Hi Ben, Thank you again for your comments; Yaron has just pushed -09 which should address most of them -- see below for the detail.
(I am merging this together with your Ballot email to have all the discussion in one place.) On 10/06/2021, 08:00, "Benjamin Kaduk" <[email protected]> wrote: > I think we are in agreement on the behavior of B in the respective > cases, and thank you for writing them out clearly to anchor the > discussion. I suspect that I'm just bothered by the word "decide" -- > to me it implies a choice among several possibilities, but most of the > time there is only one possibility that will actually work, and thus > not a real choice. (What with failure not being an option, and all ;) > If we instead used language along the lines of "might behave" for each > case, I don't think it would seem problematic to me. We changed "decide" to "might behave" as you suggest. On 09/06/2021, 23:59, "Benjamin Kaduk via Datatracker" <[email protected]> wrote: > Section 2.3.1.3 > > In order to indicate which specific delegation applies to the > requested certificate a new "delegation" attribute is added to the > Order object on the NDC-IdO side (see Figure 4). The value of this > > We might want to get the phrase "request object" in here somehow, since > we go on to talk about returning an error response, which is of course > only possible if there is a corresponding request. (The next section > does talk about the "request object created by the NDC"). Done. > Section 2.3.2 > > If the delegation is for a STAR certificate, the request object > created by the NDC: > [...] > * MUST have entries in the "identifiers" field for each delegated > name present in the configuration; > > Just to confirm: this is saying that the request/order must request a > certificate for all names covered by the delegation; it cannot request > only a subset of the names in the particular delegation object? On > first read this seems a bit restrictive, but I suppose it can make > state handling at the IdO easier since the information from the > delegation object can be used to construct the request to the actual > CA. (Similarly for the non-STAR case in ยง2.3.3, of course.) Yes. > The example delegation URL in Figure 4 doesn't match the URL structure > used for the example delegation list in Section 2.3.1.2. (This is not > inherently problematic, but could cause a small amount of reader > confusion.) The same identifier occurs in several subsequent figures, > as well. Done - with a cameo :-) > Section 3 > > Although most of this document, and in particular Section 2 is > focused on the protocol between the NDC and to IdO, the protocol does > affect the ACME server running in the CA. A CA that wishes to > support certificate delegation MUST also support unauthenticated > > Is it correct to say "non-STAR certificate delegation" here? (The > corresponding change needed to support STAR delegation would have been > done already to support non-delegated STAR issuance, if I understand > correctly.) I don't think the observation is correct: STAR issuance does not require the server to support unauthenticated GET. It is a feature that the client needs to request explicitly, and the server could refuse if it does not implement it -- or for any other reason. (See Section 3.4 of RFC8739.) Or have I misinterpreted your thought? > Section 7.2 > > The ACME account [...] > > Please double-check and confirm that the singular 'policy' and > '"delegation" object" are as intended here. IIRC we do allow multiple > delegation objects to be associated with a single account. Done, thanks for spotting this! cheers, t IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you. _______________________________________________ Acme mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/acme
