Okay, there are two CFJ 3644s. This one and the one regarding Humiliating Public Reminders (which appears as an Annotation in the FLR). Was this resolved?
On Thu, Oct 18, 2018 at 9:24 PM Timon Walshe-Grey <m...@timon.red> wrote: > ============================== CFJ 3644 ============================== > > Corona and D. Margaux made a Contract in the last 24 hours. > > ======================================================================== > > Caller: G. > Barred: D. Margaux > > Judge: twg > Judgement: TRUE > > ======================================================================== > > History: > > Called by G.: 29 Sep 2018 02:19 UTC > Assigned to twg: 01 Oct 2018 03:01 UTC > Judged TRUE by twg: 18 Oct 2018 11:24 UTC > > ======================================================================== > > Caller's Arguments: > > 1. Can we infer natural exchanges like this are Agoran contracts? > It would be cool if we could - that would make flexible "handshake > deals" be backed up by Agoran courts. > > 2. I think a contract is the only means of act-on-behalf that works - > by R2466 (Acting on Behalf), allowing it must be Rules-allowed and > is secured-2, and Rule 1742 (Contracts) is the only thing that allows > it. So it would be doubly-cool if things like this weren't blocked. > > ======================================================================== > > Judge twg's Arguments: > > The caller refers to the following thread of messages: > > On Fri, 28 Sep 2018, D Margaux wrote: > > I act on Coronas behalf to transfer all of Coronas liquid assets to me > > > > On Fri, Sep 28, 2018 at 5:52 PM Corona <liliumalbum.ag...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > > > > As I think I don't have the steel or whatever to pay upkeep for my > > > refinery, and am too busy/bored with Agora to micromanage my other > > > properties, I give permission to any player to act on my behalf to > transfer > > > all of my liquid assets to emself, until the end of this September. > > > > > > I know, I could just let myself get zombified, but the buildings > wouldn't > > > survive and that would be a shame. > > > > > > This is not binding, but if I were to return in the future, and the > economy > > > didn't go through some sort of reset, I would like the player who > claimed > > > the assets offered in this message to give me at least a part of them > back > > > so I don't have to start from scratch. > > > > > > ~Corona > > > > > -- > > D. Margaux > > > > This case presents a question of law: did Corona's and D. Margaux's > messages meet the requirements outlined by Rule 1742/19, "Contracts", > for this exchange to be considered a contract? If not, then the > caller's second argument is sound: D. Margaux's action would have been > INEFFECTIVE, as the only mechanisms provided by the rules for acting on > behalf are contracts and zombiehood. > > Rule 1742/19 states, in part: > > Any group of two or more consenting persons (the parties) may > make an agreement among themselves with the intention that it be > binding upon them and be governed by the rules. Such an agreement > is known as a contract. A contract may be modified, including > by changing the set of parties, by agreement between all existing > parties. A contract may also terminate by agreement between all > parties. A contract automatically terminates if the number of > parties to it falls below two. For the purposes of this rule, > agreement includes both consent and agreement specified by > contract. > > We can summarise the definition of "contract" to produce a list of > requirements that must be satisfied for this exchange to be considered a > contract: > > 1) Is it an "agreement"? > 2) Did Corona and D. Margaux consent to it? > 3) Did Corona and D. Margaux have the intention that it would be > binding upon them and governed by the rules? > > I will investigate each of these requirements in turn. > > First, do these message constitute an "agreement" between Corona and > D. Margaux? Rule 1742 says that "agreement includes both consent and > agreement specified by contract". However, to apply this as a definition > of a countable noun would suggest that "an agreement" can mean either > "a consent" or "an agreement specified by contract" - the first being > nonsensical and the second a circular definition. This court therefore > believes that the intent of this sentence is to define the _action_ of > agreement, viz. the method by which a contract may be modified or > terminated, and recommends that Rule 1742 be amended to reduce the > confusion caused by this terminology. > > Lacking a rule-bast definition for an "agreement", we thus turn to past > judicial precedent. In CFJ 3315, faced also with the problem of the lack > of definition for this word, the Honourable Judge scshunt noted that the > rules clearly assumed the existence of the external concept of an > "agreement", and held that: > > ...given the lack of reference to agreements within the rules, it > appears to be that the interpretation of "agreement" in this CFJ > and in the rules should be given maximum latitude, so djanatyn's > statement can be interpreted as an agreement (such an > interpretation being of questionable value for any purpose other > than the analysis of this inquiry, however). > > This court sees no reason to overturn the precedent set in CFJ 3315, > and therefore confirms the Honourable Judge scshunt's ruling. It is > clear that both Corona and D. Margaux believed this exchange of messages > to constitute a contract, as both took actions on the assumption that > D. Margaux's action to transfer Corona's liquid assets to emself was > EFFECTIVE; and therefore this exchange matched their understandings > of the concept of an "agreement". The first requirement for the > exchange to be considered a contract is therefore met. > > Secondly, did both Corona and D. Margaux consent to the agreement? > "Consent" is explicitly defined by Rule 2519/0, "Consent": > > A person gives consent (syn. consents) to an action when e, acting > as emself, publicly states that e agrees to the action. This > agreement may be implied, but only if it is reasonably clear from > context that the person wanted the agreement to take place. > > Corona stated that e "g[a]ve permission" to any player to fulfill the > other half of the agreement. This is an unambiguous statement of > consent. D. Margaux, meanwhile, attempted to perform an action that > would be POSSIBLE only if e did, in fact, consent to the agreement; > game custom is that this constitutes valid implied consent. Both Corona > and D. Margaux were thus consenting parties to the agreement. > > Finally, did both Corona and D. Margaux intend for the agreement to be > binding upon them and governed by the rules? Again, their later actions > confirm that they believed (and hence intended for) their agreement to > have been a contract, which by definition would have been binding upon > them and governed by the rules. > > The above requirements all having been met, I judge CFJ 3644 TRUE. > > ======================================================================== > > -- >From V.J. Rada
