On Dec 4, 2014, at 2:43 PM, William Herrin
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On Thu, Dec 4, 2014 at 1:53 PM, John Curran
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
> Parties are likely to use RPKI services such that (as someone put
> it recently) - "routing decisions are affected and breakage happens”
>
> While such impacts could happen with whois, parties would have to
> create the linkages themselves, whereas with RPKI it is recognized
> that the system is designed to provide information for influencing of
> routing decisions (a major difference, and one that a judge could be
> made to recognize if some service provider has a prolonged outage
> due to their own self-inflicted Whois data wrangling into routing filters.)
Hi John,
So along the risk line with whois at one end and spam RBLs at the other, RPKI
sounds almost identical to the risk of deploying DNSSEC. Or am I missing
something that makes RPKI more risky?
Bill -
You asked for a comparison between whois and RPKI in terms of
risk profile and I provided that. ARIN doesn’t run spam RBLs, but
you can seek out those who do and ask them why they think that
may be more risky than RPKI services, if you so wish.
/John
John Curran
President and CEO
ARIN
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