On Wed, 12 Nov 2008, comex wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 12, 2008 at 1:10 PM, Kerim Aydin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> Ok, but entering into the spirit of this argument, if one contract
>> passes a value "valid FOR vote iff secret info = true" to another contract,
>> then even *if* the conditional involves uncertainty in the Agoran
>> gamestate, the receiving contract (and its internal state) just sees "vote
>> iff Conditional" where conditionals either aren't specifically permitted
>> by the contract, or are permitted, but in this case rely on unavailable
>> information. So why (from internal operation of werewolf) is the contract
>> not able to simply conclude "this conditional is invalid."?
>
> The receiving contract is intended to receive either "vote FOR"
> (unconditionally) or nothing at all. Either because the contract does
> or doesn't allow the AFO to act-on-behalf in the first place, or
> because the contract doesn't exist.
But does the werewolves contract care when it determines whether a vote
is an unclear/undetermined conditional? As a simple model, let's say
there's three entities: your contract, Agora, and Werewolves. There's
two models of the "gamestate split". The first model splits gamestate
into (a) and (b) the whole way along the line:
(a)You Vote --> Agora courts say Vote --> Werewolves say Vote
(b)You !Vote --> Agora courts say !Vote --> Werewolves say !Vote
In this case, the courts can "validate" a vote that then affects
werewolves and your scam works. The second version is:
(a)You Vote --> Agora courts say Vote ----> Werewolves say unknown
(b)You !Vote --> Agora courts say !Vote / conditional therefore !vote.
What's to argue for the first case? The non-legislated custom that we
maintain "platonic gamestates" as long as possible, and the idea that
Werewolves is "bound" by the rules, therefore splits as Agora splits.
What's to argue for the second case? First, Werewolves is in a sense
"independent" in that it is a contract subjected to B as well as Agora
and therefore can apply the conditional to the condition of the Agoran
courts. Second, the fact that case 2 can be resolved as a "conditional"
s.t. "this vote works if Agoran courts declare it works" and such
information is not likely to come in the voting period (the courts can
come back UNDETERMINED - a side note is that there's nothing to compel
Murphy to reveal information). Third, it is a "natural" reading under
equity so that interpretation can reasonably flex into inquiry, the
contract has a more compelling nature to be "bound by" equity. Most
telling to me is that "gamestate collapse" etc. is wholly custom and not
particularly legislated, whereas the fact that we should consider the
"natural and intended" reading in a contract is.
Finally, inquiry or equity, when you cross a border of what is "clear"
or "unclear", it is more "natural" in law to collapse an "uncertain
platonic gamestate" into saying that "the gamestate is (X or Y),
therefore the vote is unclear." rather than say "the gamestate is
clearly (X or Y) therefore the vote is clear (X or Y)." Further
remember that currently, Agoran Courts don't officially "change/
collapse the gamestate"--- as long as the court result is unknown
during the "voting period", the condition remains unknown to persons
(i.e. contestants).
In a sense this is a conflict between two agoran 'customs' on
resolving unclarity, and not a conflict between anything written in
the rules, I'd say the combination of "good of game" and "spirit of
equity" and "letter and spirit of what a CFJ decision is and does"
argues for the latter choice.
-Goethe
