Roman Danyliw has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-acme-onion-05: No Objection

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COMMENT:
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Thank you to Dale R. Worley for the GENART review.

** Per the normative Tor reference:
   [tor-spec] The Tor Project, "Tor Specifications",
              <https://spec.torproject.org/print.html>.

Is there any versioning to the protocol or timestamp that can be provided for
this bare URL

** Section 3.2.  Consider providing a reference to RFC2986 for PKCS#10.

** Section 4.
    instead the ACME server MUST attempt to
   calculate its CLIENT-ID as per Part "Client Behaviour" of [tor-spec].

The section name in [tor-spec] is “Client Behavior” – “American English”
spelling.

** Section 3.2.  What is the basis for the nonce needing to contain at least
64- bits of entropy

** Section 8.2.  Editorial.
    The reasons the author wishes to pursue this path in
   the first place are detailed in Appendix A.

Should this read s/The reasons the author wishes to pursue/The reasons the WG
pursued/ -- this is a consensus document.

** Section 8.5, 8.9, 8.9.1

-- Section 8.5   “A site operator SHOULD consider the privacy implications of
redirecting to a non-".onion" site”

-- Section 8.9 “Hidden Service  operators SHOULD consider the privacy
implications of this before requesting WebPKI certificates.”

-- Section 8.9.1. “… for internal or non-public services, operators SHOULD
consider using
   self-signed or privately-trusted certificates that aren't logged to
   certificate transparency.”

What does it mean to “SHOULD consider …” a topic?  This is an optional
adherence (“SHOULD”) to a non-binding review (“consider”).

** Section 8.9
   ACME client developers SHOULD warn
   users about the risks of CT logged certificates for hidden services.

How would this warning be accomplished?

** Section 8.9.2
   When an ACME client is registering to an ACME server it SHOULD
   provide minimal or obfuscated subscriber details to the CA such as a
   pseudonymous email address, if at all possible.

What does “SHOULD … if at all possible” mean?



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