> If the only realistic (fair, efficient & proportionate) way to pay for > Bitcoin's security was by having some inflation scheme that violated the 21 > million cap, then agreeing to break the limit would probably be what makes > sense, and in the economic interest of its users and holders.
So, Paul Sztorc was right again, there are three options: Enormous Block Size Increases, Violate 21M Coin Limit, or >50% Miner Fee-Revenues Come From Merged Mining: https://www.truthcoin.info/images/sb-trilemma.png. And I think using Merged Mining is the best option. More about that: https://www.truthcoin.info/blog/security-budget-ii-mm/ > Another option, if we were to decide we are over-secured in the short term, > would be to soft-fork in a reduction in the current and near-future mining > rewards, by somehow locking the coins in a contract that deprived the miner > of the full reward, and then using that contract to pay the rewards out far > in the future, should at some point we feel the security budget was > insufficient. Yes, that's also possible, RSK uses that. And making some kind of soft-fork for that is also possible, but I don't know if miners will agree to send some coinbase reward to "<futureBlockNumber> OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY OP_DROP OP_TRUE". On 2022-07-06 06:29:18 user Corey Haddad via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: >Bitcoin's finite supply is the main argument for people investing in it, the >whole narrative around bitcoin is based on its finite supply. While it has its >flaws and basically condemns bitcoin to be only used as a store >of value (and >not as a currency), I don't think it's worth questioning it at this point. > >Just my 2 sats. > >Giuseppe. A finite supply alone is not enough to give something value, as it must also be useful in some way. In the case of Bitcoin, various forms of cryptographic security must all work - and work together - to make Bitcoin useful. If the only realistic (fair, efficient & proportionate) way to pay for Bitcoin's security was by having some inflation scheme that violated the 21 million cap, then agreeing to break the limit would probably be what makes sense, and in the economic interest of its users and holders. There will always be competitive pressures with respect to efficiency, and both being over-secured and under-secured would be economically inefficient for a crypto currency, and thereby laving room for a more optimally-secured competitor to gain ground. Currently there is zero feedback in the Bitcoin system between what we might think is the optimum amount of security and what actually exists. There is also zero agreement on how much security would constitute such an optimum. Figuring out how much security is needed, or even better, figuring out a way to have a market mechanism to answer that question, will be an important project. Another option, if we were to decide we are over-secured in the short term, would be to soft-fork in a reduction in the current and near-future mining rewards, by somehow locking the coins in a contract that deprived the miner of the full reward, and then using that contract to pay the rewards out far in the future, should at some point we feel the security budget was insufficient. Anthony Towns presented a form of this concept in greater detail at a Scaling Bitcoin conference some years ago. While this solution, if employed, would only work for some finite amount of time, it is possible that could give additional decades before the accumulated security budget was exhausted. Corey _______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
