Owen Friel \(ofriel\) <[email protected]> wrote: deb> Again architecture: If the EST Server sits in front of a large deb> organization, then domain validation is more interesting, and the deb> Get /csrattrs may or may not be able to recommend a SAN, right? I deb> can see that policy oids could be provided, if that is a thing in deb> these systems. [we use policy oids in US DOD, but that is possibly deb> uncommon elsewhere.]
ofriel> That is also a fair point, for complex deployments its not clear
ofriel> what policy the EST server may want to apply before assigning a
ofriel> SAN. The text in section 3 currently states:
“EST servers could use this mechanism to tell the client what fields to
include in the CSR Subject and Subject Alternative Name fields”
ofriel> We could beef up that statement and explicitly state that the
ofriel> policy by which the EST determines the SAN to specify is
ofriel> explicitly out of scope. And also note that policy OIDs could be
ofriel> provided.
I would love to hear from operators and designers of CAs about how a
RA can communicate to the CA about things it doesn't like, or wishes to add,
to a certificate request.
The CSR is immutable, being signed by the EE requesting.
ACME doesn't provide any out-of-CSR mechanism, nor does CMC or CMP (correct
me if I'm wrong here!)... Max and I talked a lot about this when design
RFC8995,
and we had to conclude that it was simply non-standard.
In the case of ACP (RFC8994) use of BRSKI, like the Ford Model-T, the CSR may
contain anything the Pledge wants to put in, it will get an otherName
containing the encoded ACP IPv6 ULA.
In implementing, I also realized that the GET /csrattrs is pseudo-idempotent.
When first called, it needs to allocate an IPv6 ULA for that node, and it
needs to store it, such that whenever the same IDevID does the GET, it gets
the same answer. It's uncomfortable having to change database state on a
GET, but at least the result is cachable!
In the ACME integrations, we haven't said how the RA will decide what dNSName
SAN will be returned, but the same property will apply. The RA needs to
collect a CSR that it can pass along up ACME, and for which is can do dns-01
challenges.
--
Michael Richardson <[email protected]> . o O ( IPv6 IøT consulting )
Sandelman Software Works Inc, Ottawa and Worldwide
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