On Thu, Dec 09, 2021 at 07:12:45AM -0500, Alex Schoof wrote: > The multisig scheme is interesting. From my understanding of Single Use > Seals, since seal n commits to seal n+1, for the on-chain aggregation seals > you would want to pick some common aggregation service provider ahead of > time and if that provider disappears, you’re stuck and cant close the next > seal. If instead you say “this seal commits to three of the five of these > next seals” then you mitigate both availability and censorship risk. Am I > getting that right?
Re: "some common aggregation service provider", you might be misunderstanding the protocol: since seals are trustless with regard to validity, I can validate your seal, regardless of which aggregation service you use. But other than that, I think we're on the same page! A concrete example would be an exchange: they do a lot of transactions, so they could choose to be their own aggregator, and wouldn't need any multisig at all because they can trust themselves not to censor themselves. :) Meanwhile, one of their customers might use 3-of-5 as you suggest, as they only do a few transactions a month. Interestingly, in some scenarios it might be worthwhile to both run your own aggregator, and use multisig. Eg Alice could use a 2-of-3 with two third-party aggregators, and her own aggregation chain. If both third-parties are up, she does no on-chain transactions at all; if one third-party is down, she can use her own, and the remaining third-party. Thus she would only do an on-chain transaction to defeat censorship/failure. -- https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
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