On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 7:10 PM, Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > Mitigate a potential CPU exhaustion denial-of-service attack by limiting > the maximum size of a transaction included in a block.
This seems like a fairly indirect approach. The resource being watched for is not the size (otherwise two transactions for 200k would be strictly worse than one 200k transactions) but the potential of N^2 costs related to repeated hashing in checksig; which this ignores. The cost of the indirection is forclosing future applications which involve larger signatures but have no quadratic component and are thus fast to verify-- or requring yet another hard fork to remove the limit, or a kludgy soft fork that splits the same data across two "transactions" which get processed as a unit... all would be unfortunate. Alternative 1 sounds more attractive to be for this reason as it's more direct. _______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
