Mark,

Most invaluement subscribers do direct queries - to hostnames that end with my own valid domain names that don't have this DNSSEC issue - those are the ONE ones that make use of public DNS and are broadcast across the internet.

Our usage of ".local" zones for those who are RSYNC'ing our data - dates back to something like 2007, and the RFC you referred to is from 2013. By the time this RFC had been published, we'd already had customer using the ".local" for 6 years. At the time that came out in 2013, I assessed whether I needed to get my clients to change that, but it didn't seem to effect anyone. Again, those of our subscribers who RSYNC our data and use the ".local" zone names - are just using that for 100% local usage, and are not trying to broadcast it across the internet. And in many of THOSE cases, if the BIND and RBLDND are on the same computer, as is often the case, it doesn't even go out to the LAN - this is all on one single computer.

So are you claiming that if I simply changed the zone naming form ending in ".local" - to something else - such as ".dnsbl" - then all my problems would go away? And the forwarder will start working? (even though rbldnsd doesn't do DNSSEC)

That would be EXCELLENT news! Or, if that doesn't actually fix my problem, do you have any suggestions that actually address my actual question?

Rob McEwen

On 9/10/2020 7:37 PM, Mark Andrews wrote:
.local is for mDNS (RFC 6762).  Do not use it for other purposes as you are 
hijacking the namespace.

The best solution is to NOT change the name of the zones from those that you 
use publicly.  That way they have the correct DNSSEC chain of trust down from 
the root.  If you want to use different zone names then create delegations to 
empty unsigned zones (SOA and NS records only) like those done for 
10.IN-ADDR.ARPA in a zone you control.  That breaks the DNSSEC chain of trust 
at the delegation point.  If you later decide you want to sign these zones you 
can do so and link them into the DNSSEC chain of trust.  Just sign both the 
rbldsnd-formatted files and the empty zones.

If you absolutely must continue to hijack the .local namespace, which is 
allocated for a different purpose, then add validate-except entries to 
named.conf

Mark

On 11 Sep 2020, at 01:56, Rob McEwen <r...@invaluement.com> wrote:

I manage an anti-spam DNSBL and I've been running into an issue in recent years 
- that I'm FINALLY getting around to asking about. I just joined this list to 
ask this question. Also, I checked the archives, but couldn't find an answer - 
at least, not one I understood.

So basically, while most of our users do direct queries and don't have this issue - some 
of our larger subscribers RSYNC the rbldsnd-formatted files, and then they typically run 
rbldnsd on the same server as their BIND server that is answering their DNSBL queries. 
Then, their invaluement zone names will all end with "invaluement.local". 
Typically, their RBLDNSD server is set up to listen on 127.0.0.2 - and then they use BIND 
for answering their DNSBL queries, and so they tell BIND to get its answers for THOSE 
invaluement dnsbl queries by doing a DNS forwarder, telling bind to get the answers for 
THOSE zones from 127.0.0.2 - as shown below:

zone "invaluement.local" in {
   type forward;
   forward only;
   forwarders { 127.0.0.2; };
};

This works perfectly - so long as DNSSEC is turned off. And since most of our 
subscribers are running a dedicated instance of BIND that is ONLY used for 
DNSBL queries, they don't mind turning DNSSEC off.

But, occasionally, we have a customer who cannot turn DNSSEC off. So I was 
hoping that THIS command would work:

dnssec-must-be-secure "invaluement.local" no;

But it doesn't seem to be helping at all. Is that command suppose to disable DNSSEC checking for a 
particular zone? If yes, what did I do wrong? If not, what does "dnssec-must-be-secure" 
set to "no" do?

I've heard that there is NOT a way to get this to work - and that such 
subscribers much use DNS Delegation, instead. But I really wish         this 
could be done by simply turning off DNSSEC for a particular zone. That could be 
useful for MANY various types of internal zones that need this. But if this is 
that case, how would that DNS Delegation look, to get the above forwarding 
example to work using delegation instead?

Thanks in advance for your help!

--
Rob McEwen, invaluement
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--
Rob McEwen
https://www.invaluement.com
+1 (478) 475-9032


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