Maybe Jeff can clarify but my communications with him seemed to imply he didn't think any kind of difficulty penalty scheme is workable. I strongly dispute that assertion.
On Thu, Sep 3, 2015 at 7:23 PM, Jorge Timón <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > Greg, I believe Jeff is focusing on BtcDrak's proposal ( > https://gist.github.com/btcdrak/1c3a323100a912b605b5 ) where the > increased nBits are used to vote for the block size to raise > permanently ( or until it gets voted down). > His arguments don't seem to apply to your original proposal (where the > size is only increased for that block). > > > On Thu, Sep 3, 2015 at 7:57 PM, Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev > <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: >> On Thu, Sep 3, 2015 at 2:40 PM, Jeff Garzik <jgar...@gmail.com> wrote: >>> Expanding on pay-with-diff and volatility (closing comment), >>> >>> Users and miners will have significant difficulty creating and/or predicting >>> a stable block size (and fee environment) with pay-with-diff across the >>> months. The ability of businesses to plan is low. Chaos and >>> unpredictability are bad in general for markets and systems. Thus the >>> binary conclusion of "not get used" or "volatility" >> >> Sorry, I'm still not following. I agree that predictability is important. >> >> I don't follow where unpredictability is coming from here. Most (all?) >> of the difficulty based adjustments had small limits on the difficulty >> change that wouldn't have substantially changed the interblock times >> relative to orphaning. >> >>> It's written as 'a' and/or 'b'. If you don't have idle hashpower, then >>> paying with difficulty requires some amount of collusion ('a') >>> Any miner paying with a higher difficulty either needs idle hashpower, or >>> self-increase their own difficulty at the possible opportunity cost of >>> losing an entire block's income to another miner who doesn't care about >>> changing the block size. The potential loss does not economically >>> compensate for size increase gains in most cases, when you consider the >>> variability of blocks (they come in bursts and pauses) and the fee income >>> that would be associated >> >> What the schemes propose is blocksize that increases fast with >> difficulty over a narrow window. The result is that your odds of >> producing a block are slightly reduced but the block you produce if >> you do is more profitable: but only if there is a good supply of >> transactions which pay real fees compariable to the ones you're >> already taking. The same trade-off exists at the moment with respect >> to orphaning risk and miners still produce large blocks, producing a >> larger block means a greater chance you're not successful (due to >> orphaning) but you have a greater utility. The orphing mediated risk >> is fragile and can be traded off for centeralization advantage or by >> miners bypassing validation, issues which at least so far we have no >> reason to believe exist for size mediated schemes. >> >> As you know, mining is not a race (ignoring edge effects with >> orphaning/propagation time). Increasing difficulty does not put you at >> an expected return disavantage compared to other miners so long as the >> income increases at least proportionally (otherwise pooling with low >> diff shares would be an astronomically losing proposition :)!). >> >> Pay-for-size schemes have been successfully used in some altcoins >> without the effects you're suggesting. >> _______________________________________________ >> bitcoin-dev mailing list >> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org >> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev _______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
