Greetings,

While reviewing this document during AUTH48, please resolve (as necessary) the 
following questions, which are also in the XML file.

1) <!-- [rfced] FYI, the title of the document has been updated as follows. 
Please review.

Original:
  RADIUS/1.1, Leveraging ALPN to remove MD5

Current:
  RADIUS/1.1: Leveraging Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) to 
Remove MD5
-->


2) <!-- [rfced] We have updated the abbreviated title of this document (which
appears in the header of the PDF output) to match this document's full
title. Please review to ensure this change is accurate.

Original: RADIUSv11

Current:  RADIUS/1.1
-->


3) <!-- [rfced] Please insert any keywords (beyond those that appear in
the title) for use on https://www.rfc-editor.org/search. -->


4) <!-- [rfced] To avoid the double negative, may the phrase "not known to be
insecure" be updated to "known to be secure" in the two instances below?
(FYI, we changed "there" to "their" based on the context.)

Original: 
   While the use of MD5 in RADIUS/TLS is not known to be insecure, it
   can be difficult for individual organizations to perform
   cryprographic analyses of the protocols that they use.  It is much
   simpler and more practical to simply verify that there insecure
   digests such as MD5 are not used anywhere in the system.  Then by
   definition, the systems are at least not known to be insecure.

Perhaps:
   While the use of MD5 in RADIUS/TLS is known to be secure, it
   can be difficult for individual organizations to perform
   cryptographic analyses of the protocols that they use.  It is much
   simpler and more practical to simply verify that their insecure
   digests such as MD5 are not used anywhere in the system.  Then by
   definition, the systems are at least known to be secure.
-->


5) <!-- [rfced] FYI - We have updated the second item in the list below for
parallel structure with the other list items. Please review and let us
know any objections.

Original:
   A preliminary implementation has
   shown that only minor code changes are required to support RADIUS/1.1
   on top of an existing RADIUS/TLS server implementation, which are:

   *  A method to set the list of supported ALPN protocols before the
      TLS handshake starts

   *  After the TLS handshake has completed, a method to query if ALPN
      has chosen a protocol, and if yes, which protocol was chosen.

   *  Changes to the packet encoder and decoder, so that the individual
      packets are not authenticated, and no attribute is encoded with
      the historic obfuscation methods.

Current:
   A preliminary implementation has
   shown that only minor code changes are required to support RADIUS/1.1
   on top of an existing RADIUS/TLS server implementation.  These
   include:

   ...

   *  A method to query if ALPN has chosen a protocol (and if yes, which
      protocol was chosen) after the TLS handshake has completed.
   
   ...
-->


6) <!--[rfced] Please clarify "default 4K packet size".
Does this refer to the 4096-byte maximum size or something else?

Original:
   *  The default 4K packet size is unchanged, although [RFC7930] can
      still be leveraged to use larger packets,
-->


7) <!-- [rfced] Section 2: For readability, we have adjusted some of the
definitions in this section to have a closer 1:1 relationship
between abbreviation and expansion. Please review.
-->


8) <!-- [rfced] Section 3.3: Please review the following questions regarding the
list that appears in this section.

a) Is this list intended to directly correspond to the preceding table 
(now Table 1)? If so, please let us know if it should be updated, as
"Configuration Variable Name" does not appear in the table.

Original:
   A more detailed definition of the variable and the meaning of the
   values is given below.

   Configuration Variable Name

      Version

b) May the "Values" text be reformatted for clarity? Perhaps it could 
be more clearly separated into 2 portions as follows.

Original:

   Values
      
      When the variable is unset, ALPN is not used.

      [...]

         Client Behavior
            [...]
         Server Behavior
            [...]

      Other values ("1.0", "1.0, 1.1", "1.1", etc.)

         Client Behavior
            [...]
         Server Behavior
            [...]

Perhaps:

   For "Value":
      
      (A) If unset, ALPN is not used.

          [...] 

          Client Behavior
            [...]
          Server Behavior
             [...]

      (B) If set to "1.0", "1.0, 1.1", "1.1", or future values:

          Client Behavior
             [...]
          Server Behavior
             [...]


c) Please clarify this usage of either / or / or else. Are there three
alternatives? (Also, seemingly "with" was meant to be "which"; we changed it
to "that".)

Original:
         The client will receive either no ALPN response from the server, or
         an ALPN response of one version string with MUST match one of the
         strings it sent, or else a TLS alert of "no_application_protocol"
         (120).

