> Still, re-reading your initital post, I'm convinced that the weakening of the > DoS protections is probably not a huge problem, so maybe lets try this in a > release and see what happens.
Awesome! I very much agree. The relaxation of some of these DoS prevention rules I think will really open up a lot of use cases and adoption > Notably, if people actually use this new replacement behavior, the > institutions > doing these sweeps of unconfirmed outputs might stop doing that! Agree, I'm pretty sure it's unintentional. I know a lot of services struggle with coin selection, so what they do is conceptually have a receive wallet from which they can sweep to their hot wallet (or cold storage) to keep their utxo manageable. Currently some of them are sweeping unconfirmed inputs with it, but I don't think it's a conscious design choice, just something that happens to be working well now. (FWIW I observed this behavior like 6+ months ago, I haven't kept track of if it's still happening or how often. But at the time I had to write off the idea of low-fee rbf batch transactions as it was happening too often to be feasible) -Ryan ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ On March 9, 2018 1:28 PM, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > > > On Thu, Mar 08, 2018 at 03:07:43PM -0500, Russell O'Connor wrote: > > > On Thu, Mar 8, 2018 at 1:34 PM, Peter Todd p...@petertodd.org wrote: > > > > > But that's not a good argument: whether or not normal users are trying to > > > > > > attack each other has nothing to do with whether or not you're opening up > > > > > > an > > > > > > attack by relaxing anti-DoS protections. > > > > I'm not suggesting removing the anti-DoS protections. I'm suggesting that > > > > replaced transaction require a fee increase of at least the min-fee-rate > > > > times the size of all the transactions being ejected (in addition to the > > > > other proposed requirements). > > Fair: you're not removing them entirely, but you are weakening them compared > to > > the status quo. > > > > Equally, how often are normal users who aren't attacking each other > > > > > > creating > > > > > > issues anyway? You can always have your wallet code just skip use of RBF > > > > replacements in the event that someone does spend an unconfirmed output that > > > > > you sent them; how often does this actually happen in practice? > > > > Just ask rhavar. It happens regularly. > > > > Not many wallets let you spend unconfirmed outputs that you didn't create. > > > > > > > > > The problem is with institutional wallets sweeping incoming payments. It > > > > seems that in practice they are happy to sweep unconfirmed outputs. > > Pity, that does sound like a problem. :( > > > Setting all of the above aside for a moment. We need to understand that > > > > rational miners are going to prefer to transactions with higher package fee > > > > rates regardless of whatever your personal preferred RBF policy is. If we > > > > do not bring the RBF policy to alignment with what is economically > > > > rational, then miners are going to change their own policies anyways, > > > > probably all in slightly different ways. It behooves everyone to develop a > > > > reasonable standard RBF policy, that is still robust against possible DoS > > > > vectors, and aligns with miner incentives, so that all participants know > > > > what behaviour they can reasonably expect. It is simply a bonus that this > > > > change in RBF policy also partially mitigates the problem of pinned > > > > transactions. > > Miners and full nodes have slightly different priorities here; it's not clear > > to me why it matters that they implement slightly different policies. > > Still, re-reading your initital post, I'm convinced that the weakening of the > > DoS protections is probably not a huge problem, so maybe lets try this in a > > release and see what happens. > > Notably, if people actually use this new replacement behavior, the > institutions > > doing these sweeps of unconfirmed outputs might stop doing that! That's > > probably a good thing, as respends of potentially conflicted unconfirmed > > outputs can be dangerous in reorgs; we're better off if outputs are buried > > deeply before being spent again. > > > ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > https://petertodd.org 'peter'\[:-1\]@petertodd.org > > bitcoin-dev mailing list > > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev _______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
