On Sat, 22 Nov 2008, Alex Smith wrote: > However, there are other reasons why the > resulting contract might not take effect; effects of a contract which > rely on agreement to it (such as acting on behalf) won't work unless the > players in question have actually agreed to it, and violations of > amendments against the nature of the contract can't be punished by the > criminal courts (due to TITE) or the equity courts (due to the > punishment not going against the nature of the contract's original > intention).
Gratuitous Concurring Opinion (important concept here): Peter Suber's quote (thanks, Murphy!): "My rationale for requiring unanimous votes for amendment, initially, is to create a kind of social contract in which no player can be overruled until she consents to take the risk by switching to majority rule or some other system." The splitting of R101(iii) and (iv) is meant to follow this rationale, and the fact that there are explicitly two separate standards in (iii) and (iv) should be taken to Mean Something. You have to give explicit consent to join something in the first place. But once you agree to join something with non-unanimous change mechanisms, or if you are in something with unanimous change mechanisms and you agree to make the mechanism non-unanimous, you accept the risk and must live with the consequences--no blanket protection once you consent to be in (the only caveat being no secret surprises due to (iv)'s review clause). For TITE purposes, any contract that specifies a non-unanimous change mechanism has such change as part of its "original intention." Being inducted into a whole rules system whose jurisdiction you haven't agreed to be in is Mousetrapping. But once you've agreed to step into a jurisdiction, if you're put in trouble but a non-unanimous change method you agreed to be a part of, that's not a Mousetrap, that's Nomic. -Goethe
