> I’ve seen no actual demonstration of the relevance of game theory to Bitcoin. >People throw the words around quite a bit, but I can’t give you an answer >because I have found no evidence of a valid game theoretic model applicable to >Bitcoin. It’s not a game, it’s a market.
Agree its difficult to predict and include all the possible things that may happen. Two articles I had read in past that explained few things based on game theory: https://jimmysong.medium.com/uasf-bip148-scenarios-and-game-theory-9530336d953e https://jimmysong.medium.com/segwit2x-game-theory-scenarios-part-1-7f863904a72 > Who knows, I don’t get invited to round table meetings. My question was related to discussions on mailing list, IRC channels, Reddit, Twitter, GitHub etc. Not sure if everyone does but few had no issues with Taproot before signaling according to https://web.archive.org/web/20210316221837/https://taprootactivation.com/ > Every time two people trade both party validates what they receive (not what >they trade away). Those receiving Bitcoin are economically relevant and their >power is a function of how much they are doing so. Agree. Running and 'using' the node for economic activity can be considered enforcing consensus rules. > Majority miners can enforce censorship by simply not building on any >non-censoring blocks. This is what soft fork enforcement is. I am not sure about this. > I don’t see that it needs a label apart from signaling. There are many kinds >of voting. It would be hard to equate signaling with any of them. It’s a >public signal that the miner who mined a given block miner intends to censor, >that’s all. Signaling can be done for many things. In this case I think miners are signaling 'readiness'. Pieter Wuille had answered a related question on SE: https://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/97043/is-there-an-active-list-of-bips-currently-open-for-voting/ Since this is misunderstood or misinterpreted by many, I had even requested Hampus Sjöberg to mention this in https://taproot.watch/ : https://github.com/hsjoberg/fork-explorer/issues/57 -- Prayank Jun 30, 2021, 14:47 by e...@voskuil.org: > > Hi Prayank, > > > > > > > So majority hash power not following the consensus rules can result in > > chain split? > > > > > > Any two people on different rules implies a chain split. That’s presumably > why rule changes are called forks. There is no actual concept of “the rules” > just one set of rules or another. > > > > > > > Why would majority of miners decide to mine a chain that nobody wants to > > use? > > > > > > I don’t presume to know why people prefer one thing over another, or what > people want to use, nor does economics. > > > > > > > What are different things possible in this case based on game theory? > > > > > > I’ve seen no actual demonstration of the relevance of game theory to Bitcoin. > People throw the words around quite a bit, but I can’t give you an answer > because I have found no evidence of a valid game theoretic model applicable > to Bitcoin. It’s not a game, it’s a market. > > > > > > > Do miners and mining pools participate in discussions before signaling for > > a soft fork begins? > > > > > > Who knows, I don’t get invited to round table meetings. > > > > > > > Can they still mine something else post activation even if signaling > > readiness for soft fork? > > > > > > A person can mine whatever they want. Signaling does not compel a miner to > enforce. Each block mined is anonymous. But each miner seeing the signals of > others, unless they are coordinating, would presumably assume that others > will enforce. > > > > > > > Who enforces consensus rules technically in Bitcoin? Full nodes or Miners? > > > > > > A node (software) doesn’t enforce anything. Merchants enforce consensus rules > when they reject trading for something that they don’t consider money. Every > time two people trade both party validates what they receive (not what they > trade away). Those receiving Bitcoin are economically relevant and their > power is a function of how much they are doing so. > > > > > > Miners censor, which is inconsequential unless enforced. Majority miners can > enforce censorship by simply not building on any non-censoring blocks. This > is what soft fork enforcement is. > > > > > > > Is soft fork signaling same as voting? > > > > > > I don’t see that it needs a label apart from signaling. There are many kinds > of voting. It would be hard to equate signaling with any of them. It’s a > public signal that the miner who mined a given block miner intends to censor, > that’s all. > > > > > > > According to my understanding, miners follow the consensus rules enforced > > by full nodes and get (subsidy + fees) for their work. > > > > > > Miners mine a chain, which ever one they want. There are many. They earn the > block reward. > > > > > > > Signaling is not voting although lot of people consider it voting including > > some mining pools and exchanges. > > > > > > What people consider it is inconsequential. It has clearly defined behavior. > > > > > > e > > > > > > > > From:> Prayank <pray...@tutanota.de> > Sent:> Sunday, June 27, 2021 5:01 AM > To:> e...@voskuil.org > Cc:> Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> > Subject:> Re: [bitcoin-dev] Trinary Version Signaling for softfork > > > > > > > > Hello Eric, > > > > > > I have few questions: > > > > > > > Without majority hash power support, activation simply means you are off on > >a chain split. > > > > > > So majority hash power not following the consensus rules can result in chain > split? Why would majority of miners decide to mine a chain that nobody wants > to use? What are different things possible in this case based on game theory? > > > > > > > And activation without majority hash power certainly does not “ensure” this. > > > > > > Do miners and mining pools participate in discussions before signaling for a > soft fork begins? Can they still mine something else post activation even if > signaling readiness for soft fork? > > > > > > > If one wants to enforce a soft fork (or otherwise censor) this is > >accomplished by mining (or paying others to do so). Anyone can mine, so > >everyone gets a say. Mining is trading capital now for more later. If enough > >people want to do that, they can enforce a soft fork. It’s time Bitcoiners > >stop thinking of miners as other people. Anyone can mine, and that’s your > >vote. > > > > > > Who enforces consensus rules technically in Bitcoin? Full nodes or Miners? > > > > > > Is soft fork signaling same as voting? > > > > > > According to my understanding, miners follow the consensus rules enforced by > full nodes and get (subsidy + fees) for their work. Signaling is not voting > although lot of people consider it voting including some mining pools and > exchanges. > > > > > > > > > -- > > > Prayank > >
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