Marlison, Thank you for taking the time to read the JCC Consulting, Inc. web page and to discover that in addition to database consulting, I’m involved in the US and international standards development efforts for database languages. My 30 years of helping to develop the SQL standard has given me a strong appreciation for precise and complete definitions. However, none of that really applies ARIN.
If you want to understand how ARIN is set up and its restrictions, read through ARIN’s Documents: • Bylaws (https://www.arin.net/about/corporate/bylaws/) • Articles of Incorporation (https://www.arin.net/about/corporate/documents/incorporation/) If you want to better understand the history of how ARIN and the other Regional Internet Registries were created, there is a bit of information at https://icannwiki.org/American_Registry_for_Internet_Numbers. There should be more RIR history around, but I’m not sure where. You asked: If the ARIN’s current practice includes the flexibility, investigation, and communication about BGP Hijacking, why is the development of such a policy out of scope as well as the legal right to carry it out? ARIN is currently handling BGP/Route hijacking issues by identifying issues and communicating with the appropriate parties. Those parties cooperate with ARIN because it is in the best interest of the internet as a whole, not because ARIN has legal authority over those parties. I do not yet see how to codify either the BGP hijacking problem or the appropriate response to that problem into an ARIN policy that has the flexibility to be as effective as ARIN’s current informal process. Keith From: Marilson Mapa [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Tuesday, May 7, 2019 4:06 PM To: Keith W. Hare <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Subject: Re: [arin-ppml] [EXT] Re: Open Petition for ARIN-prop-266: BGP Hijacking is an ARIN Policy Violation Hi Keith, After all an exempt comment. No disparagement without ulterior motives and respectful. You are a rare bird. INCITS must have been successful in recognizing efforts and professional dedication. But we're not perfect, right? > you will find that ARIN has a very narrow scope and no legal power to > enforce anything outside of its narrow scope. Any policy needs to take that > narrow scope into account. Tell me Keith, who wrote this scope? Was this scope imposed by some supreme authority or was it written by members of the community itself? > The License will terminate automatically upon any breach by you of the terms > of this Policy. > A failure by JCC to enforce any of its rights under this Policy is not a > waiver of those rights or any other rights JCC has under this Policy. This scope was written by you on the JCC. Tell me, is it pro forma or is it for real? > I recommend reading this blog. I read Keith and there is a speech that continues to resonate in my head: “The main reason that ARIN does not report... does not report... does not report… And: “ARIN takes route hijacking very seriously, and does work, where possible, to address these issues.” This is not the stance shown by the ARIN advisors on the list. > ARIN’s current practice… …includes the flexibility, investigation, and > communication… If the ARIN’s current practice includes the flexibility, investigation, and communication about BGP Hijacking, why is the development of such a policy out of scope as well as the legal right to carry it out? “JCC delivers on time and within budget. JCC brings to projects, not only knowledge and experience, but also software tools and a robust development and testing environment.” “Successful projects begin with an architecture based on a thorough understanding of the component parts and how they interact.” Who honored the above principles received the INCITS Award. What prize would you give to ARIN? GoldenPoo? Marilson Em ter, 7 de mai de 2019 às 10:52, Keith W. Hare <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> escreveu: Marilson, I have not yet seen a complete clear consistent definition of BGP/Route hijacking. Such a definition is a prerequisite to defining a meaningful policy. If you read through ARIN’s Documents: • Bylaws (https://www.arin.net/about/corporate/bylaws/) • Articles of Incorporation (https://www.arin.net/about/corporate/documents/incorporation/) • Policy Development Process (https://www.arin.net/participate/policy/pdp/) • Number Resource Policy Manual (https://www.arin.net/participate/policy/nrpm/) you will find that ARIN has a very narrow scope and no legal power to enforce anything outside of its narrow scope. Any policy needs to take that narrow scope into account. So, within ARIN, a policy proposal needs to: • Clearly define what the proposal is attempting to address • Fit into ARIN’s narrow scope Yesterday, John Curran provided a link to a blog describing ARIN’s current practices with regard to handling reports of potential route hijacking: https://teamarin.net/2019/05/06/how-does-arin-handle-reports-of-route-hijacking/ I recommend reading this blog. To me, ARIN’s current practice is a good way of responding to BGP/Route hijacking reports. It includes the flexibility, investigation, and communication necessary to identify and correct issues. The current practice works by using communication and persuasion. It has the advantage that the details are not codified in policy and so can adjust depending on the actual details and intent discovered during the investigation. Keith From: ARIN-PPML [mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>] On Behalf Of Marilson Mapa Sent: Monday, May 6, 2019 11:41 PM To: Owen DeLong <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> Cc: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> Subject: Re: [arin-ppml] [EXT] Re: Open Petition for