On Wed, May 6, 2020 at 3:51 PM Rebecca <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > On Wed, May 6, 2020 at 3:41 PM Aris Merchant via agora-discussion < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> On Tue, May 5, 2020 at 10:26 PM Rebecca via agora-discussion < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >> > On Wed, May 6, 2020 at 3:11 PM Aris Merchant via agora-discussion < >> > [email protected]> wrote: >> > >> > > On Tue, May 5, 2020 at 9:16 PM Rebecca via agora-business < >> > > [email protected]> wrote: >> > > >> > > > On Wed, May 6, 2020 at 2:07 PM Rebecca <[email protected]> >> > wrote: >> > > > >> > > > > I CFJ: >> > > > > { CFJ 3828, which had the following statement, “A recent rule >> named >> > "A >> > > > > coin award" was enacted, increased >> > > > > the number of coins R. Lee owns by 1, and then repealed itself.” >> was >> > a >> > > > > "CFJ about the legality or possibility of a game >> > > > > action” under rule 2553, such that if a judgement of PARADOXICAL >> was >> > > > > assigned to it for seven days, the caller of the CFJ would win the >> > > game} >> > > > > >> > > > > I don't think anything is INSUFFICIENT here, so I'm not going to >> > > provide >> > > > > much argument/evidence. A good argument was made by G., below. And >> > the >> > > > CFJ >> > > > > statement and rule quote is given here so you don't need to go >> > looking >> > > > (I'm >> > > > > not CFJing whether a judgement of PARADOXICAL was in fact >> assigned, >> > so >> > > no >> > > > > need to look for that either) >> > > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > Sorry, I retract this CFJ and replace it with the following. >> > > > { CFJ 3828, which had the following statement, “A recent rule >> named "A >> > > > coin award" was enacted, increased >> > > > the number of coins R. Lee owns by 1, and then repealed itself.” >> was a >> > > "CFJ >> > > > about the legality or possibility of a game >> > > > action” under rule 2553, such that if a judgement of PARADOXICAL was >> > > > assigned to it for seven days, the caller of the CFJ would be >> eligible >> > to >> > > > win the game by announcement under rule 2553} >> > > > >> > > > I adopt G's argument as to this CFJ which I include below (the rest >> of >> > > > these words are eirs not mine) >> > > > >> > > > The CFJ statement began 'A recent rule named "A coin award" was >> > > > enacted...' which is a passively voiced action (active voice would >> have >> > > > been "Proposal XXX enacted a Rule...") . I think it's come up a >> couple >> > > > times recently in CFJs, that mere use of the passive voice doesn't >> > change >> > > > the fact that there's an action with an actor? >> > > > >> > > > Further, parsing the statement a bit gives 'A recent rule ... >> increased >> > > > the number of coins' which is definitely asking whether a rule >> > succeeded >> > > > in the action of coin-creation (a Rule creating a coin is >> definitely an >> > > > action, right?) So is a past tense "did X do Y?" close enough to >> "it >> > was >> > > > POSSIBLE for X to do Y at the time it is purported to have >> happened?" >> > > I'd >> > > > personally say yes because forcing the statement writing around >> > > > possibility is a mess compared to the straightforward "did X >> happen". >> > > >> > > >> > > Arguments: >> > > >> > > There is no way this is a CFJ about the possibility of a game action. >> To >> > > see why let's take a look at G.'s example. If the CFJ was "Rule XXX >> COULD >> > > do so and so", the answer would be yes, unless so and so involved >> messing >> > > with something secured. The question is whether Rule XXX actually >> *did* >> > so >> > > and so is a completely separate matter. Possibility implies a question >> > > about the power of an agent, and the only agent involved >> unquestionably >> > had >> > > that power. So a CFJ about whether the rule COULD do the action has a >> > > materially different outcome (trivially TRUE) and is thus a different >> > > question. Indeed, the reason the CFJ is PARADOXICAL is that the rule >> > COULD >> > > have done what the CFJ statement said it did, but it's impossible to >> > figure >> > > out whether it did that (or did something else instead). >> > > >> > > Onto the legality. Here, there's actually some question. It very much >> > > depends on how you define the term "legality". Whether a rule decided >> to >> > do >> > > something is certainly a legal question, and could be called a >> legality. >> > > However, I think the term "legality of a game action" probably refers >> to >> > > the matter of whether an action is legal or illegal. If this weren't >> > clear >> > > enough on its own, it is from the canon of noscitur a sociis, given >> the >> > use >> > > of the word "possibility" and the fact that possibility and >> > permissibility >> > > tend to go together. >> > > >> > > Bottom line here, whether something could happen and whether it did >> > happen >> > > are completely different questions. This is particularly relevant in >> this >> > > case, where one of the questions results in paradox and the other >> > doesn't. >> > > The rule could do everything that it might have done; the question of >> it >> > > actually did so is irresolvable without paradox. I respectfully opine >> > that >> > > the court should rule FALSE. >> > > >> > > -Aris >> > > >> > >> > This is a CFJ about the possibility of a game action. The statement for >> CFJ >> > 3828 was really three statements. If any were FALSE, the CFJ would be >> > FALSE. >> > 1: A recent rule called "A coin award" was enacted. For it to be >> enacted, >> > it needs to have been possible to enact this rule. Although the paradox >> > does not arise from this proposition, the proposition being present in >> the >> > CFJ still makes the CFJ "about" a possibility. >> > 2: [The rule] increased the number of coins R. Lee owned by one. For >> this >> > to happen, it needs to have been POSSIBLE for the rule, with the >> specific >> > text as enacted, to have awarded a player a coin. This is about the >> > possibility not of ANY rule giving a player a coin (trivially possible) >> but >> > the possibility of THIS rule giving a player a coin, which led directly >> to >> > the paradox.\\ >> > 3: The rule repealed itself. It was only POSSIBLE for the specific >> rule, as >> > written, to repeal itself if it did in fact award a player one coin. >> This >> > is basically nested with proposition two. >> > >> > It's true as Aris says that "possibility" implies a question about the >> > power of the agent. The problem with his argument is that the agent >> > referred to is the rule "A coin award" which had the exact same power as >> > any other rule: the ability to do what its actual text commands and no >> > more. >> >> >> This strikes me as the same as saying that a person has the power to do >> something by announcement only if they actually decide to go through with >> the announcement. The question of whether an agent could do something is >> the question of whether it could *if it wanted to*, and for a rule wanting >> to do something is the same as having its text say it. >> >> It gets worse! The text of the rule COULD lead to the lead to the effect >> happening! There's just no way to tell if it actually did, which is why >> the >> CFJ was PARADOXICAL. But the coin being awarded was one of the POSSIBLE >> outcomes of the text, we just don't know if it was the one selected. So >> even supposing that rules CAN only act in a manner compatible with their >> text, it's *still* trivially possible for the rule to act in the specified >> way in this instance. >> >> -Aris >> > It is impossible for someone to perform a game action by announcement > unless they announce it. That is a proposition "about the possibility of a > game action" (and it is a true proposition). > > If I said "rule 101 has just given me one coin", that would not be > possible. Rule 101 does not have any text that purports to give me a coin > and therefore it is impossible that it has given me one. This is how > English works. > > -- > From R. Lee > In fact, any CFJ about whether a game action happened or not is a CFJ about the possibility of a game action. If a game action didn't happen according to the rules, it is impossible that it happened. If it did happen or, like in this case, indeterminately could have happened, it is possible. -- >From R. Lee
