Hi Matthijs,
thanks, that explains a bunch.
I checked both domain with '/rndc dnssec -status/' and they do show
different states:
# rndc dnssec -status psihopat.si
dnssec-policy: nsec3_no_rotate
current time: Wed Oct 2 14:25:31 2024
key: 37651 (ECDSAP256SHA256), ZSK
published: yes - since Tue Oct 1 20:23:24 2024
zone signing: yes - since Tue Oct 1 20:23:24 2024
No rollover scheduled
- goal: omnipresent
- dnskey: omnipresent
*- zone rrsig: rumoured*
key: 7162 (ECDSAP256SHA256), KSK
published: yes - since Tue Oct 1 20:23:24 2024
key signing: yes - since Tue Oct 1 20:23:24 2024
No rollover scheduled
- goal: omnipresent
- dnskey: omnipresent
*- ds: hidden*
- key rrsig: omnipresent
# rndc dnssec -status sociopat.si
dnssec-policy: nsec3_no_rotate
current time: Wed Oct 2 14:25:34 2024
key: 17354 (ECDSAP256SHA256), ZSK
published: yes - since Tue Oct 1 10:09:53 2024
zone signing: yes - since Tue Oct 1 10:09:53 2024
No rollover scheduled
- goal: omnipresent
- dnskey: omnipresent
- zone rrsig: omnipresent
key: 61220 (ECDSAP256SHA256), KSK
published: yes - since Tue Oct 1 10:09:53 2024
key signing: yes - since Tue Oct 1 10:09:53 2024
No rollover scheduled
- goal: omnipresent
- dnskey: omnipresent
*- ds: rumoured*
- key rrsig: omnipresent
So I ran /rndc dnssec -checkds published**/for both zones:
# rndc dnssec -checkds published sociopat.si
Marked DS as published since 02-Oct-2024 14:33:33.000
# rndc dnssec -checkds published legenda.si
Marked DS as published since 02-Oct-2024 14:33:47.000
That changed KSK DS state from *hidden* to *rumoured* for psihopat.si,
but made no change to sociopat.si.
Should the change be immediate or is it also TTL dependent?
Regards,
Danilo
On 2. 10. 24 13:10, Matthijs Mekking wrote:
Hi Danilo,
When you enable DNSSEC for the first time, first the DNSKEY and the
signatures need to be introduced in the zone, and propagated to the
world. The propagation depends on the TTL values, and these are
derived from the dnssec-policy configuration. By default it takes more
than a day because of max-zone-ttl is set to 86400.
Only then it is fully safe to publish the DS, so at that point BIND
will publish the CDS/CDNSKEY records.
Note that this long delay is only when you enable DNSSEC, key
rollovers only need to take the DNSKEY TTL into account (plus some
safety and propagation values).
So you submitted the DS too soon. Luckily the delay on the first sign
is pretty conservative and your zones appear to be fine after
publishing the DS. But in an automated way (CDS polling), the DS would
have been submitted later than you did.
Three more comments:
1.
> I thought that Bind checks the DS on the parent and only publishes
CDS > / CDNSKEY if DS doesn't exist or is in some way different.
No. The CDS/CDNSKEY RRset is published and won't be removed from the
zone.
The RFC says that when the Parent DS is in sync with the CDS/CDNSKEY
RRset, the Child DNS Operator MAY delete the CDS/CDNSKEY RRset.
We chose not to do so, because it can be handy to see what the DS
records in the parent should be given what CDS/CDNSKEY RRset is
published in the child zone.
2.
Depending on your configuration, BIND will check if the DS is actually
in the parent zone. If it does not, you have to check it manually and
tell BIND with the 'rndc dnssec -checkds' command. Otherwise, the DS
may stay in the "Rumoured" state indefinitely, and this can influence
future key rollovers.
3.
You can use the options 'cds-digest-types' and 'cdnskey' to set what
RRsets need to be published.