ARIN-prop-266: BGP Hijacking is an ARIN Policy Violation They say that there are more than 80,000 autonomous systems with about one million prefixes. The coexistence of this universe without the BGP seems impossible with equal operability. But the BGP has at its origin a critical design flaw. Whoever designed it or was ill-intentioned, or assumed that the world would have no borders, would have no economic geopolitical problems, and ISP managers would be a caste of people with unquestionable reputation. The vulnerability in BGP design allows any of these thousands of ISPs to hijack network traffic. But Hijack is not a result of system vulnerability. It is the result of the actions of malicious individuals or organizations and the result of the precariousness of a policy and its customary ill will (or bad intention?) In implementation. Mr. Owen, I'd like to be able to answer your questions, but I'm not an IT professional and my role is not to tell you how to solve such problems. My role is to charge solution and ethical behavior because I am your victim. Yesterday was "out of scope", today "there are no legal powers", tomorrow... only the devil knows. Mr. Ash's swamp is not on prop-266, it's on this corrupt internet that treats the population as beef cattle. Why so such resistance? Hmm?... Marilson Em seg, 6 de mai de 2019 às 03:42, Owen DeLong <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> escreveu: On May 4, 2019, at 15:02 , Marilson Mapa <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > I have no opposition to doing something if we can get a proposal that offers > something that ARIN can do. > The first step must be to identify what ARIN can do and accept what is beyond > ARIN’s mandate and capabilities. Owen, this is a position that will certainly be supported by all who have endured prop-266. With respect to items 3, 4 and 5 of your pronouncement, punitive rules could be imposed by ARIN in order to reduce illicit acts. The devil is in the details… What punitive rules do you see ARIN being able to enact that would have any real effect? How do you see those rules being enforced? Who would those rules be enforced on? Consider the typical situation: Organization A has an RSA with ARIN and is registered with resource X. Organization C has an RSA with another RIR and is registered with resource Y. Organization Q has no RSA with any RIR and advertises space X to Organization C. Organization Q presented Organization C with a fraudulent LOA from Organization A. Please explain what punitive rules ARIN could enact in this case. Please explain who ARIN would inflict what penalties on and how that would cause organization Q to stop? Please explain how ARIN becomes aware that Q’s LOA from A is forged? Please provide a detailed suggestion or at least enough of a blueprint that it can lead to actionable policy. Owen Marilson Em sáb, 4 de mai de 2019 às 16:09, Owen DeLong <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> escreveu: > On May 3, 2019, at 10:13 , Carlos Friaças via ARIN-PPML > <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > > > Hi, > > > On Fri, 3 May 2019, Andrew Bagrin wrote: > >> I'm curious why do people not want to let ARIN try to start getting involved >> to help resolve the issue of hijacking? I don’t accept the premise of the question. I think people are perfectly willing to see ARIN expand its involvement in resolving issues of hijacking to the extent that ARIN can have a meaningful impact on the situation. I think others in this discussion have a greatly inflated opinion of ARIN’s powers and capabilities in this regard. > > <proposer hat on> > > This is uncharted territory. Some people fear the unknown. I think that is overly dismissive and an inaccurate assessment of most of the opposition to this proposal. Indeed, IMHO, this is actually well charted territory as similar discussions of ARIN’s ability to curtail routing problems have been held before in this and other fora with the consistent outcome that after a period of education, most in the discussion arrive at the same conclusion: 1. Most of the resource hijackers are not those who have contracts with ARIN with one notable exception. 2. Those with a contract with ARIN generally are those who have committed resource fraud in order to obtain said contract with ARIN and upon sufficient proof, ARIN already has policies and procedures in place to reclaim the resources. 3. Stopping hijacking requires an action by those who run routers. ARIN does not run (many) routers. 4. ARIN does not control the businesses who run routers. 5. ARIN does not have the authority to dictate business practices to ISPs beyond those related to the maintenance of the ARIN registration database. 6. The theory that ARIN allocates exclusive rights to use number resources on some amorphous concept known as “the global internet” is a novel idea, but not particularly proximal to reality. >> Why would anyone be against ARIN having a process to help resolve these >> issues? Sure we can question how effective it will be, but anything will be >> more effective than nothing, and by actually doing, failing and learning, >> ARIN will only improve and refine the process. We will all learn from this. > > I've learned a lot between proposal versions in RIPE, LACNIC and ARIN. I have no opposition to doing something if we can get a proposal that offers something that ARIN can do. The first step must be to identify what ARIN can do and accept what is beyond ARIN’s mandate and capabilities. Owen _______________________________________________ ARIN-PPML You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the ARIN Public Policy Mailing List ([email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>). 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