Erm... you might want to check this list again. You have it going 3, 4, 6,
7.
-Aris
On Wed, Jan 29, 2020 at 5:52 PM Alexis Hunt via agora-business <
agora-busin...@agoranomic.org> wrote:
> On Wed, 29 Jan 2020 at 13:45, Timon Walshe-Grey via agora-discussion <
> agora-discussion@agoranomic.org> wrote:
>
> > Jason Cobb wrote:
> > > RESOLUTION OF PROPOSALS 8287-8307
> > > =================================
> > >
> > > I hereby resolve the Agoran decisions to adopt the below proposals.
> >
> > NB: The F/A ratios on several of Proposals 8292-8307, and on the second
> > attempt at 8290, are incorrect because they do not take into account the
> > amendments to voting strength made by Proposal 8291. To be specific,
> > Alexis's voting strength falls to 3 because the Prime Minister now only
> > receives a bonus (which itself is now of 2, not 1) on proposals with a
> > ministry set, which none of these do, and G.'s voting strength rises to
> > 4 because the Speaker now receives a bonus on all decisions.
> >
> > This is not a formal CoE because I don't believe it changes the
> > outcome of any of the votes.
> >
> > -twg
> >
>
> Because there are multiple contradictory proposals in this batch (trying to
> change the voting strength range to different things), and because of the
> change of voting strengths, I would like to insist on correct resolutions.
>
> However, it's not clear to me that they're actually invalid, because of the
> serious ambiguity of what constitutes a "tally".
>
> Therefore, I instead submit the following proposal:
>
> Proposal: Clearer Resolutions (AI=3)
> {{{
> Amend Rule 208 (Resolving Agoran Decisions) by replacing the third and
> fourth items in the list with the following:
> {
> 3. It specifies the quorum of the decision.
>
> 4. It specifies all the valid ballots, and no invalid ballots, on that
> decision, as of the end of the voting period, including each ballot's
> author, eir voting strength, its vote, and, if the vote is a conditional
> one, the unconditional vote to which it is evaluated.
>
> 6. The total strength of all ballots cast for each non-PRESENT option.
>
> 7. It specifies the outcome, as defined by other rules.
> }
>
> [Note that the existing "more than one option" text is basically
> tautologically true and practically useless anyway. PRESENT is an option,
> so only a decision with no other options would only have one. And even if
> we changed it, we short-circuit single-candidate elections so we might as
> well just drop that text.
>
> This is the main point of the proposal; I apologize to the Assessor that e
> does perhaps not wish to do the additional work here, but it was a
> longstanding Assessor practice and, as we are getting into the space of
> highly variable voting power again, quite necessary.]
>
> Amend Rule 683 (Voting on Agoran Decisions) by appending the following
> paragraph to the end of the rule:
> {
> When used in reference to a person who has cast a vote on an Agoran
> decision, rather than to a person who is eligible to or otherwise might
> cast a vote, the term "voter" refers only to a person who has a valid
> ballot on that decision.
> }
>
> [This is slightly different from the existing definition, as it includes
> people whose votes were not valid but became valid, but such a scenario
> shouldn't happen and in any case, this lines up with existing language so
> as to prevent a weird situation where a person's vote counts towards the
> result but not quorum.]
>
> Amend Rule 955 (Determining the Will of Agora) by replacing the text "The
> outcome of a decision is determined when it is resolved, and cannot change
> thereafter." with "The outcome of a decision is fixed at the end of its
> voting period, after evaluating all votes whose values are determined only
> at the end of the voting period, and cannot change thereafter."
>
> [This prevents manipulation of voting strength post-decision from affecting
> the result because that's an absurd amount of power to offer an Assessor,
> to be able to delay or otherwise manipulate the timing of resolutions so as
> to modify voting strength after a resolution. It also simplifies eir job
> considerably by not requiring em to take into account the effects of
> proposals on voting strength as e resolves them, especially if a CoE
> results in different ordering of proposals.]
> }}}
>
