Deb Cooley <debcool...@gmail.com> wrote:
    >> I don't understand your comment.
    >> Mutual Authentication = Server Authentication + Client Authentication.
    >> In section 7.3, paragraph we are explaining that the client 
authentication
    >> uses a different kind of key.

    > [DC]  I guess you could add that to the terminology section.  From what I
    > could see you are using mutual auth and client auth interchangeably.

okay, that's a bug, and we discussed it today about how to make it clearer.

    > Although, I'm not sure even I understand what it means for client auth to
    > use a 'different kind of key'.

poor choice of words on my part!

I mean, the registrar-agent certificate might be from a different CA:
an IDevID rather than an LDevID for instance.

We imagine the Registrar-Agent is likely an APP running on some rugidized 
tablet.
I think that Registrar-Agents will be provisioned over EST in that situation,
with a more traditional RFC7030 password authenticated flow.
BUT, if the tablet had an IDevID in it, then BRSKI could be used.
Few off-the-shelf tablets would come with an IDevID [%], but a bespoke tablet
might well come that way.

We've agreed to remove the paragraph in question, which was trying to
clarify, but it clearly only confused.

==== stop here

[%]- I have been thinking a lot over the past 3-4 years about how to get an
     IDevID-ish object deployed into virtual appliances, or smart-device apps.
     I tested the waters for WIMSE, whether or not that fit into it's
     charter, and it seems to be unclear.   But there is a fundamental
     existential question: what does it mean for vendor X to say that object
     Y exists, if object Y can be snapshotted, cloned and downloaded again
     and again?   Vs defending against spammers/DoS.
     Today, private keys are built-in to apps and that key might be used to
     get a proper credential, but I'm very nervous about that.
     ps: please start a new thread here.

--
Michael Richardson <mcr+i...@sandelman.ca>   . o O ( IPv6 IøT consulting )
           Sandelman Software Works Inc, Ottawa and Worldwide




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