> This turned out to be happening because Windows DNS was actually sending its
> query as "dig badsign-A.test.dnssec-tools.org +dnssec +cdflag", in other
> words telling BIND not to perform DNSSEC validation.
Agreed. Looking at a Wireshark capture, it does look like this was the
case with the Windows 2008 R2 query:
Flags: 0x0110 Standard query
0... .... .... .... = Response: Message is a query
.000 0... .... .... = Opcode: Standard query (0)
.... ..0. .... .... = Truncated: Message is not truncated
.... ...1 .... .... = Recursion desired: Do query recursively
.... .... .0.. .... = Z: reserved (0)
.... .... ...1 .... = Non-authenticated data: Acceptable <--
CD flag set here
with:
Additional records
<Root>: type OPT
Name: <Root>
Type: OPT (EDNS0 option)
UDP payload size: 4000
Higher bits in extended RCODE: 0x0
EDNS0 version: 0
Z: 0x8000
Bit 0 (DO bit): 1 (Accepts DNSSEC security RRs) <-- DO
flag set here
Bits 1-15: 0x0 (reserved)
Data length: 0
returning this as a result (non-validated, even with DNSSEC validation
turned on at the BIND side):
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 18664
;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1
;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 4000
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;badsign-A.test.dnssec-tools.org. IN A
;; ANSWER SECTION:
badsign-A.test.dnssec-tools.org. 85968 IN A 75.119.216.33
whereas Windows 2012 does have the CD flag turned off by default:
Flags: 0x0100 Standard query
0... .... .... .... = Response: Message is a query
.000 0... .... .... = Opcode: Standard query (0)
.... ..0. .... .... = Truncated: Message is not truncated
.... ...1 .... .... = Recursion desired: Do query recursively
.... .... .0.. .... = Z: reserved (0)
.... .... ...0 .... = Non-authenticated data: Unacceptable <--
CD flag is off
Additional records
<Root>: type OPT
Name: <Root>
Type: OPT (EDNS0 option)
UDP payload size: 4000
Higher bits in extended RCODE: 0x0
EDNS0 version: 0
Z: 0x8000
Bit 0 (DO bit): 1 (Accepts DNSSEC security RRs) <-- DO
flag is on
Bits 1-15: 0x0 (reserved)
Data length: 0
and SERVFAIL returned:
; <<>> DiG 9.9.3-P1 <<>> @127.0.0.1 badsign-A.test.dnssec-tools.org
; (1 server found)
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: SERVFAIL, id: 48614
;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1
> It turned out not to be possible to enable DNSSEC validation on the Windows
> domain controller itself, because the mechanism for entering the DNS root
> trust anchor was also broken.
Looks that way to me as well. From what I can see in R2, the only
trust anchor algorithm that is supported is RSA/SHA-1, not compatible
with the root's algorithm 8 (RSA/SHA-256). Looking at the algorithm
list in 2012 though, it seems like many new algorithms are now
supported.
> Based on a Microsoft tech support case that I opened, the only way to fix
> this was to turn off EDNS ("dnscmd /config /EnableEDnsProbes 0").
> This also seems to have been fixed in Windows Server 2012.
What a bummer, this essentially stops anyone from using DNSSEC
validation correctly on R2. And while DNSSEC validation is a useful
utility, what concerns me more is the inability for other
organizations / entities to be able to look up our DNSSEC signed
zones, especially with the fact that IPv6 is enabled by default on R2,
causing unanticipated service failures for these organizations /
entities.
Taking comcast.com as an example again, if Exchange was to send mail
to a @comcast.com address, it will do the following lookups:
; <<>> DiG 9.9.3-P1 <<>> @127.0.0.1 comcast.com MX
; (1 server found)
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 19571
;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 4, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 5
;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 4000
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;comcast.com. IN MX
;; ANSWER SECTION:
comcast.com. 600 IN MX 5 mx1.comcast.com.
comcast.com. 600 IN MX 5 mx4.comcast.com.
comcast.com. 600 IN MX 5 mx2.comcast.com.
comcast.com. 600 IN MX 5 mx3.comcast.com.
;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:
mx1.comcast.com. 3600 IN A 76.96.32.247
mx4.comcast.com. 7200 IN A 69.241.43.118
mx2.comcast.com. 7200 IN A 76.96.32.252
mx3.comcast.com. 7200 IN A 69.241.43.117
----
; <<>> DiG 9.9.3-P1 <<>> @127.0.0.1 mx1.comcast.com AAAA
; (1 server found)
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: SERVFAIL, id: 13421
;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1
;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 4000
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;mx1.comcast.com. IN AAAA
----
And mail bounces in Exchange because DNS lookup for the mail server
supposedly "failed." (it never gets to try the A records themselves).
Unless the system administrator knows about this issue, I really doubt
they will go try disabling EDNS or IPv6. Instead I think our DNS
servers would be to blame for this issue (which I half agree, due to
the tampering of the order of the RRs by BIND9 returned).
Now just hoping that there is a directive that we can use to maintain
the authority section RRs' order.
--
David Lam
Security Administrator
Information Educational Technology
dav...@ucdavis.edu
(530) 752-6971
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