I don't know what you mean by "render the replay threat moot." If you don't have replay protection, replay is always a threat. A very serious one.
-- Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also sharing with the NSA. > On Jun 6, 2017, at 5:19 PM, Kekcoin <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > Hmm, that's not the difference I was talking about. I was referring to the > fact that using "post-chainsplit coinbases from the non-148 chain" to > unilaterally (ie. can be done without action on the 148-chain) taint coins is > more secure in extreme-adverserial cases such as secret-mining reorg attacks > (as unfeasibly expensive they may be); the only large-scale (>100 block) > reorganization the non-148 chain faces should be a resolution of the > chainsplit and therefore render the replay threat moot. >
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