Doesn't a good soft fork signaling mechanism along with an activation warning system for non-upgraded nodes (i.e. BIP9, or even block version ISM for that matter) essentially fix this? I don't quite get why this should be an issue.
On December 17, 2015 10:52:39 AM PST, Jeff Garzik via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: >On Thu, Dec 17, 2015 at 1:46 PM, jl2012 <jl2...@xbt.hk> wrote: > >> This is not correct. >> >> As only about 1/3 of nodes support BIP65 now, would you consider CLTV >tx >> are less secure than others? I don't think so. Since one invalid CLTV >tx >> will make the whole block invalid. Having more nodes to fully >validate >> non-CLTV txs won't make them any safer. The same logic also applies >to SW >> softfork. >> > > >Yes - the logic applies to all soft forks. Each soft fork degrades the >security of non-upgraded nodes. > >The core design of bitcoin is that trustless nodes validate the work of >miners, not trust them. > >Soft forks move in the opposite direction. Each new soft-forked >feature >leans very heavily on miner trust rather than P2P network validation. > > >------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >_______________________________________________ >bitcoin-dev mailing list >bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org >https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
_______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
