mined including 397dcbe4
>>>>
>>>> miningpool.observer reports both 397dcbe4 and ba967010 as missing in the
>>>> first three blocks, and gives similar mempool ages for those txs to what
>>>> my logs report:
>>>>
>>>> https://miningpool.observer/template-and-block/0000000000000000000436aba59d8430061e0e50592215f7f263bfb1073ccac7
>>>> https://miningpool.observer/template-and-block/00000000000000000005600404792bacfd8a164d2fe9843766afb2bfbd937309
>>>> https://miningpool.observer/template-and-block/00000000000000000004a3073f58c9eae40f251ea7aeaeac870daeac4b238fd1
>>>>
>>>> That presumably means those pools (AntPool twice and "unknown") are
>>>> running with large mempools that didn't kept the earlier 1.2sat/vb txs.
>>>
>>> To be clear, you think that AntPool and that other exchange is running with
>>> a
>>> larger than normal max mempool size limit? You mean those miners *did* keep
>>> the
>>> earlier 1.2sat/vb tx?
>>>
>>>> The txs were mined by Foundry:
>>>>
>>>> https://miningpool.observer/template-and-block/00000000000000000001382a226aedac822de80309cca2bf1253b35d4f8144f5
>>>>
>>>> This seems to be pretty good evidence that we currently don't have any
>>>> significant hashrate mining with fullrbf policies (<0.5% if there was a
>>>> high fee replacement available prior to every block having been mined),
>>>> despite the bounty having been collected.
>>>
>>> Oh, we can put much lower bounds on that. I've been running OTS calendars
>>> with
>>> full-rbf replacements for a few months without clear evidence of a full-rbf
>>> replacement. While there was good reason to think some miners were mining
>>> full-rbf before a few years back, they probably didn't bother to reapply
>>> their
>>> patches each upgrade. `mempoolfullrbf=1` is much simpler to use.
>>>
>>> --
>>> https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
>>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
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