https://github.com/libbitcoin/libbitcoin/wiki/Other-Means-Principle
>> On Mon, Jun 18, 2018 at 11:39 AM Артём Литвинович via bitcoin-dev >> <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: >> Dilution is a potential attack i randomly came up with in a Twitter >> arguement and couldn't find any references to or convincing arguments of it >> being implausible. >> >> Suppose a malicious actor were to acquire a majority of hash power, and >> proceed to use that hash power to produce valid, but empty blocks. >> >> As far as i understand it, this would effectively reduce the block rate by >> half or more and since nodes can't differentiate block relay and block >> production there would be nothing they can do to adjust difficulty or black >> list the attacker. >> >> At a rough estimate of $52 per TH equipment cost (Antminer pricing) and 12.5 >> BTC per 10 minutes power cost we are looking at an order of $2 billion of >> equipment and $0.4 billion a month of power costs (ignoring block reward) to >> maintain an attack - easily within means of even a minor government-scale >> actor. >> >> Is that a plausible scenario, or am i chasing a mirage? If it is plausible, >> what could be done to mitigate it? >> >> >> -Artem >> _______________________________________________ >> bitcoin-dev mailing list >> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org >> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
_______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