Option A ("either X, Y, or Z"):
         The client will receive either no ALPN response from the
         server. an ALPN response of one version string that MUST
         match one of the strings it sent, or a TLS alert of 
         "no_application_protocol" (120).

Option B ("X, Y, or Z"):
         The client will receive no ALPN response from the server, an
         ALPN response of one version string that MUST match one of
         the strings it sent, or a TLS alert of 
         "no_application_protocol" (120).
-->


9) <!-- [rfced] In the text below, how may we adjust the wording of "should be
reverted to using allow both" and "until such time as"?

Original:
   If there are connection issues, then the configuration should be reverted
   to using allow both "radius/1.0" and "radius/1.1" ALPN strings, until such
   time as the connection problems have been resolved.

Perhaps:

   If there are connection issues, then the configuration should be reverted
   to allowing both "radius/1.0" and "radius/1.1" ALPN strings, until the time
   that the connection problems have been resolved.
-->


10) <!-- [rfced] In the list that follows Table 2, would you like to 
add entries for "no ALPN" and "1.0"? We note they are the only 
table entries that are not listed.
-->


11) <!-- [rfced] What does "[RFC6614], Section 2.4 item (3)" refer to?
Is this intended to refer to a list item, a specific paragraph, or
otherwise?

Original:
   There are others ways to mitigate these risks.  The simplest is to
   follow the requirements of [RFC6614], Section 2.4 item (3) and
   [RFC7360], Section 10.4, which mandates that RADIUS over TLS
   implementations validate the peer before sending any RADIUS traffic.
-->


12) <!-- [rfced] As Section 3.4 of RFC 8044 refers to the "text" data,
should the section number be updated to 3.5?

Original:
   Specifically, the MS-MPPE-Send-Key and MS-MPPE-Recv-Key attributes
   ([RFC2548], Section 2.4) MUST be encoded as any other attribute of data
   type 'string' ([RFC8044], Section 3.4).

Perhaps:
   Specifically, the MS-MPPE-Send-Key and MS-MPPE-Recv-Key attributes
   ([RFC2548], Section 2.4) MUST be encoded as any other attribute of 
   data type 'string' ([RFC8044], Section 3.5).
-->


13) <!--[rfced] As the keyword is RECOMMENDED rather than RECOMMENDS, 
how may this be rephrased? The preceding sentence is included for
context.

Original:
   When the Message-Authenticator attribute is missing from Access-             
          
   Request packets, it is often possible to trivially forge or replay           
          
   those packets.  As such, this document RECOMMENDS that RADIUS clients        
          
   always include Message-Authenticator in Access-Request packets when          
          
   using UDP or TCP transport.

Perhaps:
   When the Message-Authenticator attribute is missing from Access-             
          
   Request packets, it is often possible to trivially forge or replay           
          
   those packets.  As such, it is RECOMMENDED that RADIUS clients               
   
   always include Message-Authenticator in Access-Request packets when          
          
   using UDP or TCP transport.
-->


14) <!-- [rfced] Please review the following questions regarding the usage of
"etc." in the instances below.

a) Could this section title be updated to be more specific than
relying on "etc."?

Original:
5.4.  CHAP, MS-CHAP, etc.


b) Similarly, should the first sentence of this section contain more 
list items before the "etc."?

Original:
   While some attributes such as CHAP-Password, etc. depend on insecure
   cryptographic primitives such as MD5, these attributes are treated as
   opaque blobs when sent between a RADIUS client and server.  


c) May we update this text as follows so that "etc." does not interrupt 
the noun/adjective pair "encoding schemes"? If not, please provide 
other text.

Original:
   So long as any future specification uses the existing encoding, etc.
   schemes defined for RADIUS, no additional text in future documents is
   necessary in order to be compatible with RADIUS/1.1.

Perhaps:
   So long as any future specification uses the existing schemes for encoding,
   decoding, etc., that are defined for RADIUS, no additional text in future
   documents is necessary in order to be compatible with RADIUS/1.1.
-->


15) <!-- [rfced] For conciseness, may we condense these two sentences into one?

Original:
   A server implementing this specification can proxy CHAP, MS-CHAP,
   etc. without any issue.  A server implementing this specification can
   authenticate CHAP, MS-CHAP, etc. without any issue.  

Perhaps:
   A server implementing this specification can proxy and authenticate CHAP,
   MS-CHAP, etc. without any issue.
-->


16) <!-- [rfced] FYI, "to" has been removed from "forward it to over a
different connection" in this sentence. Please let us know if it 
does not convey the intended meaning.

Original:
   Clients MUST NOT forward the packet over the same connection, and SHOULD
   NOT forward it to over a different connection to the same server.

