this judgement is currently vacated due to the motion to reconsider, just to note for the class.
On Thu, Jul 2, 2020 at 11:36 PM Kerim Aydin via agora-official < agora-offic...@agoranomic.org> wrote: > status: https://faculty.washington.edu/kerim/nomic/cases/#3851 > (This document is informational only and contains no game actions). > > =============================== CFJ 3851 =============================== > > R. Lee attempted to perform a forbidden action in the message in > evidence. > > ========================================================================== > > Caller: G. > Barred: R. Lee > > Judge: Publius Scribonius Scholasticus > Judgement: TRUE > > ========================================================================== > > History: > > Called by G.: 19 Jun 2020 02:49:52 > Assigned to Publius Scribonius Scholasticus: 20 Jun 2020 00:26:04 > Judged TRUE by Publius Scribonius Scholasticus: 26 Jun 2020 15:49:22 > > ========================================================================== > > Caller's Evidence: > > R. Lee wrote: > > I intend, without objection, to amed the rules in the following > > inconsequential way: > > Amend every word in the ruleset except the rules at power 4 to read > > "Meep" > > > Caller's Arguments: > > In reference to: > Attempting a forbidden action is PROHIBITED, and is the Class-4 > Crime of Engaging in Forbidden Arts. > > We never really define "attempt" though we use it a lot in the rules. > Generally, if you begin the prerequisites of a process to do something > (i.e. announcing intent to perform an action in a legal way that begins a > waiting period) a person would say you're "attempting" to do it. ("What > was that announcement for?" "oh, e's attempting to win by apathy"). > > -------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Gratuitous Arguments by R. Lee: > > Merely thinking and planning to commit murder isn't attempted murder, the > acts carried out have to be "more than merely preparatory" (under English > law). The same applies to this analogous crime, merely preparing to take > the ossifying action is not an attempt; attempt is actually doing an action > (even if that action fails, as it would ossify Agora). > > The thing my proposal had to do with it was that it removed the bit that > said "intending to do a forbidden art is a crime" (or whatever). For what > it's worth under the common sense factors, the fact that making a formal > intent to do an action that would ossify the game was specifically removed > from the rule means that it is unlikely the rule is meant to still > criminalize it. > > rules tend to think intending anything you want is okay and criminalizing > formal intent is bad, see the No Faking rule (exempting intent) > > -------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Gratuitous response by G.: > > I submit, m'lud, that the fact that my learned opponent believed the > concept of "intent" was in the previous rule version shows that "attempt", > in a natural sense, coveys the sense of intent in the (unremoved) text. > > -------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Judge Publius Scribonius Scholasticus' Arguments: > > First, let's look at the common language definition of "attempt", one of > which is "[To] make an effort to achieve or complete".[0] By this > definition, it seems clear that, since an intent is an effort to > complete the intended action, R. Lee did attempt to perform a forbidden > action; however, we should also look to the use of "attempt" as a term > of art in jurisprudence. Here, we find possibly conflicting definitions: > "Any act that is more than merely preparatory to the intended commission > of a crime"[1] and "the crime of having the intent to commit and taking > action in an effort to commit a crime that fails or is prevented".[2] > The second of these is clearly fulfilled as R. Lee stated eir intent > publicly and took action towards the commission of the crime, but the > first rests upon whether the intent was "merely preparatory". Given that > the statement of intent was a necessary condition for the later > commission of the crime and could not have reasonably served any other > purpose, I find that the intent was more than merely preparatory. Given > that the three definitions are agreeable with respect to the > circumstances, we need not further analyze which is best to use. As a > result, I assign a judgment of TRUE to CFJ 3851. > > [0]https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/attempt > [1] "attempt." In **A Dictionary of Law**, edited by Law, Jonathan. : > Oxford University Press, 2018. > [2]https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/attempt#legalDictionary > > ========================================================================== > > -- >From R. Lee