In message <[email protected]>, Michael Peddemors <[email protected]> wrote:
>.. and given the >large increase in nefarious actors on the internet, it is important to >have accurate information on the responsible party for that part of the >internet. > >I for one want to see ARIN do more, and be given a mandate to enforce >the given requirements already in place. As should be evident to anybody who has been paying attention, I agree completely. And it isn't just me. Not by a long shot. It should be self-evident also that essentially every member of the law enforcement community, at all levels, would also like to see, if anything, the existing SWIP rules strengthened, rather than diluted, and, more importantly, would like to see them actually enforced someday. Unfortunately, as the examples I gave, of 69.162.115.240/28 and 69.162.77.192/29, vividly illustrate, not only are the existing rules being openly flouted, but they are even being *brazenly* flouted, by at least some crooked providers... in this case Limestone Networks... who, for all I know, are selling identity protection services to criminals, as would appear to be the case here. (If anyone wants all of the particulars about the specific bad actors that are hiding out within the two blocks in question, and/or their direct links to an active and ongoing malware distribution operation, you can contact me off list and I will provide details.) Of course, Limestone Networks and its clearly non-residential "residential customer" are far from the only example I could cite here. It just happens to be among the most brazen and obvious. A fuller listing of all of the active identity concealment services that are, as we speak, being provided by entities holding direct ARIN allocations (and to various flavors of bad actors / criminals) would be so lengthy that I'm sure nobody here would bother to read it. In my more idealistic moments, I like to believe that we all have a shared and common interest in the security of the Internet as a whole. Few of us find the ongoing presence of spammers, hackers, and malware distributors to be directly beneficial. But clearly there are exceptions. Some holders of direct ARIN allocations are provably and unambiguously profiting from ignoring even the minimal and ineffectual SWIP rules that are currently on the books, and are doing so consciously, and in clear cooperation with bad actors, as a paid "service" to protect the true identities of these bad actors. Apparently, this is all exactly how the ARIN community wants things to be... nevermind the obviously negative effects to the security of all of us, and nevermind the general disrepute that these few "bad apple" providers bring to the ARIN community as a whole. The community makes sure that nobody, least of all the bad apple providers, will ever have to do or document anything that they don't much feel like doing or documenting, and the bad apple providers then, in turn, drive their proverbial trucks through the gaping loopholes in the rules and/or their enforcement, and thus profit handsomely by selling identity protection services to snowshoe spammers and malware distribtion operations, presumably for some additional premium, addded on top of the price for the usual and customary provision of non-cloaked services. I like to think that someday the vast majority of law-abiding and rule-following members of the ARIN community are going to wake up and realize that a small minority (<5%) of ARIN direct allocation holders are responsible for the vast majority (>95%) of all of the problems on the Internet, and that at some point the majority will at last conclude that enough is enough, and that all of these clever "hide the ball" games and shenanigans should finally, seriously, be ended. But I'm realistic enough to know that that day is not today. As with most problems faced by mankind... including global warming... things are going to have to get much much worse before they get any better, and the only thing that has been shown, over time, to reliably motivate homo sapiens to get up and out of their comfortable barcoloungers is a crisis that can no longer be ignored. I wish for once that we humans could be smart enough to act to solve at least this one evident problem early, i.e. -before- things reach crisis proportions, but in this case that doesn't seem at all likely. Would that it were otherwise. Regards,. rfg _______________________________________________ PPML You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the ARIN Public Policy Mailing List ([email protected]). Unsubscribe or manage your mailing list subscription at: http://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/arin-ppml Please contact [email protected] if you experience any issues.
