On Apr 10, 2025, at 10:21 AM, Salz, Rich <rs...@akamai.com> wrote: > The document tries to be careful about trying to move vendors to TLS 1.3, > while still recognizing that deployment issues may force the addition of TLS > 1.2. If a vendor is on TLS 1.0/1.1 this document doesn’t apply. > I am concerned that if we water this down more, just so some vendors can > claim compliance with an RFC, it will be ineffective if not useless.
That for me is the main issue. As Paul noted, vendors are already ignoring other RFC MUST requirements. They are likely to ignore this one, too. We should not be catering to people who violate the standards. My concern is that there are proposals to change the standard to match one use-case. There are many, many, other use-cases which will be affected by this change. There has been little acknowledgment of that by proponents of the change. I have some questions for the people who propose making TLS 1.3 a SHOULD for new protocols: * do we want one already non-compliant use-case to set the bar for security? * do we want to avoid mandating TLS 1.3 for every other use-case? * when will we be able to mandate TLS 1.3? I would suggest that the answers here are "no, no, and now". If the answers are "yes, yes, and never", then we might as well not publish this document. I would also suggest that there are no other combinations of answers. i.e. there is no intermediate position where we don't mandate TLS 1.3 now, but perhaps we will mandate it one day. I just don't see any of the current arguments against mandating TLS 1.3 changing in 10 or even 20 years. Alan DeKok. _______________________________________________ Anima mailing list -- anima@ietf.org To unsubscribe send an email to anima-le...@ietf.org
