On 15/04/2025 17:25, Fries, Steffen wrote:
Hi Gorry,
Thank you for your comments. I put the reaction inline marked with [stf].
@mcr, thank you for pushing the email out.
We will incorporate the changes as indicated below in the next version. The
intermediate version is available onhttps://github.com/anima-wg/anima-brski-prm. We
will incorporate the changes into this version likely tomorrow. Diff with version
18:https://author-tools.ietf.org/diff?doc_1=draft-ietf-anima-brski-prm&url_2=https://raw.githubusercontent.com/anima-wg/anima-brski-prm/refs/heads/main/draft-ietf-anima-brski-prm.txt.
Best regards
Steffen
Please see bcomments elow after reading rev -19.
-----Original Message-----
From: Michael Richardson<mcr+i...@sandelman.ca>
Sent: Tuesday, April 15, 2025 5:23 PM
To: Gorry Fairhurst<go...@erg.abdn.ac.uk>; The IESG<i...@ietf.org>; draft-
ietf-anima-brski-...@ietf.org;anima-cha...@ietf.org;anima@ietf.org;
i...@kovatsch.net;t...@cs.fau.de
Subject: discuss comments from Gorry
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-anima-brski-prm/ballot/
The comments from Gorry did not get to the mailing list and are not in the
archives.
We were confused by this, until we saw that it says "Not sent" in the upper
corner.
I didn't know that was an option, or a thing, and I'm guessing maybe
Gorry didn't either. I wondered perhaps if the plumbing failed, but I guess
intentional.
Here they are for the purposes "of the tape" (archive) his comments:
----
Thank you for preparing this document. I have the following four questions where
I'd appreciate more clarity in the text:
1. The text says: “SHOULD NOT provide information beneficial to an attacker”.
I don’t understand the RFC 2119 SHOULD recommendation. To me, the current
text does not say what actually has to be done, or what ought not to be done
(e.g.
citing some suitable RFCs to help clarify what is needed). Also I do wonder
whether this be a “MUST”? (i.e., under what conditions is it considered good to
provide information to benefit an attacker?). Could this just be wisdom -
e.g.”needs to avoid”, rather than a protocol requirement?
[stf] correct finding, the normative language is wrong here. Proposal to replace
OLD
SHOULD NOT provide information beneficial to an attacker
NEW
should not provide information beneficial to an attacker
OK - Thanks, I see this was included, I have removed this item from my
ballot.
2. “TLS 1.2 MAY be used”, please could you explain why this is only "MAY"
rather than being stronger, noting draft-ietf-uta-require-tls13 and RFC 9325,
which
asserts that TLS 1.3 is in widespread use.
[stf] Discussion to that already started on UTA and ANIMA WG list. Main
motivation in BRSKI-PRM as extension to BRSKI, is to keep backward
compatibility and provide the same requirements as the RFC 8995 and also the
availability of TLS 1.3 in existing frameworks.
I don't think was addressed by text in the draft. I also see another
DISCUSS relating to this topic.
3. I could not understand the protocol action of the “MUST” requirement below
(i.e.
what does “available” mean for a RFC2119 requirement?:
“if the certificate chain
is not included in the x5c Header Parameter, it MUST be available
at the domain registrar for verification”
Please consider changing this text, for instance text like the following could
be
helpful:
“if the certificate chain is available at the domain registrar for
verification, it MAY be omitted from the x5c Header Parameter“.
[stf] okay, understood. The intention was to underline that if the information
is not available in the response, it must be available at the registrar to
enable validation of the response.
Your reply explains what is needed, but it did not really address the
use of the RFC2119 requirement, becuase the current text only states
this needs to be present, rather than what action is needed when it is
not present.
I expected a formulation more like:
<< XXX needs to be available at the domain registrar for verification...
... If X is not available, the domain registrar MUST YYYY>>
Where YYY is the protocol action that you require.
I have updated this item from my ballot.
4. Please update the text to explain/clarify:
“The registrar MAY consider ignoring any but the newest PER
artifact from the same pledge in case the registrar has at any point
in time more than one pending PER from the pledge?"
I don't understand the requirement from the text, please explain: For
example, could this perhaps be a RFC2119 requirememnt: "MAY ignore" .. and
then add text to describe when this is allowed (or not).
[stf] agreed, will be updated accordingly
OK - Thanks, I have removed this item from my ballot.
Comment (2025-04-10) Not sent
1. There appears to be some slight format problem with the bullets I saw listed
in
my rendering:
“such as: * Avoid
logging personally identifiable information unless unavoidable. * Anonymize or
pseudonymize data where possible.”
[stf] agreed, will be repaired
Done, thanks.
2. I did not understand the list of three security considerations at the start
of
section 12. At least, it would be very helpful to explain these in sufficient
detail to
understand each, and also helpful to understand the implications for users of
each.
Some words to clarify would be very helpful.
[stf] It was intended as an intro to the following subsections. Proposal to
update from
OLD
Further security aspects are considered here related to:
NEW
Further security aspects considered in the following subsections related to:
Thanks.
3. Please could you add text to explain “no transport layer security between
Registrar-Agent and pledge..” e.g., please explain: Is this something that users
ought to add to a design? how? why? is it a desirable property? Why?
... or is this intended to be explained more in the next subsections?
... Especially since 7.1 speaks of optional use of TLS.
[stf] We tried to explain the optional usage of TLS in section 7.1 and section
11 to underline that it is recommended to be used if there are privacy
requirements to be addressed. The utilized self-contained objects are integrity
protected but still readable. If there is sensitive information included (user
names, etc.) confidentiality is likely desired and can be provided using TLS.
My problem here is I don't understand what :"no transport layer security
between...:" actually refers to. I think the text needs explained more.
A reference to section 7.1 would be helpful also.
4. Please update the text to clarify what is intended by: “Pledges MAY support
both initiator and responder mode.” Is this MAY intended to permit
*both* of the modes, or *either* of the modes, or something else?
[stf] good point, this is more a pledge capability question and not intended as
normative may. Proposal to change from
OLD
Pledges MAY support both initiator and responder mode.
NEW
Pledges may support both initiator and responder mode.
OK
5. Please consider updating the text:
“503 Service Unavailable: if a simple retry of the Registrar-Agent
request might lead to a successful response; this error response
SHOULD include the Retry-After response header field with an
appropriate value”
- Why is this not a MUST, if there is a reason, please explain the
alternative and when this is a suitable response.
[stf] Good point. Proposal to change to MUST.
I didn't see this change.
Best wishes,
Gorry
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