On Sun, 4 Aug 2013, Fool wrote:
> It could be said that the example of Lacanist obscurity exists already in rule
> 217, although in a more postsemantic sense. The rules are contextualised into
> a textual subcultural theory that includes language as a reality. Therefore, a
> number of theories concerning Lacanist obscurity may be found.
'
The assertion of "common sense and best interests" in R217 rather belies any
application of obscurism, IMO. Obscurism is not a wholly different concept
from
any charge to find a personal exegesis of mystical text, should we choose to
follow that route (in my first Agoran post, I jokingly submitted a ditty
comparing
the Agoran ruleset to Torah - a passage describing Babylonian rabbis could
equally
compare to our arguments). Yet the charge to apply "common sense" would turn
us
against either formalism or the full deconstruction of text in the vain hope of
communicatable enlightenment: while Wittgenstein suggests we must pass over
[such things] in silence, R217 in fact provides a specific alternative to
silence
in establishing a communal common good (communal in that it is applied "for the
good of the game") and if language is to serve reasonable purpose, we should
strive for such a Middle Way in Rules interpretation, somewhere between strict
formalism and discarding reasonable linguistic meanings as being part that of
which we cannot speak.
Otherwise, there's really not much point to playing the game, or being a Person
at
all, really.
