> Bitcoin would lose the security and in the short term even the ability to mine blocks every 10 minutes.
Presumably a POW hard fork would be accompanied by a difficulty reset, so that the deployment didn't have *both* of these problems from the outset. There's really little difference between 10 minutes at little/no security and zero conf. See testnet. But people might feel better about still seeing blocks. But in any case it's not clear to me why you assume a loss of security in the "short term" is something that can be overcome. The short term can presumably prevent the long term from ever becoming. e > On Mar 7, 2017, at 1:17 AM, Tom Zander via bitcoin-dev > <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > >> On Tuesday, 7 March 2017 00:23:47 CET Gareth Williams via bitcoin-dev wrote: >> What you're describing is a hashpower activated soft fork to censor >> transactions, in response to a user activated soft fork that the majority >> of hashpower disagrees with. > > It is incorrect to say that censoring of transactions is what Edmund > suggested. It's purely about the form they take, you can re-send the > transaction in a different form with the same content and they go through. > Hence, not transaction censoring. > > I do believe the point that Edmund brought up is a very good one, the idea > that a set of users can force the miners to do something is rather silly and > the setup that a minority miner fraction can force the majority to do > something is equally silly. This is because the majority mining hashpower > can fight back against this attack upon them. > > Don’t be mistaken; a hash-minority attacking the hash-majority is in actual > fact an attack upon Bitcoin as a whole. > If this were possible then next year we’d see governments try to push > through changes in the same UASF way. I’m very happy that UASFs can’t work > because that would be the end of Bitcoin's freedom and decentralized nature. > >> It is always possible for a majority of hashpower to censor transactions >> they disagree with. Users may view that as an attack, and can always >> respond with a POW hard fork. > > I definitely welcome that approach. > > The result would be that you have two chains, but also you ensure that the > chain that the miners didn’t like will no longer be something they can mine. > Not even the minority set of miners that like the softfork can mine on it. > This is a win-win and then the market will decide which one will "win". > >> Bitcoin only works if the majority of hashpower is not hostile to the >> users. > > This goes both ways, miners both generate value (in the form of security) > and they take value (in the form of inflation). > If the majority of the users are hostile and reject blocks that the miners > create, or change the POW, then what the miners bring to the table is also > removed. > Bitcoin would lose the security and in the short term even the ability to > mine blocks every 10 minutes. > > So, lets correct your statement a little; > «Bitcoin only works when the majority of the hashpower and the (economic) > majority of the users are balanced in power and have their goals aligned.» > > -- > Tom Zander > Blog: https://zander.github.io > Vlog: https://vimeo.com/channels/tomscryptochannel > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev _______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