Hope this helps, best regards,
Matthijs
On 10/2/24 12:42, Danilo Godec via bind-users wrote:
Hi Greg,
thanks for the answer.
I knew that CDS and CDNSKEY are just in my own zone and (as far as I
understand), serve to inform the parent DNS about (upcoming?) changes
in DS / DNSKEY records. I'm not quite sure about establishing the
initial trust with the parent, but as our ccTLD parent DNS doesn't
support CDS / CDNSKEY it's not a big deal anyway.
What I don't understand is why Bind published CDS / CDNSKEY just for
one of two very similar domains? Initially I thought that Bind checks
the DS on the parent and only publishes CDS / CDNSKEY if DS doesn't
exist or is in some way different.
Regards,
Danilo
On 2. 10. 24 12:19, Greg Choules wrote:
Hi Danilo.
The CDS and CDNSKEY are published in your own zone, not anywhere
else. You can confirm this by doing a dig for them directly, or AXFR
if you permit transfers on your server.
They are intended for use with registrars that *do* support
automatic DS creation using one of them. If yours doesn't and you
already published your DS in the parent, then no big deal. The CDS
and CDNSKEY will just sit in your zone and you don't have to do
anything with them.
Does that help?
Cheers, Greg
On Wed, 2 Oct 2024 at 10:58, Danilo Godec via bind-users
<bind-users@lists.isc.org> wrote:
Hi all,
yesterday I filled my day fiddling with DNSSEC for a couple of my
test domains - both have been signed 'manually' before, but I
haven't published the DS record.
So yesterday I setup both for dnssec-policy, while also changing
the signing algorithm and keys (basically started from scratch):
dnssec-policy "nsec3_no_rotate" {
keys {
ksk key-directory lifetime unlimited algorithm 13;
zsk key-directory lifetime unlimited algorithm 13;
};
nsec3param iterations 0 optout false;
};
...
zone "sociopat.si <http://sociopat.si>" {
type master;
file "master/Danci/sociopat.si.hosts";
key-directory "master/Danci/keys";
dnssec-policy "nsec3_no_rotate";
inline-signing yes;
};
zone "psihopat.si <http://psihopat.si>" {
type master;
file "master/Danci/psihopat.si.hosts";
key-directory "master/Danci/keys";
dnssec-policy "nsec3_no_rotate";
inline-signing yes;
};
...
I published DS records through my registrar and after a couple of
hours all seemed fine - both Verisign dnssec-analyzer and DNSViz
show no errors or warnings for them.
However, today bind logged this:
named[17379]: general: info: CDNSKEY for
keysociopat.si/ECDSAP256SHA256/61220
<http://sociopat.si/ECDSAP256SHA256/61220> is now published
named[17379]: general: info: CDS for
keysociopat.si/ECDSAP256SHA256/61220
<http://sociopat.si/ECDSAP256SHA256/61220> is now published
I'm pretty sure this is not bad or wrong, but I would like to
sort-of understand, why Bind decided it needs to publish CDS /
CDNSKEY for this one and not the other one, given that DS records
are published in ccTLDs:
# dig dssociopat.si <http://sociopat.si>
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;sociopat.si <http://sociopat.si>. IN DS
;; ANSWER SECTION:
sociopat.si <http://sociopat.si>. 5826 IN DS 61220
13 2 D8C1553B3D6BCF7A704A3D821069F57B6946DCA1D198D303E3B4C730 616F92AD
# dig dspsihopat.si <http://psihopat.si>
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;psihopat.si <http://psihopat.si>. IN DS
;; ANSWER SECTION:
psihopat.si <http://psihopat.si>. 7200 IN DS 7162
13 2 3C5A5625F848DBCF99A0B85017AFE04FD1F681037B61BE970D57AE9F 90F21CD8
Also, as far as I know, .si DNS servers don't support CDS /
CDNSKEY, so publishing them might be futile.
Regards,
Danilo
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