My gut feeling is that this is a bit overcomplicated. There are too many categories. Additionally, I dislike this sort of pragmatization. The generally platonic model has served Agora well the vast majority of the time. I don't have extended reasoning here, those are just my initial reactions.
-Aris On Mon, Jan 13, 2020 at 11:14 AM Alexis Hunt via agora-discussion <agora-discussion@agoranomic.org> wrote: > > Here's some outline I was thinking to move us towards a more pragmatic > model of law: > > Any question that arises as part of a dispute can be categorized into one > of the following: > > - Question of fact, divided into: > - Questions of natural fact, being facts which are true without reference > to the rules of Agora at all. Example: whether a player gave their consent > to a contract. > - Questions of legal fact, being facts which arise because of the rules > of Agora. Example: the state of a switch. > - Questions of law, being questions purely about the interpretation of the > law. Example: which of two clauses of the rules takes precedence. > - Questions of application (typically called "mixed fact and law" in > real-world law), being questions about the application of the law to the > facts. Example: whether or not an action is effective. > > A legal fact may be a legal fiction, which is a legal fact that overrides > natural fact(s) or other legal fact(s). Legal fictions must be created > explicitly and do not have indirect effects to ensure preconditions are > satisfied, for instance, a legal fiction that an asset is owned by someone > who cannot own it does not also create a legal fiction that they meet some > other criterion that allows them to own it. If the rules do not provide a > mechanism to get the fact out of the illegal state, it remains. > > [ This limited scope of legal fictions is intended to limit the complex > recomputations they might require. In thinking about this, I saw a > potential issue with the ratification rules as they exist: suppose an > agoran decision self-ratifies listing a non-player as a voter. This could > conceivably be argued to ratify that the person was a player at the time of > its initiation. But, if we once again moved the right to not play the game > to take precedence over ratification which is arguably an important change > in its own right, then the entire ratification could fail because of their > non-consent. Similarly, if a player's voting strength is listed wrong, > does that ratify that conditions exist to give em the necessary voting > strength? That could cause the ratification to fail if it is ambiguous, for > instance a player with two blots incorrectly listied voting strength 2 > could be ratified either as having a single blot or being Prime Minister. > When actually we want to limit the scope of the ratification to just the > value of the "voting strength" variable. ] > > Certain processes may give rise to Findings on questions. These amount to > binding interpretations of the game and world, and apply retroactively. In > particular: > > - Findings of Fact apply to the moment or period of time to which they > refer. Their binding effect may, however, extend temporally because, for > instance, a Finding that a player owns an asset necessarily implies that e > continues to own the asset until something causes em to lose it, and may > also imply that e has owned it for some period of time beforehand. > > [ As mentioned below, Findings of Fact subsume ratification. ] > > - Findings of Law are binding forwards in time. They may be persuasive to > events that predate the Finding but do not necessarily bind their > interpretation. They apply until the relevant law changes enough so that > they no longer apply (whether a Finding of Law continues to apply is itself > a question of law). > > [ The restriction of bindingness being forwards in time is to limit > recalculation and to allow for precedents to change by way of Findings of > Law. ] > > - Findings of Application are, like Findings of Fact, binding at the moment > or period of time to which they refer. They are not, however, capable of > creating legal fictions. > > Findings have some reasonable security property on them. Additionally, a > Finding cannot remove a player's ability to seek recourse through Findings > or otherwise make an inescapable change to the game. > > Ratification becomes a form Finding of Fact. A judge of an inquiry CAN, > without objection, make Findings as part of the development of the > arguments for their case. An objection does not, in and of itself, mean > that the judge should change eir reasoning. > > [ The primary purpose of this minimal use of Findings is to a) provide a > different basis for ratification and b) allow us to experiment with them in > the context of CFJs, without making them mandatory or undermining the > existing system. Wordsmithing on the anti-Lindrum protections would be > appreciated, but I think it probably should come in primarily via amendment > to R101. ] > > Alexis
