why not? beter handled by isc and done in a clean way then 1.000.000 of dirty ways as these ;)
------------------------------- Alberto Colosi IBM Global Business Services Sistemi Informativi S.P.A. IT NetWork & Security Department *-* *-* *-* SECURITY IS EVERYONE'S BUSINESS Member of IBM Information Security WW CoP Mark Andrews <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent by: [EMAIL PROTECTED] 04/12/2008 00.26 To [EMAIL PROTECTED] cc Subject Re: Dropping external recursive requests One needs to be really, really careful here. There are lots of unverifiable assumptions in the OP query. Also rd being set my just be the result of someone testing with a tool which sets rd by default. Going silent on a query reponses protocol is not a good idea. There are already too many firewalls / nameservers that do this to legitimate queries. We really don't want to encourage this sort of behaviour. If it is a forged packet it should be dropped regardless of the setting of RD. If the only reason to think the packet is forged is the setting of RD=1 then the OP has committed a reasoning error. Mark In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Chris Buxton writes: > That ought to work, and work well. > > This will not impact outside name servers that query your name server, > because they send iterative queries. If they're sending recursive > queries, they're abusing your server. I can't see any problems with this > approach. > > If you have authoritative data in the third view, make sure that when > the first view wants to look it up, its iterative query to the server > machine itself is routed through to the third view (rather than being > captured by the first view). > > Chris Buxton > Men & Mice > > On Tue, 2008-12-02 at 17:10 -0800, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > Our DNS server occasionally get requests for recursion with forged src > > addresses. > > Currently our server returns "Standard query response, Refused" since > > our named.conf > > only allows recursion for our internal machines. This, of course, > > results in the poor > > machine whose address was forged receiving spurious traffic. > > > > Some of the Cisco firewalls support DNS inspection and can be > > configured to drop > > requests which want recursion. What are the ramifications of enabling > > this? > > > > Can bind be configured to do this? I was thinking about something > > like: > > > > view "internal" { > > match-clients { localhost; localnets; }; > > ... > > } > > > > view "external-recursive" { > > match-clients { any; }; > > match-recursive-only yes; > > blackhole { any}; > > } > > > > view "external" { > > ... > > } > > > > -- John > > [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > _______________________________________________ > > bind-users mailing list > > bind-users@lists.isc.org > > https://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users > > _______________________________________________ > bind-users mailing list > bind-users@lists.isc.org > https://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users -- Mark Andrews, ISC 1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742 INTERNET: [EMAIL PROTECTED] _______________________________________________ bind-users mailing list bind-users@lists.isc.org https://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users
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