On Fri, Jun 13, 2008 at 4:58 PM, Kerim Aydin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > The relevance to current controversies is that an explicit statement to > "not limit" (for rights) and "assumed to exist" (for privileges) does not > necessarily mean "grant" for a speech act. > > Rather, as the basis of an enlightened society, "natural rights" and > "privileges" are actions that persons are assumed to be able to perform > outside the rules, and calling them rights and privileges stops the rules > from preventing them from happening or punishing for them (acknowledges > then as being "inalienable"). But speech acts, being actually granted by > the rules, are not "natural" but rather constructed, so aren't autmatically > granted power when a right or privilege is recognized. > > If you look at CFJ 1955, there were three rights (judgement, agreeing, > and deregistering) that were found to require a mechanism (CAN) to be > inferred. For agreeing and quitting the game, we're just recognizing that > if someone quits the game (stops posting) or refuses to agree to something, > we can't force the issue (physically impossible). So the rules just > recognize that players can do the actions in question. > > Judgement is a little tricker (as it requires a formal process to exist) but > the use of the term "cause" in the right itself specifically acknowledges > that it is intended to create/infer a mechanism, while the others don't.
How about Rule 101 (vi), the right of participation in the fora? It is physically impossible for the rules to prevent me from posting to the fora- possible for the Distributor, perhaps, but not for the rules themselves. So, by this tack, the Rules are just reaffirming my natural right to post to the fora. Except that they don't. It has been judged that the rule only applies in the circumstance that I'm telling the truth. The right does not apply to lying, a distinction which does not exist in any sort of "natural law". Similarly with the right of refusing to agree to things. We do and can prosecute people for violating the Rules even if they have not agreed to them (see CFJ 2003), but not contracts. This distinction exists only because Rule 101 says it does. Now, it's really too bad that I didn't have the *right* to do what I wilt. Then, there are two intepretations of Agoran law possible: that I CAN do what I wilt by announcement, or that I just MAY. In the latter case, my right is reduced compared to the former, so Rule 101 forces us to pick the CAN. The "interpretation of Agoran law" clause, however, does not apply to privileges. I think, in fact, that not being able to be prosecuted for anything is sufficient that that privilege does materially exist, i.e. I benefit from it. Still, if I cannot amend rules by announcement, my privilege of doing what I wilt is severely curtailed compared to if I could. Does the last sentence of Rule 101's preamble-- about taking precedence over any rule which would allow restrictions of my rights or privileges-- along with the close, close proximity of privileges to rights imply that my privilege is to be interpreted as broadly as is reasonable? Certainly that is Agoran custom with rights. It's kind of too bad we don't have other privileges as precedent.