Current:
   Clients MUST NOT forward the packet over the same connection and SHOULD NOT
   forward it over a different connection to the same server.
-->


17) <!-- [rfced] References:

a) FYI, RFC 5077 (which was obsoleted by RFC 8446) is cited once in 
this document in a block quote. We added a sentence after the
quoted text to note that fact.

b) FIPS 140 is mentioned throughout this document but is not listed as
a reference. May we add it as a reference? In addition, may we
update "FIPS-140" to "FIPS 140" for consistency with this reference?
-->


18) <!-- [rfced] Please review the following questions and/or changes regarding
the terminology used in this document:

a) We note the use of both single (') and double (") quotes around data types
in this document. For consistency with RFC 8044, would you like to update to
double quotes?

Examples from this document:

data type 'string' ([RFC8044], Section 3.5)
data type 'text'
'text' data type in [RFC8044], Section 3.4
"text" ([RFC8044], Section 3.4) or "string" ([RFC8044], Section 3.5).


b) Because "ALPN" is "Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation",
"ALPN negotiation" seems redundant. May we remove the word 'negotiation' 
in the following examples?

performing ALPN negotiation
ALPN negotiation issues.
Figure 1: Possible outcomes for ALPN Negotiation


c) FYI, we have updated the formatting of the values below for consistency
with other instances in the document. Please review to ensure these changes
are correct.

Original:
... with value Unsupported Extension (406).  
... with value 502 for "Request Not Routable (Proxy)"
... with value 202 for "Invalid EAP Packet (Ignored)".

Current:
... with value 406 (Unsupported Extension).
... with value 502 (Request Not Routable (Proxy)).
... with value 202 (Invalid EAP Packet (Ignored)).
-->


19) <!-- [rfced] Abbreviations:
Per Section 3.6 of RFC 7322 ("RFC Style Guide"), abbreviations must be
expanded upon first use.

a) Should "CoA-NAK" be expanded as "Change-of-Authorization Negative 
Acknowledgment", or otherwise?

Original:
   The Error-Cause attribute is defined in [RFC5176].  The "Table of
   Attributes" section given in [RFC5176], Section 3.6 permits that
   attribute to appear in CoA-NAK and Disconnect-NAK packets.  

b) Is this handling of "EAP-pwd" and "EAP-TTLS" accurate?

Original:
   Another way to mitigate these risks is for the system being
   authenticated to use an authentication protocol which never sends
   passwords (e.g.  EAP-pwd [RFC5931]), or which sends passwords
   protected by a TLS tunnel (e.g.  EAP-TTLS [RFC5281]).  

Perhaps:
   Another way to mitigate these risks is for the system being authenticated
   to use an authentication protocol that never sends passwords (e.g., an
   Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) method like EAP-pwd [RFC5931]), 
   or one that sends passwords protected by a TLS tunnel (e.g., EAP Tunneled
   Transport Layer Security (EAP-TTLS) [RFC5281]).


c) FYI, we have added expansions for the following abbreviations
upon first use. Please review to ensure correctness.

   Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP) 
   Microsoft CHAP (MS-CHAP)
   Protected Extensible Authentication Protocol (PEAP) 
-->


20) <!-- [rfced] Please review the "Inclusive Language" portion of the online 
Style Guide <https://www.rfc-editor.org/styleguide/part2/#inclusive_language>
and let us know if any changes are needed.  Updates of this nature typically
result in more precise language, which is helpful for readers.

For example, please consider whether "traditional" should be updated for
clarity in the instances below. Would "historic" be an acceptable
replacement? (We note this document already uses "historic" many times.)

While the NIST website
<https://web.archive.org/web/20250214092458/https://www.nist.gov/nist-research-library/nist-technical-series-publications-author-instructions#table1>
indicates that this term is potentially biased, it is also ambiguous.  
"Tradition" is a subjective term, as it is not the same for everyone.

205:   The following items are left unchanged from traditional TLS-based
771:   from traditional RADIUS.  This protocol is only used when
-->


Thank you.

RFC Editor/kf/ar


On Apr 3, 2025, rfc-edi...@rfc-editor.org wrote:

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Updated 2025/04/03

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--------------------------------------
RFC9765 (draft-ietf-radext-radiusv11-11)

Title            : RADIUS/1.1: Leveraging Application-Layer Protocol 
Negotiation (ALPN) to Remove MD5
Author(s)        : A. DeKok
WG Chair(s)      : Margaret Cullen, Valery Smyslov
Area Director(s) : Deb Cooley, Paul Wouters

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